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Abstract
The thesis, based on research into written works, aims to de-essentialise the terms 
‘feminism’ and ‘fundamentalism’. Drawing on the growing anthropological evidence of 
a ‘feminist’ type activism within an Islamic framework, I analyse this global 
phenomena of Gender Activism. I explore the important intersections between gender 
activism and the Islamic revival. In order to give focus to the study and to highlight the 
specifics at the national level, I include case studies of gender activism in the context of 
increasing Islamism in present day Egypt and Iran. The Islamic revival has meant that 
the issue of gender has re-emerged as an area of conflict between, on the one hand, 
Western countries endorsing international human rights norms and, on the other hand, 
Muslim countries drawing on pre-modem Shari ’a Laws. The globalisation of Islam in 
the last two decades has resulted in the world-wide promotion of a particular model of 
the ‘Ideal Islamic Woman’. This model, which reflects the dominant discourse within 
Islamism, emphasises the inferiority and natural domesticity of women.
I look at how gender activists fight this restrictive monolithic image of women put 
forward by Islamists as being part of ‘true Islam’. Muslim women are reclaiming their 
history and religion for themselves. They have reinterpreted the Qur’an and Surma in 
radically new ways and have drawn upon the egalitarian propositions evident within 
them. Their work shows how during the spread of Islam in its first centuries restrictive 
interpretations were built into the Shar'iah by male jurists. This has resulted in an 
association of orthodox Islam with ‘patriarchy’. Today, Islamists in Egypt and Iran 
attempt to restore legal discriminations against women based on pre-modem Shari ’a 
Law. Gender activists are fighting such legislation unfavourable to women in the areas 
of marriage and divorce using religiously-based arguments. Islamist women 
themselves are actively involved in this battle against the dominant model of the ‘Ideal 
Islamic Woman’. The feminism of Islamist women provides a valuable warning 
against the persistence of Orientalist attitudes. It leads us to question the definition and 
very nature of religion and ‘feminism’.
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Preface
As a Muslim woman, I had for many years been confronted with the dilemma 
of trying to reconcile my beliefs in female autonomy with my faith. At the same 
time, coming from what might be perceived to be a rather a liberal and 
‘modernist’ background, I became increasingly bewildered by the image of the 
Muslim woman as projected by the Islamic revival. It seemed to me that for 
many Muslim women it was very difficult, if not nearly impossible, to reconcile 
what appeared to be two diametrically opposed ways of thinking: one’s faith in 
the religion of Islam versus one’s views of the total inherent equality between 
men and women in the social, economic and political spheres as well as in 
family life. The media exacerbated the divide by depicting an ever increasing 
polarisation between a gender inegalitarian Muslim world and a secular West.
Like many other women the world over I found myself asking whether it was 
actually possible to be a ‘Muslim feminist’. Even a decade ago such a position 
would have been untenable. However, in my quest for answers I discovered 
that the Islamic revival had in fact made many women deeply re-examine their 
faith. Consequently there now exist a number of serious attempts to reconcile 
feminism with Islam. Since I did not feel that my own training and knowledge 
of Arabic was sufficient for an in depth investigation into the Islamic texts 
themselves, I considered that it would be useful to analyse what others had 
written on the subject. Furthermore, since I had neither the resources nor the 
time to devote to an in-depth fieldwork study into Muslim societies, I was 
therefore forced to conduct my investigation largely on the written texts. My 
research has been inspired in the main by Dr. Riffat Hassan, who is a rare 
example of a Muslim woman theologian. What follows is an investigation into 
the work of scholars such as her who are all working courageously, and despite 
enormous pressure from conservative forces, to formulate an ‘Islamic 
feminism’ or ‘gender activism’. The following thesis is thus the result of a very 
personal quest for answers.
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A Note on Methodology
My research consisted mainly of the analysis of written texts. My initial survey 
o f the literature revealed the availability of material on a number of Muslim 
countries. Although I had hoped to cover a wide geographical area, however, 
in view of the sheer volume of material available I was forced to limit myself to 
in-depth study of two countries only. In my search for source material I 
consulted the libraries of the London School of Economics & Political Science 
(the B.L.P.E.S.) and the School of Oriental & African Studies, and the 
specialist collections of the following organisations: Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws; Women Against Fundamentalism; and, Change. I delved into 
numerous books, journals, pamphlets, magazines and newsletters. Further 
refinement of thoughts and ideas was achieved by contacting various individual 
‘experts’ - anthropologists, feminist activists and Islamic specialists - and 
organisations in order to seek their view-points. I had the opportunity to 
discuss many topics in depth with Muslims at the Islamic Societies and 
Women’s Study Circles of a number of British Universities. Certain limitations 
were imposed on my research due to the lack of access to original Arabic and 
Persian texts. However, translations were available for most of the material 
and many of the authors I was concerned with had chosen to write in English.
The development of my ideas was also supplemented and, I believe, enriched 
by many a discussion/debate/argument with colleagues, friends and family. My 
recent introduction into an ‘Islamist’ family environment has enabled me to 
gain a deeper and more in-depth knowledge of the Islamic revival on a first­
hand basis. Contrary to my expectations, my personal experience in this 
atmosphere has in fact served to dispel many of the assumptions and 
stereotypes I previously had of Islamist women. This interaction enabled me to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the views of Islamist women. Furthermore, I 
was forced to reflect on the diversity of forms and ideas evident within 
‘feminism’ and the religious revival.
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Glossary
Allah
Al-ziyy
al-Islami
Aql
Ayah
Bulugh
Burqa
Chador
Da'wa
Fatwa
Faskh
Fiqh
Fitna
Gharbzadegi
Hadith
Hajj
Hanafi
Hanbali
Literally, the one or oneness. Arabic word for God
Refers to a certain 'Islamic' dress code and largely consists of a 
variety of styles of headgear (and sometimes face coverings) and 
garments that are loose-fitting, ankle-length and long sleeved 
Sense, reason, understanding; rationality 
A verse in the Qu'ran
Maturity; attainment, arrival (at)
Middle East: refers to face mask, made of fabric or leather, 
which covers the entire face except for the eyes. In Indian sub­
continent: refers to garment covering the whole body, similar to 
a chador
A  square of fabric that falls from the top of the head to the 
ankles and is held or pinned closed under the chin.
Preaching; the inviting of others (specifically to the religion)
A formal legal opinion or decision issued by a religious leader (a 
mujtahid) on a matter of religious law 
Annulment (of marriage)
Islamic jurisprudence
Chaos, civil war. In some Arab countries, fithnq is also a slang 
term for a beautiful woman
Westoxication, fascination with the West
A saying of the Prophet Mohammad or a saying about him or 
his teachings by contemporaneous sources; tradition 
The pilgrimage to Makkah that all Muslims are obliged to make 
at least once in their lives, if they have the means to so do. Also, 
the month of the Islamic calendar in which the pilgrimage takes 
place
One of the four main schools of Sunni legal and religious 
thought
The strictest of the four main schools of Sunni legal and 
religious thought
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Hijab Literally, a curtain. Generally, refers to a code of dressing or 
more specifically the head-cover
'Idda Waiting period that all divorced or widowed women must
observe 
I jab Offer
Ijma' Consensus
Ijtihad Independent judgement in legal and theological matters
Imam Leader of community prayers. Also, among Shi'ites, the first
twelve leaders of their community were given the title. Many 
Iranians revived the term for the Ayatollah Khomeini 
Infitah Opening; specifically referring to Sadat's 'open-door policy' in
Egypt
Isnad Chain of transmitters of a hadith
Jabr Compulsion; the guardian's constraining power to suppress a
woman's consent to marriage 
Jamaat-i-Islami Islamic organisation founded by Mawdudi in Indian sub­
continent; has growing wide-spread support today 
Jahiliyya State of ignorance; specifically the pre-Islamic period
Jihad Effort, struggle, striving; specifically war to defend Islam. The
closest English equivalent is crusade
Kafir Non-believer of Islam
Khalifa Successor, caliph
Khul A type of divorce initiated by a woman in which she gives her
husband a kind of compensation in return for his agreement to 
so divorce
Madrassa A  religious school associated with a mosque. Institutes of Islamic
jurisprudence 
Mdhr Dower, bride-price
Maliki One of the four main schools of Sunni legal and religious
thought
Mujtahid An Islamic jurist who exercises ijtihad
Mujtahideen Plural of mujtahid
Muslim Literally, one who submits to Allah's will
Muta' Temporary marriage
Nafacjah Maintenance
NiJcah Contract of marriage
Niqab A  veil worn by women that completely covers the face
Nushuz Disobedience of wife, abandonment of marital duties
Purdah Institution of segregation of the sexes
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Qawwam Lord, master; one who takes care of
Qabul Acceptance
Qadi Judge
Qanun Law; specifically secular law as opposed to Shari'a
Qu'ran Islamic holy text revealed to the Prophet Muhammad
Razui Narrator, relater, transmitter (of hadith)
Sahih Authentic (hadith)
Sahabiya Female companions of the Prophet Muhammad
Shaft One of the four main schools of Sunni legal and religious
thought
Shari'ah Islamic law
Sigheh A temporary marriage recognised by the Shi'ites
Shi'ite Adherent to the Islamic faction that arose in the 7th Century in a
split over who should be the successor to Mohammad.
Partisans of Ali ibn Abu Taleb, Mohammad's cousin and son-in- 
law, and followers of the belief that the leadership should stay 
with Mohammad's descendants 
Shura Consultation, discussion
Siyasat Polity
Sunndh The traditions of the Prophet Mohammad. Those things he did
himself, or approved of by him, or that were done in his
presence without earning his disapproval.
Sunni As  opposed to Shi'ite. Literally one who follows Mohammad's
tradition
Sura A  chapter in the Qu'ran
Talacf Divorce by repudiation
Ta'aliq Conditional pronouncement of the talaaq
Taj did Renewal; new presentation
Takfir Charge of unbelief
Tcnvhid Belief in the Oneness of God
Ujrat al-mithl A  wife's wages for domestic work
Ulema A  body of religious scholars who interpret Islamic law for the
community
Umma The world-wide Islamic community
Usui al-fiqh Roots of jurisprudence
Vilayet-e-facjih Juris-consult
Wali Guardian
Wacff Endowment
Wilaayat Authority; father's right to custody
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Note
Translations of Qur’anic Verses cited are from Yusuf Ali
The Holy Qu'ran: Translation,Text and Commentary 
Dar al-Arabia, 1968
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Introduction: The Muslim 
Woman in a Global Context
The place of the Muslim woman in society has been seen by Western social scientists, 
feminist writers and Islamic scholars alike as being especially problematic. The social 
condition of Muslim women appears to preoccupy non-Muslims as much as the Muslims 
themselves; as evidenced by the continuous churning out of a plethora of books on the 
subject of women and Islam. The word ‘Islam’ in the Western sphere, particularly in the 
media and popular culture, tends to give rise to a particular image of the Muslim woman 
and her position and place in society. This image is of an ‘oppressed’ and subservient 
Muslim woman. She is usually, seen to be veiled, passive, under-educated and exploited.
The peculiar practices of Islam with regard to its ‘oppression’ of women have always 
formed part of the Western narrative of the quintessential ‘Otherness’ and inferiority of 
Islam. Early Western ideas of Islam were derived from tales of travellers and crusaders 
and were augmented by interpretations by clerics of often poorly understood Arabic texts. 
Edward Said, in his renowned work Orientalism, describes how the discourse of 
Orientalism justified political domination through colonialism (Said 1987:3). This 
discourse defined the Muslim and the Oriental as “irrational, depraved, immature and 
incapable of representing himself or governing himself’ (Said 1987:40). According to 
Said, the European encounter with the Orient turned Islam into the very epitome of an 
Outsider against which the whole of European civilisation from the Middle ages was 
founded on. The Orientalist vision of Islam, which to an extent persists in scholarly works 
even today, shows a virulent dislike of Islam. Islam is presumed to be a unitary 
phenomenon as no other religion is, and shown to be antihuman, incapable of
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development, self knowledge or objectivity. The harshest criticism of the inhumanity of 
Islam lay in the field of gender relations.
Historical writings have made a dubious link between about Islam and sexuality. From the 
17th Century onwards, Europeans wrote of a lascivious Islam that had embedded within it 
a repugnant sexual morality. The Orient was represented as the sexually perverse, erotic 
and exotic ‘Other’. Oriental women, especially Muslim women, were objectified as the 
embodiment of sensual license and sexual freedom (Abu Shehab 1993). They were 
represented as irresistibly attractive and dangerous. These images of uninhibited sexuality 
and eroticism catered to bourgeois Europe’s baser instincts. Oriental society was the very 
antitheses of civilised and ordered Christian society.
The issue of women emerged as the centrepiece of the Western narrative of Islam in the 
late 19th Century, as Europeans established themselves as colonial powers in Muslim 
countries. This reorganised narrative was created by a coalescence of the old narrative of 
Islam (as described by Said) with the language of feminism (Ahmed 1992:150). There was 
a fusion between the issues of women, their oppression and the cultures of Other men. 
Victorian woman-hood and mores with respect to women came to be regarded as the 
civilised ideal. The thesis of the new colonial discourse was that Islam was innately and 
immutably oppressive to women. The ‘veil’ was the most visible marker of the 
‘Otherness’ and inferiority of Islamic societies. Representation of Muslim Middle-Eastern 
women by authors such as Burton, Doughty and Dickson reflected English assumptions 
about women and the idealisation of the monogamous Victorian Household (Pastner 
1978). Their writings showed the common Western misconceptions of purdah or 
seclusion, polygny and the very nature of Middle-Eastern society. While Burton saw the 
‘erotic’ potential of the veil and perceived it to be a ‘coquettish article of clothing’, the 
above mentioned writers consistently failed to understand the modesty of veiled and 
secluded women (ibid). They categorically refused to see that the emphasis on sexual 
segregation and fully clothed women as the epitome of decency was also, indeed 
characteristic of Victorian society.
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1.1 Globalisation and Islam
Today’s Muslims frequently reiterate that Orientalist attitudes towards Islam continue 
amongst much of current scholarship and the media. The negative collage of images 
allows the idea of Islam as the new enemy replacing communism to take hold in the 
popular imagination. The Western media continues to portray the image of a monolithic 
Islam that is violent, inhumane and oppressive to women. The enormous influence of the 
mass-media in people’s lives is linked to rapid cultural flows between nations and typifies the 
‘globalisation’ process (During 1994, Ahmed 1994).
The past two decades have seen a rapid development in communications and the transfer of 
information between parts of the world. Whilst the process of globalisation may be said to have 
begun at the time of colonialism, late 20th Century globalisation is fundamentally different in 
many respects. Today’s global process is marked by the accelerated pace at which information 
and cultural exchanges (facilitated specially by the mass media) take place and the scale and 
complexity of the exchange. These cultural exchanges are of course not detached from political 
and economic realities. Despite the potential for democracy that this globalisation could 
achieve, cultural production and distribution seem to be dominated and monopolised by the 
Western world. Developing countries on the whole remain merely consumers of Western 
cultural capital. Many Muslims resent this ‘cultural imperialism’ of the West (which 
accompanies economic imperialism) since it is seen to produce conformity and dependence. 
The significance of the media constitutes a pivotal factor in the infiltration of Western 
thought world-wide and accounts for the growth of a global discourse.
Today, events and information are relayed around the world in a matter of hours or minutes. 
The Salman Rushdie affair is a classic example of a matter which arose from anonymity to 
global notoriety in a very short period of time. During that incident the Western media 
exacerbated and facilitated a sense of polarisation amongst the Muslims by being intent on 
delivering a message of a monolithic East versus the West (Ahmed 1994:8). However, it must 
also be acknowledged that the Western media has in some instances worked positively for 
Muslims, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia. On this issue it was mainly 
Western reporters who were responsible for creating a general climate of sympathy for 
Muslims. The Bosnia problem created an awareness of Muslims as a world community both
12
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amongst Muslims and non-Muslims. Like Palestine, Bosnia is today a rallying point for 
Muslims and this issue is a frequent theme of sermons in mosques. The issue has been 
important in creating anti-West and anti-government sentiment amongst Muslims. The Rushdie 
affair and the Gulf War were important events in politically mobilising Muslims and creating a 
global awareness of ‘Muslim-hood’. Akbar Ahmed argues that it is important to realise that 
Muslim responses to these events were complex. They clearly reflected more than a mere 
monolithic confrontation between Islam and the West, as presented by the Western media 
(Ahmed 1994)
It is not technology alone which carries culture across countries and continents; people do as 
well. The 20th Century population movements have resulted in a post-industrial Diaspora. 
Muslim society is of a global nature with over a billion people in 50 different countries (Ahmed 
1994:5). The globalisation of markets under capitalism has resulted in enormous numbers of 
people (a large number of Muslims included) moving around the globe in search of work. 
Migration and the setting up of new communities in the form of the present day Muslim 
Diaspora is symbolic of the origins of Islam in Arabia. Many Muslim migrants today thus think 
of themselves as carrying Islam to new lands and spreading the word. Muslim communities 
now are part and parcel of almost all Western countries. Within the Diaspora there is a 
renewed quest for identity and authenticity. The new Islamic movements, the problems of the 
Muslims without a homeland, and the politics of Muslim countries all fall within the context of 
a global framework. Globalisation has resulted in the detachment of culture from territory, with 
no clear anchorage in any one space. It is this de-tenitorialisation that lies at the heart of a 
variety of global ‘fundamentalisms’, including ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (Appadurai 1990, 
Ahmed 1994).
Modem Islamic revivalism or ‘fundamentalism’ can be understood at one level as a defensive 
reaction against the growing homogenising tendency of Western culture. Increasing 
secularisation and breakdown of traditional social structures and thought pattern is associated 
with modernity. One of the Muslim responses to this breakdown is to escape from the 
confusion of modernity by finding stability in religion and tradition (Ahmed 1992). Modem 
Islamic movements try to emphasise harmony and cohesiveness of an Islamic social and moral 
order. These movements seek to erase ambiguity by playing down contrasting interpretations 
of the religious message to present a clear, concise, monolithic Islam. It has been suggested
13
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that Islamist movements in the contemporary world may be promoting a homogenisation of 
ideology and practice, especially concerning women, the family and gender relations (Keddie 
1992). This homogenisation may be an attempt to combat the widely diverging interpretations 
and practices evident with regard to gender in Muslim societies. Such homogenisation creates 
a unified ‘Islamic gender ideology that is then pitted against modem Western gender practices 
and ideas. In fact it is argued that, relative to non-Muslim areas differences in gender 
status in the Muslim world are greater in modem times than they were in the past (Keddie 
1990). On the other hand the rise of Islamist movements world-wide and the global 
popular revival of Islam has once again reinforced Western perceptions and stereotypes of 
Islam as inhumane and inegalitarian.
Global culture and politics are also reflected in the spread and wide appeal of political 
discourses, movements and institutions such as human rights, women’s empowerment and 
equality, parliamentarism, socialism and democracy. International law and various United 
Nations ‘universal declarations’ based on these ideals are accepted and ratified and 
possibly consistently adhered to by the majority of Member States. Many have argued that 
although these discourses originated at a particular point in a particular civilisation, they 
have gained general universal legitimacy, except amongst a small minority of cultural 
relativists (Mayer 1991, Moghadam 1994). The changing world of ideas of Enlightenment 
Europe that spawned the ‘nation-state’, often characterised as central to modernity, also 
gave rise to new notions of universal standards and measures of morality. Ideas of human 
rights, dignity and political status mitigated against the increasing power of the State. 
These human and civil rights were seen as detached from any particular religious or 
cultural foundations and applicable at all times and in all places. Even as they practised the 
harsh, unjust ‘inequality’ of colonial domination many of these contradictory ideals were 
carried to colonial shores by Europeans. These colonialists left a legacy of Westem-style 
courts and legal codes set within their often arbitrarily crafted colonial states. The 
independence of the United States in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1798 provided the 
philosophical basis to Western women for their own insurrections. They began to demand 
a status of human being equal to that of men: the right to labour, to equal salaries, sexual 
freedom and autonomy. The Western feminist struggle was largely carried out in the 
framework of secular ideologies of democracy, equality and freedom.
14
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The concept o f ‘equality’, however, is not a unitary or simple concept (Beteille 1983). It 
consists of diverse components that are often difficult to reconcile. The ‘equality of status’ 
is easy to achieve, at least in the formal sense, by legally abolishing the privileges and 
disabilities associated with a particular station. It is more difficult - if not impossible - to 
create full equality of opportunity. When seen in the light of ideas of equality of status of 
all humans, women seem disadvantaged in many areas under the traditional interpretations 
of Islamic Law (the Shari’ah). Islamic ideas emphasise the equal humanity, and the equal 
moral and spiritual worth of men and women. However, in contrast to the ideals of total 
equality in all spheres, conservative Islamic discourse and jurisprudence stress the 
fundamentally different roles of the sexes.
The issue of gender relations and women’s role in society has had a long history within 
Islamic countries. However, if one takes the minimalist definition of feminism to mean an 
“awareness of women’s oppression and exploitation at work, in the home and in society as 
well as to the conscious political action taken by women to change this situation” (Moore 
1988:10), then feminism developed in Muslim countries only after contact with the West. 
Western ideas of nationhood (and, in particular, of citizenry involving rights and 
obligations) and of feminism (in the sense of equal treatment of women and of women as 
contributory citizens to the wealth of the nation alongside men) both began to be 
articulated in Arab-Islamic societies at the same time (Ahmed 1986:143). The early 
campaign for feminist reform in the Arab-Islamic world was largely carried out by male 
reformers and intellectuals1. Change was called for under pressure from political and 
cultural events (such as a nationalistic struggle), rather than from an indigenous movement 
in its own right. In its development in Muslim countries, within the context of nationalism 
and the growth of cultural identity, feminism and feminists have had to seek legitimacy 
with Islam (except in a few exceptional cases such as in Kemal’s Turkey and pre- 
Revolution Iran). While the idea of equal political rights was embraced, Arabicized and 
Islamicized without much difficulty, feminism began to have opponents as well as 
proponents. It was attacked as a ‘Western’ and ‘un-Islamic’ import whose consequences 
would lead to the destruction of the fabric of Islamic society (ibid). Thus although in the 
West, there was on the whole a divorce of religion from the feminist struggle, in the
1 Badran contests the commonly held view that feminism in Egypt began with men. In hex work she attempts to 
demonstrate that fem in ism  in Egypt began with women and that it was indigenously based (Badran 1993)
15
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Islamic context the framework for argumentation and change has remained largely within 
the field of Islamic legitimacy. The Western Renaissance and the subsequent intellectual 
and scientific development occurred after the departure from religion and the separation of 
Church and State (at least at the ideological level).
Today, the constitutions of most Muslim states endow their male and female citizens with 
equal citizenship and, hence, equal rights before the law. However, often this is sharply 
contradicted by the enforcement of Personal Status Laws and Codes which have been 
adapted and interpreted from Shari 'a laws. These laws are seen by many feminists, social 
scientists and Western observers as permitting wide discrepancies between the rights of 
men and women in the spheres of marriage and divorce. Reform to these laws is one of 
the ongoing battles which feminists in Muslim countries continue to fight. Recently, 
feminist anthropologists have shown an increasing interest in the roles and lives of women 
in the Middle-East. This has been in the general context of heightened Western scholarly 
interest in Islam. However, feminism and anthropology are two disciplines which are 
intertwined together in a very awkward relationship.
1.2 Feminism and Anthropology: An Awkward Relationship?
In 1970’s, feminism turned to anthropology with many questions in its search to explain 
equality and inequality, and for a theory and a body of information. This was in the 
context of the major wave of women’s rights’ thought and activism. Consequently the 
feminist critique of anthropology grew out of a concern with the neglect of women in that 
discipline (Moore 1988). The new ‘anthropology of women’ thus began in the early 
period by confronting the problem of how women were represented in anthropological 
writing. Since then, feminist anthropology has moved on from being merely the 
anthropology of women and being concerned with ‘male-domination’ to a more 
sophisticated analysis of gender relations both at the level of symbolic ideas and political 
and economic situations. Feminist anthropology is not therefore simply about adding 
women into the discipline, but also concerns confronting the conceptual and analytical 
inadequacies of disciplinary theory. The deconstruction of ‘woman’ as a sociological 
category has been accompanied by the recognition that the experiences and activities of
16
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women always have to be analysed in their socially and historically specific contexts. 
Feminist anthropology has come to focus on understanding difference by looking at the 
ways in which gender, race and class intersect, as well as the way in which all three 
intersect with colonialism, the international division of labour and the rise of the modem 
state (Moore 1988:9). Anthropology itself has struggled long and hard with the concept 
of difference; namely, cultural difference. The basis of the comparative project is that 
cultural difference is not about the peculiarities and oddities of other cultures but rather 
about cultural uniqueness and, at the same time, the similarities in human cultural life.
There are, however, serious conceptual and theoretical problems within feminism, since 
the underlying premise of feminist politics is that there is an actual or potential identity 
between women. The recognition of a universal shared oppression is the basis for ‘sexual 
politics’, premised on the notion that women as a social group are dominated by men as a 
social group. “The major problem feminism faces today is that the concept of ‘difference’ 
threatens to deconstruct the ‘sameness’ of women as a sociological category and thus the 
whole edifice on which feminist politics is based” (Moore 1988:11). Gender might not be 
a global identity after all. In fact it might not be a very important identity in comparison 
which other divisions such as race, culture, religion and class. Foucault is one thinker 
whose writings especially pose a challenge to feminism and who contributed to the 
deconstruction of such terms as ‘woman’ and ‘patriarchy’ (Ramazanoglu 1993). His work 
makes feminists think differently about the nature of knowledge and power. Foucault 
criticises feminism for the limitations and rigidities of its conception of the ‘truth’ of 
patriarchy.
Strathem in her critique of feminism and anthropology points out that what is common to 
both the disciplines is the classic premise of the comparative method in anthropology. This 
premise that social institutions, roles, etc., can be compared across cultures has its parallel 
in feminism in the assumption that women everywhere can be asked whether they are 
dominated by men (Strathem 1988:30). For anthropologists there is a presumption of 
natural similarity reflected in the ethical stance that all societies are equivalent. The 
feminist analogue to this is the assumption of equivalence amongst members of one sex 
wherever they may live. Strathem states, “for men and women the biology that makes
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them irreducibly different is regarded as at once determining and being overcome by the 
varieties of cultural experience that adapt, modify and elaborate as the givens of nature” 
(ibid). ‘Bio-essentialism’ (that there is an essential femaleness or essential maleness in our 
being that might help explain social differences between women and men) has proved to be 
a persistent problem for the coherence of feminist thought. Strathem writes that whilst 
there may be communication between the disciplines of feminism and anthropology, there 
is nevertheless a very awkward fit between the two (Strathem 1987). She characterises 
the two disciplines as “neighbours in tension” (ibid). Feminist anthropology is neither a 
system nor a body of knowledge. Strathem goes on to point out that much of the 
awkwardness of the relationship between feminism and anthropology lies in the structure 
of their epistemological styles (Strathem 1988:37).
Feminism constitutes itself in relation to the Other - ‘patriarchy’, or the institutions and 
persons who represent male domination. There can be no shared experiences with the 
persons who stand for the Other. Anthropology constitutes itself in relation to an Other: 
the alien society or culture under study (Strathem 1987). However, in contrast to 
feminism, the Other is not under attack. On the contrary, the effort is to create a relation 
with the Other. Fieldwork and the resulting ethnography rest on the collaboration between 
the field-worker and his informant(s). Whilst feminism mocks the anthropological 
pretension of creating a product that is in some ways jointly authored, anthropology mocks 
the pretension that feminists can ever really achieve that separation from an antithetical 
Other. Since the pluralism of anthropology allows a diversity of entries into the 
representation of human societies, feminism is thus admitted as one such entry. Since 
feminist scholarship is polyphonic, it admits anthropology as ‘another voice’ (Strathem 
1988:38). It appears, therefore, that anthropology and feminism are quite different and 
that there is no real fit between the two. The communication of cultures - much talked 
about in feminism in the metaphor of black, white and brown ‘voices’ engaging in dialogue 
- is a contrivance, according to Strathem. Both feminist and anthropologist perspectives 
are located in Western culture and its obsession with the relation between individual and 
society. The concept of ‘society’ occupies a very problematic place in feminist enquiry. It 
has either a taken-for-granted position as a system beyond the interests of feminist enquiry, 
or is assaulted as the locus of male ideology. However, society is not constructed 
independently from gender and cannot be comprehended in a context external from it
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(Strathem 1988:32). Gender relations are neither more nor less autonomous than all social 
relations.
While feminists argue that the achievement of sexual equality is a universal human 
aspiration, others echoing the cultural relativist stand-point argue that the notion of sexual 
equality is simply a product of the history of one particular civilisation. The principal issue 
really is whether sexual equality is a clearly defined and well-understood concept, or is 
actually subject to many varied and sometimes contradictory interpretations. Despite 
efforts to combat ethnocentrism and cultural bias, it is clear that it is in fact Western 
discourse alone - albeit a purified one - which defines what is anthropology and what is not 
anthropology, what is ethnocentric and what is not so (Moore 1988:190). 
Anthropologists argue that the discipline of anthropology is in a position to provide a 
critique of feminism based on the deconstruction of the category ‘woman’. It is also able 
to provide cross-cultural data that demonstrate the Western bias in much mainstream 
feminist theorising. Moore writes that, “feminist anthropology is one social science 
discipline which is actually able to demonstrate from a strongly comparative perspective 
that what it is to be a woman is culturally and historically variable and that gender itself is 
a social construction which always requires specification within any given context” (Moore 
1988:192). The deconstruction of the term ‘patriarchy’ does not mean that women are not 
oppressed by patriarchal structures but that the structures have to be specified in each 
instance and not simply assumed2.
1.3 Anthropology of Gender in Muslim Societies
The Shari ’a has promoted a great deal of uniformity throughout the Islamic world. Thus, 
since gender relationships are rather strictly formalised in the religious scriptures and since 
men and women are not equal under the common orthodox interpretations of these 
religious and legal doctrines, women have been seen in most of the scholarly literature as 
enduring a universal and uniform state of subjugation. The mistaken association by social
2 Patriarchy has recently become a very problematic concept in feminist anthropology. Feminists have in the past used it 
rather loosely to mean almost any form or instance o f male dominance. See Kandiyoti 1988.
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science researchers of female circumcision with Islam further stereotyped Middle-Eastern 
women and inextricably linked Islam with issues of sexuality and subordination. Even in 
the 1990’s there is still a significant body of literature that assumes a priori the existence 
of a universal Islam that mysteriously moulds behaviour from above. The emerging 
literature on Muslims, however, attempts to take into account the widely varying historical 
and social conditions of women in these societies. It argues that there is no universal Islam 
nor a universal patriarchy which is associated with it. This new literature aids the task of 
recognising diversity, variability and historical and political dynamics.
Social scientists have shown that a complex interaction of socio-economic and political 
factors and cultural-religious ideas determine gender relations and women’s position in 
society. The overemphasis on Islam as a cultural determinant on Muslim women’s 
behaviour and status is a special problem in the anthropological literature3. Islam has been 
seen as the sole determinant of women’s social, economic and political participation in 
society. Hijab has argued that one cannot blame the low participation of women in work 
in Arab countries purely on Islam or the Arab-Islamic heritage (Hijab 1988). Economic 
factors often affect the integration of women into development. Hijab argues that the 
three conditions - need, opportunity and ability - must be met before women can be 
integrated into the wage labour force. She goes on to point out that cultural attitudes, 
including Islamically-inspired ones, change remarkably quickly when the need and 
opportunity arise. Indeed religion is frequently drawn on to justify new attitudes that may 
be radically different from previous ones (ibid). Gender in Muslim societies can neither be 
read off solely from Islamic ideology and practice, nor entirely derived from global 
processes of socio-economic transformation nor from the universalist premise of feminist 
theory (El-Solh 1994). However, while the actual circumstances of Muslim women varies 
widely and are effected by socio-economic and political factors, Islam continues to be an 
important reference point and framework for social and political debate in Muslim 
countries - more so in the present environment of increasing Islamisation. The question of 
women’s role in society continues on the basis of the holy scriptures; the Qur’an and
3 Many anthropologists have recently remarked on the over-emphasis on Islam as a cultural determinant They include 
Kandiyoti 1991, Moghadam 1993, Afshar 1993.
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Hadith*. Therefore it is highly meaningful to consider the discourses on gender based on 
Islam or differing interpretations of Islam.
Since social scientists have generally seen religion to be conservative and misogynistic, it 
was accepted that religion and religious change would rarely prove emancipatory for 
women. The inappropriateness of the Western feminist ideology of emancipation which 
sees religion as necessarily conservative and patriarchal becomes only too apparent when 
we consider the complex relations between religion, and the state in the contemporary 
world. The role of women in the Iranian ‘Islamic’ revolution of 1979 challenges a number 
of Western feminist assumptions about what constitutes emancipation and equality for 
women. It has been argued that in some ways participation in the Islamic revolution 
expanded the role of the Islamic woman and improved her position in society far more 
effectively than the legal reforms of the Shah (Afshar 1993, Mir-Hosseini 1995). Women 
continue to be active members within the general Islamic revival.
However, according to the popular media social science depiction, states in which Islamist 
groups have recently seized power and re-instituted Islamic laws have thus far invariably 
enacted laws imposing severe ‘new restrictions on women’. The Iranian revolution of 
1979 is taken as a special example of the misogynistic policies of an ‘Islamic’ State. It has 
been emphasised that although women were involved in large numbers in the populist 
uprising against the Shah, consequently many of these women who had striven for social 
equality actually found themselves worse off (Tabari 1982, Azari 1983). Measures were 
adopted by the Iranian regime that would eventually lead to the seclusion of women from 
social, political and economic activity. In Pakistan the vilification of women is said to have 
increased in direct proportion to the spouting of self-righteous declarations of a new 
Islamic order (Mumtaz 1987). Television programmes, for example, increasingly depicted 
women as “the root and cause of corruption”.
Whilst acknowledging the patriarchal bias in the practice of the major world religions and 
the many inequalities inherent in the widely accepted teachings and interpretations of 
‘traditional’, ‘establishment’ Islam many women in Muslim countries nevertheless believe
4 Generally translated as the sayings or actions o f the Prophet Muhammad or those which have been attributed to him. 
See Section 3.4post, for explanation o f compilation o f the Hadith.
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that the way forward for women within an Islamic context will be by the reform of the 
Shari’ah (the corpus of Islamic law) in its present state, and by drawing on the voice of 
egalitarianism inherent in the Qu’ran itself. Indeed, numerous Verses of the Qu’ran preach 
of equality between the sexes as well as social equity and harmony. Writers have stressed 
the relatively egalitarian gender relations in Arabia at the emergence of Islam and the 
subsequent later development of more restrictive interpretations of the scriptures5. There 
are obvious problems in working from within an Islamic framework and trying to 
assimilate secular Western liberal principles into Islam. However, can women reconcile 
Islam and feminism by drawing on the egalitarian strands within the religion to formulate 
an ‘Islamic feminism’? Recent feminist work has pointed out that if Muslim women were 
silent a few decades ago, now they most definitely are not. Women’s rights protagonists 
are active in the cities of all Muslim countries (Moghadam 1994). At present there are 
many women writers in Islamic countries calling for the reinterpretation of the Shari 'ah. 
Many argue that female Muslim activists will initiate women’s emancipation. A number of 
Muslim-born women writers insist that their interpretation of women’s rights clashes 
strongly with the conservative official interpretation.
My principle objective is to identify and explore the modem discourses on women and 
gender in Muslim societies and at a global level. I propose more specifically, to examine 
the development of feminism within an Islamic framework. My emphasis on the global 
nature of Islamism and women’s responses to it is aimed at finding commonalties over 
space. I consider it important to see the culture-bearers’ views and conceptualisation of 
their universe as they live and see it. Many important questions remain to be investigated: 
what exactly is the ‘Islamist’ model of the ideal Muslim woman? What are women’s 
responses to the model of the ideal “Muslim woman” promoted by the Islamists? How 
much reality is there in the supposition that women are leading the war against 
‘fundamentalism’? Is there an Islamic feminism?
5 A  growing majority o f writers have commented on the relative gender-egalitarianism o f  early Islam as compared to later 
restrictive interpretations. Al-Hibri 1982, Hussain 1984, Stowasser 1987, Ahmed 1992, Memissi 1992.
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Most conservative Muslims believe that Islam provides a concise and clear blueprint for 
individual and social life. Anthropological studies, however, stress that Islam varies 
widely in the way it is practised by different racial, linguistic and ethnic communities as 
well as by different socio-economic classes. They thus emphasise that there are many 
different forms of Islam. Apart from the divisions and schism between the different 
schools of thought and Shari 'ah Law, divergence is also caused by the different ways in 
which Islam has interacted with varying systems of kinship and social organisation, 
political and economic structures as well as indigenous belief systems. Therefore a1 
diversity of forms, institutions and organisations is encompassed by that seemingly singular 
ascription Islam.
Despite these varying interpretations some anthropologists argue that Islam, in contrast to 
other world religions, provides a unified core. This is caused by the firm regulation of 
everyday life and a common set of repertoire and symbols which all Muslims can draw 
upon (Gellner 1981). Life is firmly regulated by a set of ritual obligations seen as 
compulsory by all the sects and schools of thought. Islam centres on five principle ritual 
activities or beliefs. They are faith or belief in the oneness of God, the daily five prayers, 
fasting in the Islamic calendar month of Ramadan, zakat or almsgiving for the poor), and 
Hajj or the Pilgrimage to Mecca. The performance of congregational prayer enforces 
solidarity amongst Muslims in a Durkheimian sense at the local level. A Muslim calendar 
marked by ritual events such as Ramadan, and the Hajj (which is televised world-wide) 
enforce unity and the idea of the Umma (a global Muslim community). This ‘imagined’ 
religious community of the Umma has been resurrected with vigour in the past two 
decades with the increasing globalisation of Islamic revival.
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According to Gellner, Islam is the religion that best disproves the secularisation thesis (Gellner 
1994:xi). This theory, which was common in social science, postulates that in industrial and 
industrialising societies the influence of religion diminishes! either science undermines faith, or 
the erosion of social units deprives religion of its organisational base, or doctrinally centralised 
rationalised religion cuts its own throat. Gellner argues that from the great literate religious 
civilisations which were in existence at the end of the middle ages Islam alone seems to have 
survived and grown as a serious faith in the modem world (ibid). Islam’s resilience is partly 
explained by its close regulation of daily personal and social life and its especial suitability to 
modernity.
From his work among nomads in Morocco, Gellner sees two types of opposed religiosity in 
Islam (Gellner 1981). This model, demarcates an egalitarian, doctrinal, scripturalist, anti- 
ritualistic, sober and sedate religion of the urban educated people which is opposed to the 
‘heretical’ and ‘superstitious’ ritualistic cults involving mediation practised by the illiterate 
desert Bedouin (and rural peoples world-wide)6. The ‘High’ form has remained normative 
even if not implemented. Throughout Muslim history periods of purificatory and reformatory 
zeal occurred (ibid). With the onset of modernity, the spread of literacy, education and the 
increased centralisation achieved by the nation state the pendulum has swung irrevocably 
towards orthodox and scripturalist Islam in line with the general trend towards the 
‘rationalisation’ and ‘democratisation’ of religion (Gellner 1981:56). With the impact of 
modernisation and Westernisation Muslims could turn to a genuinely local High Tradition 
which in many places was not identified with the old political regime to be compromised by its 
failure. The special affinity of the ‘High’ variant of Islam to modernity lies in its criteria of 
universalism, scripturalism and spiritual egalitarianism as well as the rational systemisation of 
social life (Gellner 1994:xii). Gellner argues that many features such as individualism, a rule 
ethic and a low loading of magic make it compatible with the requirements of modem life. 
Following on from Gellner’s argument, while there is a counter-response to increasing 
‘Islamisation’ observed in the growing participation in some ritualistic cults (for example the 
Zar/Bori possession cult of North Africa), on the whole underlying fundamentalist movements 
and Islamic revival in general is a shift to a literate, rationalist, codified shared culture.
6 The m odel is based on the Great Tradition/Little Tradition distinction in the anthropological study o f religion.
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Islamic symbols and language have been especially important in the context of nationalism and 
opposition to colonial domination. What separates the pre-modem from the modem era is the 
arrival on the world stage of the political fabrication known as the nation-state which as 
Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983) have shown, effectively imposed upon the communities of 
the world a set of administrative modules obsessed with the creation of cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity by means of bureaucratic efficiency and control of critical, social and educational 
institutions. ‘Nationalism* became a convenient rallying call for state cohesion and mobilisation 
and the scripturalist version of Islam was often presented as a nationalist ideology, defining all 
Muslims in a given territory as a nation. There are two outstanding models of modernisation by 
Muslim states - against religion and within it. The first is secularism (as typified by Kemalist- 
reform in Turkey and the policies adopted by the Shah in Iran) and the second is Muslim 
reformism. Where religion was closely tied to the old order the reform has been mostly anti- 
religious. However, the majority of Muslim countries, including Egypt, have followed the latter 
path and religious revival and social reform has usually overlapped with nationalism.
Although I am primarily concerned with global trends, I have chosen two countries in particular 
to bring my study into focus. These are Egypt and Iran. These two countries provide well 
documented examples of increasing Islamisation of society. As such I consider them to be 
appropriate case studies of how the Islamic revival is influencing the role of feminism and 
perceptions of gender. As many scholars have noted there is compelling justification, culturally 
and intellectually, for regarding Egypt as a mirror of the Arab world in the modem age (Leila 
Ahmed 1992:6). Egypt was the first Middle-Eastern Arab country to experience the 
consequences of European commercial expansion and to experiment socially, intellectually, 
politically and culturally with a range of ideas that have proved to be of enduring significance in 
the modem era, not only for Egypt but also for Arab societies as a whole. It is common to 
identify Islam with Saudi Arabia and the Middle-East. Few realise that large masses of 
Muslims dwell in the non-Arab world. In looking at Iran I wish to draw the discussion 
away from purely focusing on Arab-Islamic societies and attempt to highlight the issues 
relevant to Islam in the non-Arab context. Iran is important as a vivid example of the 
political utilisation of Islam. It provides an interesting contrast to Egypt in being pre­
dominantly Shi*a. Unlike Egypt where Islamism is largely in opposition to the state, Iran 
at present, manifests state-sponsored ‘fundamentalism*.
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2.1 Colonialism and Feminism
In the 1800’s the colonial powers took over the Middle-East. By means of coercive 
imperial domination, the integration of the Muslim world into the capitalist system was 
initiated. Complex and ambiguous Western ideas such as equality, freedom, human rights 
and social and economic progress entered the Muslim world even as they encountered the 
reality of material and moral exploitation under colonialist policies. These ideas originated 
in secular trends that grew in the West and confronted Christianity. Secularism was 
closely bound to the idea of a social contract - an important function of which was to 
present society not as a natural or divinely ordained phenomenon, but as an artefact of 
human will. Jayawardena links the emergence of feminist movements in the Third World 
to anti-imperialist and nationalist struggles, a general move towards secularism, a new 
concern with social reform and modernity, and the ascendance of an ‘enlightened’ 
indigenous middle-class (Jayawardena 1986). Towards the end of the 19th Century and the 
beginning of the Twentieth, reformers of women’s condition in the Muslim world emerged 
from the ranks of an educated, nationalist male elite. Their concern with women’s rights 
centred around issues of education, seclusion, veiling and polygny. This coincided with a 
broader agenda about ‘progress’ and the compatibility of Islam and modernity.
In their encounter with the West and modernity, Muslim reformers undertook an 
intellectual effort to interpret Islam in a modem way and come to terms with Western 
capitalist culture. However, the Ulema (the learned scholars or jurists) and the lower 
classes remained nervous about modernity and believed in the self-sufficiency of Islam. 
Reformers such as al-Afghani (1838-1897) argued that Islam was rational and compatible 
with modem life. Afghani’s student, ‘Abduh (1849-1905), was one of the most influential 
thinkers on the matter of reform with respect to women. ‘Abduh argued that the 
regulations affecting women in areas such as polygamy and divorce, like other ‘backward’ 
and ‘degraded’ customs, had led the Islamic nations into a deplorable state of ignorance 
(Adams 1933:13). Much of the Orientalist discourse was reiterated by these thinkers, who 
sought to reform ‘misogynistic’ practices of the harem, seclusion, veiling and polygamy. 
Islamic reform was a response, often an apologia, in the face of an external military and 
cultural threat. The Victorian paternalistic establishment appropriated the language of 
feminism in its assault on the religions and cultures of Other men(L.Ahmedl992:151).
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Many of the elite nationalist reformers were educated in the West and were influenced by 
Western concepts of modem nationalism. Their orientation therefore was partially secular 
in that they felt religion should be restricted to the private family domain. However, they 
found in Islam an effective force for the unification of the people towards a nationalistic 
struggle. However, whether in the hands of patriarchal men or feminists, the ideas of 
Western feminism essentially functioned to morally justify the attack on native societies 
and support the notion of the comprehensive superiority of the West. This provided the 
rationale on which the French-educated lawyer Qassim Amin in 1899 to call for a change 
in the position of women and the abolishing of the veil. Amin argued that to make Muslim 
society abandon its backward ways and follow the Western path to success and civilisation 
required changing women (Petersen 1992)7. Amin reiterated Victorian ideals in his 
arguments that women had to be educated so that they could become good mothers and 
housewives. He painted a rosy picture of Western women as those who enjoyed full rights 
and complete equality. Although Amin abandoned the very framework of Islam and 
attacked it8, however, not all modernists and reformers argued for whole-sale, sweeping 
modernisation and the adoption of Western cultural practices. Many simply called for a 
more cautious and selective borrowing from the West and a more religiously-based reform.
Similar to Egypt, in Iran at the turn of the 20th Century the politics of women’s liberation 
was closely allied with the politics of secularisation. The Shi’a clergy through their 
monopoly in interpreting Islam were responsible for defining the proper place and 
behaviour of women. However, since the hierarchy of sexual relations was primarily, 
though not exclusively, supported by the clerical establishment and a formal structure of 
religious traditions, in order to achieve a modicum of freedom and equalitymodernistleaders 
found it axiomatic that religion be completely separated from the government. The Shi’a 
clergy was vehemently opposed to the modem changes in the conditions of women’s lives, 
which undermined their authority and power.
7 H ie Liberation o f Women: A Document in the History o f Egyptian Feminism. Translated by Samiha Sidhom Petersen; 
Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 1992.
8 Haddad has pointed out that the Westernisation which Amin advocated was not as comprehensive as may appear at first 
glance. H e sought to have women uncover their faces, not to take o ff the veil, he asked that women be consulted about 
their marriage partners but did not make them ' .. responsible; for finding a husband, he called for restriction in the 
practice on polygamy but allowed it under special circumstances (Haddad 1985:281).
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Not all protagonists of women’s rights, however, wanted a total separation of religion and 
state. ‘Abduh, unlike other mainly secular intellectuals, had a thorough grounding in 
religious thought and could knowledgeably argue the case for reform and modernisation in 
terms that represented it as being in harmony, rather than in conflict, with ‘true’ Islam. 
Following ‘Abduh and his student Rashid Rida, a trend emerged which though not very 
influential at that time grew in influence by the latter part of this Century. These thinkers 
were more religiously orientated and deplored the typically upper-class facile unthinking 
imitation of Western ways in dress, furniture, architecture and the consumption of 
expensive luxuries; instead of the pursuit of a genuine transfer of knowledge and real 
social reform.
Education for women was one of the top-most priorities of early modernist reformers in 
the Middle-East. Whist there appears to have been little opposition to the education of 
women per se by conservative religious scholars, the content of that education was much 
debated. Conservative Muslims insisted that women’s education should be restricted to 
the study of religion, reading, writing, geography, history and mathematics. Some deemed 
that women’s study of foreign languages was a waste of time; others warned that any 
changes instituted would only give pleasure to those foreigners, mostly Christians, who 
sought to destroy Islam by changing its tenets (Haddad 1985:283). The first girls’ schools 
were established in Egypt in the 1870’s. By the 1890’s the call for more education for 
women and for reforms affecting their status was clearly audible. Women began 
presenting their case in newspapers and magazines for women. Like men before them, 
these women were also occupied with issues of education, veiling and the harem.
Accompanying these early stirrings of feminist consciousness, actual change towards an 
acceptance of Western styles and ways was in progress. Women started becoming active 
professionals, teachers and medical practitioners. During the early decades of the 20th 
Century feminism became intellectually visible, and this was then followed by an 
organisational and political movement in Muslim countries including both Egypt and Iran. 
The founding feminist discourses emerged in those decades as did the articulation of the 
first complex and incisive feminist analysis. Within this feminist discourse there were 
critical tensions that reflected the wider intellectual debates between modernist reform and 
the native vernacular Islamic discourse(L.Ahmed!992:174). Although there was a voice of
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feminism that argued more in Islamist terms, the dominant strain of feminism in Egypt and 
Iran for most of the Century was the one which discreetly affiliated itself with the 
Westernising and secularising tendencies of the upper and upper-middle-classes. The 
organisational and political success of Huda Sha’arawi (1879-1947) and her Egyptian 
Feminist Union were perhaps important in the emergence of the Westernising voice of 
feminism as the prevailing uncontested voice of feminism in those early years (Ahmed 
1992:175).
Similar to Egypt, in Iran a number of women leaders emerged and women’s groups and 
associations were established in the early half of this Century. They included among them 
the Iran Women’s Council and the New Path Society (Afkhami 1994:11). As in Egypt 
these women’s groups were active and concentrated largely on education and charity 
work. Sha’arawi’s feminist organisation made significant gains for women, especially in 
the field of education and her work produced a general rise in feminist consciousness. 
Many prominent women, such as Mai Ziyada and Doria Shafik, subsequently followed in 
her footsteps. Sha’arawi’s feminism whilst politically nationalistic was also informed by a 
Western affiliation and a Westernising outlook(L.Ahmedl992:178). In contrast Malak 
Hifni Nassef, who was regarded as a major intellectual, articulated the basis of a feminism 
that did not automatically affiliate itself with Westernisation. Nassef was opposed to 
unveiling and believed that the indiscriminate adoption of Western ways without reference 
to their suitability to a particular environment was unwise. Both Nassef and Sha’arawi 
advocated that society should enable women to pursue education and that fundamental 
reforms governing marriage were of immediate necessity. Although there were no 
substantive differences in their goals, Nassef was committed to seeking female autonomy 
in terms which were internal to the indigenous culture. Following Nassefs line, a more 
indigenous ‘Islamic feminism’ was articulated by Zeinab al-Ghazali (b. 1918) the Islamist 
founder of the Muslim Women’s Association.
It is true that reform introduced by upper and middle-class political leaders who had 
accepted and internalised the Western discourse did indeed lead to legal reforms benefiting 
women in certain countries; and, specifically, in Turkey. However, both in Egypt and Iran 
these reforms primarily benefited women of the urban bourgeoisie alone and had little 
impact beyond this class. Thus whilst upper-class women became actively engaged in
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professions, social services and charity, however, rural and lower-class women were 
negatively effected by the encounter with modernity and integration into the capitalist 
world system (Abu Shehab 1993:108). Aside from the global level, economic and political 
factors at the state level also affected women. As Kandiyoti has pointed out, the post­
independence trajectories of modem states and variations in the. deploymenPof Islam in 
relation to different nationalist ideologies and oppositional social movements are of central 
relevance to an understanding of the condition of women (Kandiyoti 1991, Badran 1995).
■V
The quasi-secular and secular states which emerged from colonial domination attempted to 
implement ambitious projects of rapid Western inspired modernisation and secularisation 
of traditional institutions. Modem Iran emerged from the declining rule of the Qajar 
dynasty. During the 18th and 19th Centuries the Shi’a Ulema or clergy gained great influence 
and power at the cost of the weak government of the Qajar dynasty (Fischer 1980). The 
intervention of the Russians and the British disrupted the delicate balance between state and 
religion. Iran was not made into a formal colony; unlike most of the Muslim world which came 
under direct colonial domination. However, in Iran there was much Ulema-lead agitation 
against the European presence, as well as against modernisation and the growing interventionist 
state.
Reza Shah Pahlavi’s nationalist-statist programme (1926-1941) had much similarity to the 
secular Kemalist project in Turkey. In Turkey, the secularisation of the family code and 
the enfranchisement of women were parts of a broader struggle to liquidate the theocratic 
institutions of the Ottoman state and create a new legitimising state ideology. However, in 
Iran the project fell short of radically transforming the organisation and structure of the 
Shi’a clergy, which was very different to that of Ottoman Sunnism. The Iranian clergy 
retained its organisational and financial autonomy in Iran and this had profound 
consequences for the future (Paidar 1995). As in Egypt, under the Pahlavi’s secular- 
oriented modernising policies many advances were made by and for women in Iran. 
Women’s participation was expanded in the social, economic and educational life of the 
country. There was a growing rate of literacy and an increased prominence of women in 
higher education and the professions. The integration of women into political life was 
evidenced by the granting of female suffrage by the Shah in 1963, the election of women 
to the M ajlis (parliament) and the Senate, and the appointment of women as judges. Left-
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wing opposition to the state pointed out the limited nature of these reforms and the 
continued legal, economic and social inequalities of women under the Pahlavis. They 
argued that these reforms were more cosmetic than substantive and that except possibly in 
the case of a small minority of upper-class women, the overall changes under the Pahlavis 
actually intensified women’s oppression in Iran. The secular left-wing critics shared with 
the Islamic critics a deep concern over women’s ‘moral corruption’ and the 
‘commoditisation’ of women’s sexuality in the Shah’s Iran. The Islamic critics of the old 
regime considered most of the changes under the Pahlavis as being completely undesirable 
and, indeed, responsible for the moral corruption and sub-ordination of Iranian society to 
neo-colonialist powers (Azari 1983).
As I have suggested earlier, in many Muslim countries Western impact and rule whilst on 
the whole advantageous to the upper-classes and the new middle-classes, was in fact 
harmful to the traditional or bazaar petty bourgeoisie. In Iran, state policies disrupted the 
rural economy, peasants were dispossessed of land and a vicious cycle of poverty ensued. 
Thus the traditional and lower classes turned against Western liberal ideology because it 
was associated with Western oppression. For these classes feminism was a foreign 
Western import. It was part of a conspiracy to weaken and destroy the fabric of Muslim 
society by weakening family bonds. The State undertook the project of feminism in many 
of its policies. It sought to emphasise the democratisation of education for the 
‘emancipation’ of women. However, in Iran it was often involved in coercive action as 
well, such as the forcible unveiling of women in 1936, in order to root out backward 
traditions. Official Islam adopted by the State was largely a continuation o f modernist, 
reformist Islam. The State provided religious justification for women’s work, public 
mixing of the sexes, education and family planning. Meanwhile both in Iran prior to the 
Revolution and in present day Egypt the ‘stubborn,’ ‘traditional’ masses developed an 
Islamic discourse which was anti-state, anti-West, anti-capitalist and anti-consumerist. 
This discourse defended everything which the state wanted to change. The role of women 
as primarily wives and mothers came to be considered a sacred part of religion.
There is an important connection between women, family life and the continuity of Islam in 
general (Abu Shehab 1993:186). The traditional interpretations of Islamic Law were seen 
by the modernist reformers as an obstacle to modernisation. Whilst there was secular
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influenced reform in many areas of the law, laws concerning women, marriage and the 
family remained largely untouched in many Muslim countries because governments were 
concerned not to clash too forcefully with the people. In Kemal’s Turkey, however, there 
was radical change as women were given equal inheritance rights, property rights, equal 
rights in divorce and child custody. Tunisia under Bourgiba was the only Muslim state 
that formally outlawed polygyny and where Personal Status codes Substantively reformed Shari ’ah. 
In Egypt in the 1950’s and other socialist Arab states, such as Algeria and Syria, with the 
adoption of anti-capitalist ideologies the ‘bourgeois, individualistic, consumerist Western 
model’ for women’s liberation was rejected. Feminist movements lost their independence 
and were absorbed into government bureaucracy. The state supported projects for 
women’s education, literacy and health campaigns. However, the leaders refused to see 
women’s issues as separate and important in their own right but instead considered it to be 
part of the general reform of society. Therefore the socialist regimes focused attention on 
the role of women and their intellectual, social, political and economic development. 
Although most of the political and economic institutions were secularised by the state, 
SharVah laws continued to control women’s lives in the spheres of marriage and family. 
Nevertheless, legislation was enacted which to an extent altered the Shari *ah laws that 
governed women’s lives in areas such as polygamy and divorce (see Sections 4.5 and 4.6).
The past few decades have seen a revival of a voice of feminism in Muslim communities 
which had barely heard previously. This alternative voice falls within the anti-state, anti- 
consumerist Islamic discourse of the popular masses. This discourse which was present 
earlier this Century, was wary of Western ways and attempted to articulate female 
subjectivity and affirmation within an Islamic discourse and in terms of a general socio­
cultural and religious renovation.
2.2 Islamic Neo-Revivalism or ‘Fundamentalism’
The last two decades in particular have seen a dramatic world-wide renewal of religion and a 
questioning of secularism. This has seriously challenged social science theories of the 
increasing secularisation of life in the modem world. The philosophers of the Enlightenment 
believed that the realm of the sacred would finally break away from politics; and that the 
influence of religion would become restricted to the private sphere of the family, having only an
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indirect influence on the way in which society was organised. Throughout the 1960’s the link 
between religion and civic order seemed to grow increasingly tenuous. From the 1970’s 
onwards, however, this process went into reverse. In all of the major faiths a new religious 
approach took shape which no longer aimed at adapting to secular values, but concentrated on 
recovering the sacred foundation for the organisation of society by changing society if 
necessary (Kepel 1994). This approach advocated moving on from the Enlightenment, 
rationalism and modernism that had failed, attributing its setbacks to the separation from God. 
The new phase of Islamic revival has its roots both within and against the discourse of the 
modernists who tried to harmonise Islam with modernity and the West. Revival is seen by its 
advocates as a crucial means of infusing life into a community that is weighed down by 
centuries-old traditions. The new Islamists or ‘fundamentalists’ criticise both the secular and 
Islamic modernists for an excessive reliance on the West. Modernists, in their zeal to 
demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with modernity, are seen as having employed Western 
criteria and values and thereby produced a Westernised Islam. These neo-revivalists are more 
sweeping in their condemnation of the West and their assertion of the total self-sufficiency of 
Islam. The aim today is no longer to ‘modernise Islam’ but to ‘Islamise modemity’(Kepel 
1994:2).
I do not propose to refer to Islamic neo-revivalism by its common phrase ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’. In my view the latter phrase is rooted in non-Muslim origins (in 20th 
Century Protestant Christianity in particular) and has derogatory Orientalist and negative tones 
associated with it. It implies a narrow secular European conception of religion as being simply 
blind fanaticism, irrational and superstitious. Instead, I propose to use the term ‘Islamism’ to 
refer to the recent very diverse phenomenon of Islamist activism. Islamists hold Islam to be a 
world-view and a total ideology for action and Islam is seen as the ‘natural religion’. The 
regulations and commandments of the Qur’an and the Sunnah are the law and provide the 
guidelines for everyday life. An Islamist attempts to propagate and purify Islam. Furthermore 
he or she is actively involved in organisations which attempt to transform society along Islamic 
lines.
Anthropological explanations of Islamist phenomena stress that these movements have emerged 
within a particular socio-economic and political crisis in developing countries9. On the whole
9Fischer 1980, Moghadam 1993, Moghadam 1994
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these countries have suffered from the particularly harsh experience of modernity and 
Westernisation, and these have left upon them a quest for authenticity and identity. Modernity 
brought Western governments, institutions, laws, education and cultural values firstly through 
the direct or indirect rule of European colonialism and, subsequently, through the power and 
intervention of the super-powers (the United States and the Soviet Union). Muslim 
communities suffer from the uneven distribution of socio-economic advantage within the 
societies and at the global level. In the Middle-East there is a decline in support for existing 
state systems widely viewed as authoritarian, corrupt or ineffectual (Moghadam 1994:10). 
Politically these countries are characterised by ‘neo-patriarchal’ state systems that have silenced 
left-wing and liberal institutions while fostering religious institutions in their search for 
legitimacy (ibid). Political protest is therefore couched in religious terms and for many Muslims 
the Islamic movements offer a new form of reassurance, collective solidarity and support.
Despite the emergence of neo-revivalist groups, the post World War II period was dominated 
by the establishment of modem Muslim states. In general the new nation-states and their 
political leaders continued to be heavily influenced by the West in the development of national 
ideology and state institutions (parliamentary systems of government, legal codes, education). 
With a few exceptions, nationalist leaders were more secular than religious in orientation. On 
the global scene the Unites States and the Soviet Union emerged as super powers and Western 
capitalism, Marxism and socialism were contending forces in political development. Following 
independence and de-colonisation many Muslim states experimented with socialism. It was 
perceived that an ideology fusing socialist ideals with Islamic values would help mobilise the 
masses for development. Whilst these thoughts became very prominent during the Nasser 
regime in Egypt, parallel developments took place in Pakistan under Bhutto and in Iran under 
Mosadegh. Under Nasser (1956-1973) issues of renewal, imitation and authenticity, as well as 
the reliability of what was advocated as genuine sources of socialist teachings within Islam, 
became central in the struggle between the Egyptian government and its opposition. The 
Islamist opposition, however, argued that Islam is unique in its conception of reality and should 
not be distorted to conform to modem ideologies, constructs and stereotypes (Haddad 1991:5). 
The Islamist revival attempts to affirm Islamic discourse in a way that does not seek to have its 
basis in Western forms of modem ideas.
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The beginnings of the neo-revivalist or Islamist movement can be traced to two important 
organisations that sprang up thousand of miles apart during the 1930’s and 1940’s (Esposito 
1991:38). These organisations were the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i- 
Islami in the Indian subcontinent. The founders and ideologues of the Brotherhood (Hassan al- 
Banna, 1906-49) and the Jamaat (Maulana Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi, 1903-79) had a profound 
effect not only on their own societies but also on Muslim activists across the Islamic world. 
Both these organisations sought to counter the presence and influence of Westernisation and 
secularisation by advocating a process of renewal and reform. Their goal was not the creation 
of a secular society nor a process of modem Islamic reform, but a more indigenously rooted 
authentic recreation of an Islamic state and society.
It should be stressed that socio-economic and political explanations of Islamist revival do not 
suffice in themselves. The revivalist movement is largely a cultural phenomenon that has roots 
in the constant renewal and purification which is a part of the history of Islam in particular and 
of religion in general. Concepts have been taken from the Islamic heritage and applied today 
while other concepts have been reworked to give new and novel meanings. Tajdid (renewal) is 
an old Islamic concept which has been given new life in the modem context and now acts as an 
important legitimising concept in the struggle against existing conditions (Voll 1991:24). 
Sayyid Qutb of the Brotherhood developed a modem radical interpretation of the concept of 
takfir. Takfir essentially means the identifying of a person, group or institution as being 
‘unbelieving’ or kqfir (Voll 1991:25). However, the new interpretation made it possible to 
identify professing Muslims as iftj/fr/unbelievers if they did not strictly abide by Islamic 
principles as defined by Qutb and his followers. Qutb set the tone for the militants who 
accepted the obligation to condemn the existing society and leaders as ‘infidels’10.
Another important theme of the Islamist movement is jihad, usually translated as meaning a 
military ‘holy war’. It is, in fact, much broader that this and encompasses the whole range of 
special efforts to adhere to, affirm and support the message of Allah. The principle has been 
consistently applied in a number of contexts over the centuries and was an important mobilising 
concept for the early Muslim resistance to European forces. Today jihad  has become a vital 
motivating force for Islamist activists. The more militant position is reflected by Qutb’s
10 Late in the 1970’s the Jihad group - a radical breakaway sect o f the Brotherhood - argued that the Egyptian president Anwar 
Sadat was not Islamic enough. Based on the rationale that "rulers o f this age are in apostasy horn Islam”, they assassinated Sadat
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criticism of ‘defeatist’ people who want to confine jihad  to what is today called ‘defensive 
war’. Mawdudi stated that to stake one’s life, spend of one’s wealth and to strive to establish 
the kingdom of God on Earth was jihad. He argued that . exerting oneself to the utmost to 
disseminate the word of God to make it supreme and to remove all impediments to Islam 
through tongue or pen or sword” (Mawdudi 1986:58). Modem Islamist literature calls for 
jihad  as being a struggle against the hostile forces encircling the Muslims. However, there is a 
general condemnation of violence and an advocacy of measured struggle by the majority of 
authors in the mainstream of the Islamic movement. Whilst the context of the discussion about 
jihad  has changed, the basic themes and issues reflect significant continuities in Sunni and Shi’a 
Islam over the centuries
A concept which has undergone a considerable transformation and has emerged to give current 
movements a distinctive intellectual and action framework is the concept of Jahiliyya The 
dictionary definition of this Arabic term means ‘ignorance’. In traditional Islamic usage, the 
Jahiliyya referred to the age of ignorance before the revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet 
Muhammad. However, Mawdudi began to use this term to refer to forces that corrupted 
historic Muslim societies and saw Jahiliyyah as a type of counter-revolution which came to 
dominate Muslim societies (Voll 1991:27). From the 1970’s onwards the identification of 
forces opposed to Islam as the true Jahiliyyah became an important part of activist Muslim 
rhetoric, particularly in Egypt. Islamist writers today point to the ‘promiscuity’ and 
‘corruption’ in Western society and Western practices which pervade the Muslim world as the 
modem Jahiliyyah (Abu Shehab 1993).
The West and especially the United States is seen by Islamists as bankrupt in terms of morality 
and social values (Haddad 1991, Abu Shehab 1993). The West, therefore is no longer a model 
to be emulated. Muslims see rising crime rates, race riots, substance abuse, AIDS, 
pornography, the breakdown of the family, social and economic inequity, and many other ills as 
plaguing the very structure of Western life. These problems are seen as spreading in the 
modem Jahiliyya in Muslim societies due to the blind imitation of the West and the decreasing 
role of religion in private and public life. Islamists are straggling against the global hegemony 
of Western culture. The strong intrusion of Western culture is present, obvious and 
overbearing in movies, television, news, the media, clothing styles and many other aspects of 
contemporary Muslim society. Consequently, revivalism has proven to be the strongest in
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more Westernised states such as Egypt and Iran. The Western feminist movement is blamed 
for increasing divorce rates and family breakdown, both of which contribute to moral 
degeneration, crime and violence. The immodesty and immorality of modem women (seen in 
their public visibility and adoption of Western fashions) is stressed by Islamists, such as 
Mawdudi, as a particularly crucial problem to be addressed in the transformation of society to a 
righteous and just moral Order. Islamism as a political defence of Islam against the West shares 
many tenets with Orientalism in its essentialist and ahistorical approach.
A distinction can be made within Islamist movements between movements which seek to 
maintain or legitimise political power and those which seek to acquire political power. Most of 
the strong and active movements, including the Brotherhood and the Jamaat, fall in the latter 
category and can be described as populist by virtue of their social base. Despite repression by 
governments at various points in their histories, the Jamaat and the Brotherhood continue to 
grow and flourish. The influence of these two organisations extends far beyond their national 
homelands and has achieved trans-national, global significance: the Brotherhood inspired the 
establishment of similar organisations in the Sudan, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf and Africa; the 
Jamaat developed sister organisations in India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. The writings of 
the chief ideologues of these movements, Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb, continue to be widely 
translated and disseminated throughout the Islamic world.
The resurgence of Islam in Muslim politics reflects the growing religious revival in personal and 
public life. There is an increase in Islamically oriented governments, organisations, laws, banks, 
educational institutions, and social welfare services (Haddad 1991:15). Both governments and 
opposition movements have turned to Islam to enhance their authority and muster support. 
Many Middle-Eastern and South-Asian Muslim countries originally founded as secular 
states have had this base eroded by the Islamist campaign and state-sponsored Islamisation 
programmes. Governments and leaders who have used Islam in this way include Egypt’s 
President Sadat, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, Bangladesh’s General Ershad and Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister Mahathir. Most rulers and governments, aware of the potential strength of 
Islam, have shown an increasing sensitivity to Islamic issues and concerns, and this includes 
even the more secular states such as Turkey and Tunisia. Efforts for Pan-Islamic unity have 
led to the formation of a few Islamic International organisations. Since 1969 the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) has attempted to play the important role of
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improving the circumstance of Muslims through out the world. Supported by 44 
governments that identify themselves as ‘Islamic’, this organisation has been involved in 
political as well as cultural and educational matters. International organisations such as 
these seek to foster unified action based on a common vision for safeguarding international 
Islamic interests. However, in fact often these ideas actually have little influence on state 
policy. Nevertheless, the visions of a unified and strong Islamic community have trickled 
through to the general public.
2.3 Militant Islam
The power of resurgent Islam was dramatically illustrated in the Iranian Revolution of 1978- 
1979 when the powerful, modernising, Western-oriented regime of the Shah came crashing 
down. The revolution in Iran provided a powerful inspiration to Islamic movements the world- 
over as an example to be emulated. Whilst the role of the clergy was crucial, and the ideology 
and symbolism of Shi’a Islam was important in uniting disparate groups against the Iranian 
state, there were other strong economic factors and a class struggle evident in the march to the 
revolution in Iran. It is therefore wrong to simplify the identity of Islamism purely to religion 
alone: it is essential to consider the political economy as well.
Following the establishment of Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion during the Safavid period 
(1501-1736) the institution of Shi’ism acquired certain features that became quite specific 
in relation to the position of Islam in other Middle-Eastern societies. Most importantly the 
Shi’a Ulema were unique in being quite independent economically and politically from the 
State. This occurred by the establishment of mechanisms for donations and endowments 
from the public. Thus in modem Iran there was a type of hierarchised clergy, led by certain 
Doctors of the Law, who were adept at interpreting the sacred texts as they saw fit. Religious 
personnel or ulema have powerful positions in Shi’a doctrine and history as spiritual and moral 
leaders of the community.
Fisher, in his acclaimed study of the Iranian Revolution, describes how Shi’a sacred history and 
its theme of martyrdom as elaborated in passion plays acted as the means of inciting emotions 
and strong opposition to the Shah amongst the population (Fischer 1980:4). Whilst Reza Shah 
Pahlavi (1924-1941) did not formally abandon Islam in his modernisation campaign, he had no
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regard for the strong religious feelings of his populace. Personally the Shah was a strong 
believer in an authoritarian system: he did not tolerate opposition and ruthlessly suppressed any 
voice of dissent by all means possible, including the indiscriminate use of his secret service 
SAVAK. The suppression of political discourse made religion the primary idiom of the 
political protest (Fischer 1980:9). Under the Pahlavis there was an outright attack on the 
powers of the Ulema, especially in the spheres previously monopolised by the Ulema such as 
jurisprudence, education and the supervision of public decorum (Fischer 1980:108). Despite 
the Shah’s policies, Shi’ism continued to have strong influence at popular and scholarly levels. 
The madrassas (centres of traditional religious learning) of the sacred city of Qum, were 
important as centres of political discontent and religious opposition to the State. There was 
much anxiety amongst the Ulema, over the deterioration of religious and judicial learning due 
to competition from secular-based universities patronised by the State (Fischer 1980:104). 
Violent confrontations with the State occurred in Ulema-led campaigns opposing modem 
schools, enfranchisement of women and the State’s policies of the forcible unveiling of women. 
The Ulema's authority and autonomy were further undercut by State initiatives attempting to 
take-over control of shrines, mosques, religious funds and Ulema-owned land. This initiated a 
vigorous Islamic defence of private property. Furthermore the Ulema had strong ties with the 
bazaar bourgeoisie whose economic interests were endangered by the State’s economic policies 
and foreign imports.
Strong elements of class struggle can be detected within Islamism both in Egypt and in Iran. In 
Iran the oil wealth attracted masses of peasants from the countryside where they packed into 
shanty towns, as was also the case in much of the Sunni Arab world. These were the 
‘disinherited’, suffering from the exploitative aspects of capitalism, who were mobilised by the 
Islamic Revolution. A nationalist ideology of an Iranian Muslim population oppressed by 
corrupt un-Islamic rulers and outsiders came into being. This ideology was influenced by 
socialist ideals and student activism. Shari’ati, an important ideologue behind the Revolution, 
developed a modem reformulation of the Shi’ite theory of the State. However, despite his 
claim to be a revolutionary reformist, his message was essentially identical to that of the 
religious establishment. His concept of styasat (polity) while it involved education and reform, 
emphasised leadership and force if necessary (Fischer 1980:154). What triggered the Iranian 
Revolution was an alliance between those amongst the clergy who followed Khomeini and the
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Islamist student elites who were products of the efficient educational system in Iran but 
frustrated in their attempts to rise in the social scale.
The theme of persecution, suffering and martyrdom in the fight against oppression and injustice 
is an important and persistent one in Shi’a ideology and symbolism (Fischer 1980:170). This 
theme is constantly remembered and re-enacted in annual passion plays. The sacred history 
which is re-lived in the month of Muharram (the first month of the Muslim calendar) is that of 
the martyrdom of Hussain (the Prophet’s grandson) at Karbala. Hussain was killed in battle 
against the forces of the Sunni Caliph Yazid. The Shi’a-Sunni division which was the first 
major schism within Islam occurred after the death of the Prophet and during the ensuing 
dispute over leadership of the Muslim community. The Shi’a believed that succession should 
have gone along dynastic lines to the Prophet’s son-in-law, ‘Ali. They thus regard the first 
Caliphs of Islam - Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman - as illegitimate unjust oppressors.
Fischer illustrates how in modern-day Iran the symbolic rhetoric and passion plays of the 
Karbala united disparate groups by transforming the passive weeping for Hussain into the 
active witnessing of fighting and the overthrow of tyranny (Fischer 1980:183). With lack of 
support and active opposition by the State for the Muharram commemoration, these dramatic 
enactments took on anti-State characteristics. Khomeini, who described the Shah as the 
historic evil and unjust tyrant Yazid, became identified as a major symbol of opposition to the 
Shah. Shi’a preaching was thus polished into an effective technique for maintaining a high level 
of consciousness about the injustice of the Pahlavi regime.
Whilst in exile Khomeini became identified with the hidden Twelfth Imam and legends were 
built up around his life. Shi’ite Ideology holds that no ruler will have legitimacy until the advent 
of the hidden Imam, the Mahdi who will usher in an era of justice and truth. It is to the coming 
of the M ahdi that the Doctors of Law await. The Shi’a owe ultimate allegiance to the Mahdi, 
although for reasons of convenience temporary outward allegiance may be given to the ruling 
power. In contrast traditional Sunni interpretation has it that as long as a Sultan rules according 
to Islamic laws, the Muslims should support him. This fundamental illegitimacy of the ruler 
within Shi’ism provided a valuable doctrinal basis upon which Khomeini, | before his return 
from exile, called for the overthrow of the Shah. Khomeini further developed the novel Islamic
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concept of vilayet-e-faqih or juris-consult who institutes divine law in the absence of and on 
behalf of the Imam.
2.4 Re-lslamisation from Below
Although contemporary Islamist revival is often associated solely with the Iranian Revolution, 
its seeds may be found in many parts of the world during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. The 
1967 Arab-Israeli war proved to be a turning point in the Arab world. The loss of Jerusalem, 
the third holiest city of Islam, rendered the defeat a world-wide Islamic, and not just a 
Palestinian, issue. For many Muslims the magnitude of the defeat struck at the heart of their 
sense of pride, identity and history. Amidst this a common critique of the military, political and 
sodo-cultural failures of Western-oriented development and a quest for a more authentic, 
indigenously rooted society and culture emerged. In Egypt religiosity is believed to have 
grown following the 1967 defeat. People felt that God had abandoned Egypt and allowed it to 
be defeated because the Egyptians had abandoned God (Haddad 1991, Shoukrullah 1994). 
There was a loss of faith in Nasser and his entire secularist ideology and his socialist 
programmes were judged to have been failures. Islamist movements grew stronger and more 
widespread as did their visible emblem, ‘Islamic dress’ for both men and women. Since the 
1970’s these movements have steadily continued to gain ground.
In the early 1970’s the Sadat government embarked on the infitah (open-door) policy and 
promulgated a series of new laws which encouraged foreign investors, both Western and Arab, 
in order to promote economic growth. However, in actual fact the concessions led to foreign 
investments that were lucrative only to the foreigners and to a few Arab middle-men. The 
flooding of the country with luxury and consumer goods was detrimental to the local textile, 
clothing and tobacco industries. Whilst the open-door policy brought sudden wealth to a few, 
most Egyptians experienced its negative effects and, in particular, problems were exacerbated 
by the State’s retreat from internal development and the public sector. There was high 
inflation, serious shortages in housing, low wages and reduced employment prospects. 
Corruption was rife and the perceived moral breakdown became associated with the Western 
cultural penetration. An unfamiliar and culturally offensive mixing of the sexes - accompanied 
by drinking, dating and sex - were seen as being in vogue. Despite Sadat’s promise of an era of 
prosperity, on the contrary even for the educated there was an increasing likelihood of
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unemployment. Amidst this economic and political crisis Islamism became the language of 
protest against the State. Furthermore Islamist organisations started to provide valuable social 
welfare services, which the State was unable to provide efficiently, to the under-privileged; such 
as medical aid (Kepel 1994).
In this climate of growing Islamisation Sadat made increasing accommodation to the Islamists. 
He himself took on an Islamic rhetoric and, in contrast to Nasser, was tolerant of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. Sadat actively encouraged the Brotherhood and, at the 
same time, suppressed left-wing opposition. The Brotherhood was allowed to resume their 
activities and very soon their publications reached a wide audience. However, their literature as 
well as criticising Nasserism and communism, also commenced attacking Sadat’s policies. 
Their Islamist discourse became the language of political dissent and discontent. When Sadat 
signed the Camp David agreement giving Israel diplomatic recognition, there was a hue and cry 
not only from the Islamists but also throughout the entire Muslim world.
The 1970’s and the 1980’s was characterised by the activism of highly militant Islamist groups 
in Egypt and the world over. However, it appears that pietist socially orientated Islamic 
organisations have proved to be more successful in the long term than the more militant ones; 
probably because their activities promoted social stability (Kepel 1994). The Islamic 
organisations tend to build up structures in the community which protect individuals from the 
buffeting of modem life. Through their activities they have come to occupy a dominant 
position in civil society. Carrying on into Mubarak’s era, the Brotherhood has emerged as a 
vibrant social and political force in Egyptian society. Although not registered as a political 
party, it has nevertheless formed alliances with other groups and emerged from national 
elections as a leading opposition force. Similar to other Islamist organisations the Brotherhood 
provides Islamically inspired alternative educational, legal, medical, banking and social services 
often more cheaply and more efficiently than the government. On university campuses 
Islamists have linked charity and social concern with their political and religious aims. Contrary 
to many stereotypes, the leaders of both moderate and radical Islamist organisations in 
countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan are not uneducated anti-modem 
reactionaries. A large number of young and educated people are attracted to these movements. 
Many of the activists combine traditional backgrounds with modem education at major national 
and international universities. With the exception of Shi’a groups, most Islamist organisations
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consist predominantly of lay, as opposed to clerical, members. The majority are graduates of 
the faculties of science, medicine and law rather than religion or the humanities. They come 
from the lower middle-class and middle-class backgrounds and are at the same time pious and 
highly educated. They do not simply reject modernity but are trying to espouse a more 
indigenously rooted Islamically oriented alternative to the prevailing Western forms of 
modernisation.
The Islamic movements and organisations have differing political aims. However, they 
share and have much in common in their ideals, values and aspirations. Haddad from her 
survey of Islamist literature finds that there are a number of common and recurring themes 
(Haddad 1991). Underlying most of them is the acknowledged tension in which Muslims 
perceive their culture and religion to be in conflict with the West. Common to all is the 
desire to establish what they perceive to be a ‘just’ Islamic society through the 
transformation of personal and public life. However, there is no consensus between the 
groups on precisely which Islamic ideology should be adopted, what constitutes the best 
solution, what course is to be taken or what changes are to be implemented. Mainstream 
writers are united in their condemnation of the use of violence and in their advocacy of a 
measured and controlled form of jihad. They stress the importance of reconstituting Islam 
to its rightful place in society, especially in its social and public context, and they 
emphasise the need to regulate society Islamically through the imposition of Shari 'ah laws. 
Islamists, at the same time as stressing the public face of Islam and issues of power, are 
also concerned with personal and moral salvation. The indices of Islamic re-awakening in 
the personal or individual life are many: increased religious observance such as mosque 
attendance, prayer and fasting; more emphasis on Islamic dress and values; proliferation of 
religious programming and publications. Although militant Islamist movements in the 
Sunni world have generally been defeated in their violent confrontations with the state, 
however, there is growing evidence of a quiet, moral Islamic revolution occurring. Kepel 
refers to this process as ‘re-Islamisation from below* (Kepel 1994:39). This process of 
emphasising personal moral salvation as a means of ultimately re-Islamising society has 
some of its roots in the pietist internationally influential Tabligh movement founded in 
India in 1927".
11 The Tabligh movement is essentially dedicated to the renewal o f an individual’s spiritual self. It seeks to achieve the 
Islamisadon o f society by preaching to the masses, as opposed to the imposition o f an Islamic government from above.
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The revivalist movement is very much a phenomenon of the lay world and discussion of 
religious topics is no longer purely in the hands of the clergy. Except in Shi’a Iran, the 
power and influence of the clergy has steadily declined. The Ulema has come to be 
viewed by many as being mere pawns and puppets of the government, willing to distort 
Islam to fit Western and modem ideologies. The production of much of today’s religious 
literature is outside the realms of the theological institutions or government presses. One 
of the most important factors in this democratisation of religion lies in the printed word. A 
phenomenal growth in the publication and dissemination of literature in many Islamic 
countries has played a key role in the increase in the numbers of people committed to an 
Islamist solution to modem problems. In many Muslim countries the Qur’an and other 
religious texts, tracts, pamphlets and books on Islamic law are readily available in 
bookstores and sidewalk stalls. Publishing houses are proliferating and publication is aided 
by a variety of donations. It is clear that literacy and the availability of contemporary 
commentaries that address current issues have made the Qur’an more accessible to the 
general Muslim public. The Qur’an has become an important source not only for 
devotions, but also as a means of reflecting, consciousness-raising and politicisation. 
Other modem media, such as audio cassettes (which were of considerable significance 
during the Iranian Revolution), religious videotapes and computer programmes have 
become important for the dissemination of revivalist ideas. Special literature has been 
developed for women and children.
A very important factor in Islamism has been the migration of workers in pursuit of 
employment (from, usually, the Indian sub-continent) to the oil-rich countries of the Gulf 
and to the Western industrial nations. Their experience of migrancy has in many instances 
engendered a new superior identity found in the universal bond of Islam, transcending 
national and regional identities. Boundary markers such as ‘Islamic dress’, halal foods, 
etc., have taken on an added significance in these contexts. The Salman Rushdie affair 
illustrated the strong religious sentiments of a large number of Muslims in Britain. These 
Muslims have taken on the identity of a ‘British Muslim community’ in their common 
experience as a minority in a hostile environment. In Britain re-Islamisation from below 
has been encouraged by the reduction of state welfare provision. These reductions 
encouraged Muslims to turn to self-help networks run by the mosques. The break with the
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surrounding British jahilyiyya  found a territorial basis in districts that were developing into 
forms of ghettos, organised around the mosques and controlled by the imams. Muslim 
activists living in Western countries, away from the watchful eyes of their governments, 
have been able to generate and disseminate new ideas about the potential of Islamic unity 
and revival. They are actively involved in forging international connections and relations 
with Muslim activists elsewhere in the world.
2.5 The Islamist Model of the Ideal Islamic Woman’
The growth of identity politics and fundamentalism are believed to be especially linked to 
changes in the patriarchal system, with growing visibility and public participation of women 
(Memissi 1988, Moghadam 1993). Fundamental changes have occurred in gender relations 
throughout the world with the advent of industrialisation and world capitalism. Changes in 
gender relations and the structure of the family have resulted in a contestation between modem 
and traditional social groups over the nature and direction of cultural institutions. Female 
education and employment predominantly among the upper-classes and the elite in Muslim 
countries has slowly weakened the system of patriarchal gender relations. This has created 
status inconsistency and anxiety on the part of the men of the lower middle-classes and the 
petty bourgeoisie. Memissi comments that the access of women as citizens to education 
and paid work can be regarded as one of the most fundamental upheavals experienced by 
our societies in the Twentieth Century ibid). By laying siege to the important places 
considered until then the private preserve of men and the privilege of maleness - the school 
and the workplace - women opened everything up to question, in their personal life as well 
as their public role. Therefore the ‘return to the past’ and the return to tradition that men 
demanded was, according to Memissi, simply ‘a means of putting things back in order* 
(Memissi 1991:24).
Feminist scholarship has shown that at times of rapid social change gender assumes a 
paramount position in discourses and political programmes (Moghadam 1993:136). It has 
been observed by social scientists and feminists that fundamentalist movements of all 
religions typically elaborate the wife and mother role in far greater detail than the roles of 
men and children (Moghadam 1993, Hawley 1993). Due to their physical function of
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reproduction and nurturing of the young, women are seen as embodying and transmitting 
culture and tradition. The central concerns of Islamist movements are generally attributed 
to be the sexual differentiation of social and familial roles and community morality. These 
movements are seen as having a traditional and ‘conservative’ view on the role of women. 
Women are viewed as being controlled through their veiling and confinement to the home. 
They are seen as having limited access to the public sphere. However, as I will seek to 
further elaborate upon later, contradictory impulses may be found in the Islamist movements’ 
approach to gender and women’s status12.
In its historical practice amongst the majority of Muslims, Islam has been a very masculine 
religion. Illustration of this may be seen in the following: according to the orthodox 
conservative interpretations ritual duties rest to a greater extent upon the man than upon the 
woman (Hjaarpe 1983); communal praying at the mosque is according to the majority view 
recommended for men and, although permitted, for women is not encouraged; furthermore, 
when women do participate in joint or communal prayers they are positioned behind the men; 
prescriptions concerning ritual purity ascribe instances of greater ritual impurity to women than 
to men, e.g. during menstruation and childbirth; although the Shari ’ah attributes to women the 
right to manage their own property, a woman inherits only a half of what the man inherits; in 
classical fiqh  the testimony of a woman is regarded, generally speaking, as less valid than that 
of a man; the father or husband is considered to be the leader of his family and he has authority 
over his wife (Doi 1987).
Traditional interpretations of orthodox establishment Islam have stressed the hierarchical 
relationship between the sexes, and this especially in the conjugal relationship. Whilst 
accorded full personhood, ethical equality and rights in property and marriage as 
delineated by the Shari’ah, conservative Islamic discourse stresses obedience and modesty 
for women. Although equal spiritual worth is emphasised, there are marked differences 
between the rights of men and women in Shari’ah law regarding marriage, divorce, 
inheritance and legal testimony. ‘Equality’ and ‘individual rights’ has never been stressed 
in conservative Islam. Instead complementarity of roles, hierarchy and order necessary for 
the stable functioning of the community has been emphasised. Whilst modernists have 
reiterated the egalitarianism of Islam and have argued for reform in the Shari ’ah, the
12 See Section 5.0post.
46
2. Islam and Modernity
Islamist discourse echoes the conservative arguments of complementarity and the 
suitability of women to domesticity and motherhood.
The Islamist discourse whilst echoing much of conservative interpretations of the Qur’an 
and H adith is, however, modem due to the occasional allusion to natural science. The 
recent Islamist literature in pervaded by defensiveness and xenophobia. All social change 
is seen as originating in the corrupting influence of the West. Thus Western civilisation is 
seen as depriving women of their honour and personhood, and Western education is seen 
as destroying the fabric of Muslim society and corrupting women. Huda Shar’rawi and her 
associate Saiza Nabarawi who cast off their veils in such dramatic fashion in 192313 are 
cited as a classic example of the success of the West in corrupting Muslim women: both 
had received a French education (Haddad 1985:290). Several authors articulate what 
might be called an ‘Islamist domino theory’ which sees all problems in the world, whether 
political, economic or social, to be initiated by the grant to women of access to public 
places. Followers of this theory espouse that even the mere uncovering by a woman of her 
face in public will lead to the nation’s underdevelopment, economic recession or even 
depression. The ‘Islamic Order’ is seen as an unchanging and strictly patriarchal one, 
characterised by features such as the extended family, total authority of the male over the 
female and segregation of the sexes (Stowasser 1987). Polygamy is defended as being 
natural and a social necessity. Although there is some variation in the stances taken by 
different thinkers, a simple general outline can be offered of ‘the ideal veiled and virtuous 
Islamic woman’ as elaborated in the Islamist discourse.
Islamist discourse argues that there are basic biological and psychological differences 
between men and women. It is said that these God-given differences pre-determine the 
tasks which men and women are qualified to perform on earth (Doi 1989:1). Women are 
considered to be emotional, weak, gentle and naturally inclined towards domesticity. 
Consequently women, in contrast to men, are not qualified for leadership positions. The 
model of the ‘Western woman’ is wholly rejected (Abu Shehab 1993:122). The Western 
talk of women’s liberation and emancipation is seen as a disguised form of exploitation of 
the female body. The divine moral order envisioned by Islam where there is a delineation
13 Nabarawi and Sha’rawi removed their veils at a train station, in a symbolic act o f emancipation upon their return from  
the International Women’s Alliance in Rome.
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of sex roles and where love and sex are regulated within marriage is, the Islamists argue, 
the natural state of mankind and the panacea for the chaos of contemporary society. The 
Islamists point to the promiscuity and family breakdown in the West. Islamic scholar Doi 
writes that “today checks on morality have become weak and considered unnecessary and 
as a result a flood of sexual licentiousness, nudity and promiscuity has burst in on the 
West” (Doi 1989:183)14. Islam, by contrast, is seen to envisage a social order that 
separates the spheres of activity and discourages the free mingling of the sexes. The 
Islamist vision of Muslim women is largely a negation and rejection of the ‘sexually 
liberated, economically independent, individualistic Western career woman* who is seen to 
ignore family and motherhood. Islamist writers see capitalism as an evil, inhumane force 
which draws women into the labour force and encourages licentiousness, thus upsetting 
the natural order and harmony of society (Abu Shehab 1993).
The concept of Orientalism has been reversed by the Islamists writers: they have projected 
promiscuity and uncontrolled sexuality onto the Western woman. This phenomenon of 
‘Occidentalism* has its roots in the East’s colonial encounter with the West. Thus Persian 
travellers of the early 19th Century constructed an image of the West centred on women 
and their sexuality (Tavakoli-Targhi 1991): Western women were represented as having a 
voracious sexual appetite whilst the men were deemed to be incompetent. The Persian 
concept of gharbzadegi or ‘ Westoxciation’ (fascination with the West) which results in the 
loss of self-identify and cultural alienation was important as the antithesis in defining the 
Ideal Islamic Woman during the time of the Iranian Revolution. Unlike the Westoxicated 
‘painted dolls’ of the Shah who were involved in frivolous consumerism, the ideal Islamic 
woman wore a chador, kept to her religion and traditions, and was chaste and pious 
(Shari’ati 1980).
Certain ideals of womanhood are often propagated as indispensable to the attainment of an 
ideal society. These ideals apply to women’s personal behaviour, dress, sexual activity, 
choice of partner and reproductive options. Papanek in her study shows how in countries 
where ideological movements have become regimes - such as in Hitler’s Germany and 
Khomeini’s Iran -, ideologically motivated norms are enforced to limit or determine
14 Professor Abdur Rahman D oi is the Director o f the Centre for Islamic Legal Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. 
H e has written extensively on Shari’ah law and outlined in detail the orthodox Shari'ah position on women’s role in society.
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women’s behaviour (Papanek 1994). Thus for both Hitler and Khomeni’s movements, 
motherhood was at the epicentre of the ideal woman and, accordingly, the ideal woman’s 
life in the Ideal Society was restricted to the home and family. The Khomeini regime 
emphasised the creation of new values and a new moral order. The sickness and problems 
of society became attributed to the body of the un-Islamically dressed woman. Indeed, 
there was a continuing pattern of using women’s alleged inherent traits as a means of 
justification for male control of the women: e.g. by deeming that a woman’s nature was as 
the temptress of men. Mothers in the role of educators was a common theme for 
Khomeini (as for Hitler): it was the mother’s duty to educate her children into believers of 
the faith and raise them to become dedicated soldiers and martyrs for the cause. It was in 
these capacities that women to Khomeni were ‘invaluable’ and it was for these reasons 
that he denounced Western ideology for forcing women to discard their primary 
responsibility to their family (Afshar 1982:78).
Whilst in Iran there was state enforcement of the Ideal, a similar image of the ideal woman 
was stressed in Islamist literature in the Islamic world generally and in Egypt in particular. 
In this discourse women were constantly extolled to be chaste, obedient wives and good 
mothers. It was only through the fulfilment of these ‘natural’ functions that a woman 
could achieve rank, honour and selfhood. The woman’s role was to provide warmth, 
serenity and support in the home. She should draw her security from the family and other 
family members should also be in position to so do: thus the children should be at home 
with their mother and not in a day-care centre; and, the elderly should be with the children 
and not in an old peoples’ home. Polygyny is defended as natural and acceptable while 
polyandry is not: ‘Polyandry in not only inconsistent with man’s desire for exclusivity and 
love for his children, but it is against the nature of woman also’ (Mutahhari 1991:324).
In support of the Islamist view of the roles of men and women in society, it is argued that 
the ideal home-making Islamist woman is spared the struggles and worries of a career. 
Thus she is identified as a self-sacrificing individual whose existence is fulfilled only in the 
service of others and whose joy is completed by making others happy. Although education 
and learning are religiously enjoined on both men and women, women should pursue the 
proper type of education which is suited to them - as determined by men. Contemporary 
Islamists argue that if a woman genuinely wanted to carry out her tasks of being the
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mistress of the house, wife, mother and educator then she simply would not find the time 
to work elsewhere outside of the home (Stowasser 1994)13. They say that work by 
women outside of their homes should only be condoned if it was an economic necessity. 
“Islam does not require women to participate in trade, vocation or profession unless it is 
very necessary” (Doi 1989:147). Such work is undesirable due to the fact that it would 
inevitably bring women into contact with unrelated men. Islamists demand that following 
the onset of puberty, the sexes should be strictly segregated outside of the family nucleus: 
whether in school, at work or in public life. Furthermore, Islamists fear that economic 
independence of women would upset the ‘natural’ hierarchy of the sexes (1986:114) The 
Islamist discourse is most strict and forceful on the necessity of the ‘veil’ for Muslim 
women as a badge of their identity and modesty and as a deterrent to fornication. Islamist 
writers argue that the purpose of the veil is to make it impossible for a man to become 
sexually aware of a woman by seeing her. The modesty of the veiled Muslim woman is 
contrasted against the ‘nudity’ of the Western woman who interacts with men in public 
without inhibitions. Feminist thinkers are seen as trying to bring women unveiled into the 
public arena and thereby promote promiscuity and chaos.
Despite the rhetoric of the home-making wife and mother, however, Islamist women have 
in fact continued to go on into higher education and have entered the professions (Shaheed 
1988, Ahmed 1992). There is evidence of varying positions on gender within the Islamist 
movements themselves. This disjunction between ideal and practice is well illustrated by 
the example of the famous Egyptian Islamist leader Zeinab al-Ghazali. Her personal 
lifestyle and history were flagrantly at odds with her public statements on the domestic role 
of women in Islamic society. She entered two marriages on terms that she set and which 
gave her control over the continuance of the marriage (Hoffinan 1985 ). She divorced 
from her first husband because he took up her time and kept her away from her work. She 
stipulated to her second husband prior to their marriage that her perceived mission came 
first and that they would have to separate in the event of any major disagreements (ibid). 
So far, men have generally been in control of the Islamist discourse. Is it possible that the 
Islamist women’s model of the Ideal is different to men’s?
15 Stowasser quotes from Shaykh al-Sha'rawi o f Egypt who has outlined a very popular contemporary guide for Muslim  
women.
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Liberals, reformers and feminists continue to challenge and criticise the restrictive and 
inflexible blueprint of the Islamic Social Order and the Ideal Islamic Woman. In this they 
basically take two positions: one is to look into the early sources themselves and to refute 
certain aspects by bringing into view contradictory detail indicative of the fact that early 
Islamic society was much more flexible and, hence, quite different from what later 
restrictive material made it out to be. The second method of dealing with the restrictive 
and inflexible system is to deny its relevance altogether by understanding the Qur’an as a 
source book of Islamic values in which the general, moral-religious norms are more 
important than the specific political, social and economic detail that the Holy Book 
proclaims.
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Gender Activism and the Islamic 
Framework
The global diffusion of concepts of democracy and equality pose an important cultural and 
political problem to Muslims. A number of authors argue that the ideals of human rights 
have received a wide acceptance amongst the Muslim populations of the Middle-East 
(Mayer 1991, Dwyer 1991). They state that the precepts of Islam like those of 
Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and other major religions possessed of long and complex 
traditions, are susceptible to interpretations that can either create conflict between 
religious doctrine and human rights norms or reconcile the two. Whilst the modernists try 
for reconciliation, conservatives and Islamists insist that there is a clash between the 
Western world-views and the Islamic blueprint for social order. The literature arguing that 
Muslims must reject international rights norms, and instead follow distinctive Islamic rights 
principles which limit freedoms and restrict rights provides the theoretical rationales for 
many of the steps that governments have taken in the course of Islamisation programmes 
(Mayer 1991). These programmes have led to changes in the legal systems that have had 
adverse effects on the recognition and protection of human rights. Ignoring the 
fundamental Islamic notion of ‘ethical equality’, these conservative interpretations 
emphasise the sexual and religious discrimination inherent in the pre-modem Shari’ah 
laws. They point to the pre-modem Islamic sources which do distinguish in a number of 
areas between the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women, free persons and 
slaves.
Gender egalitarian systems in varying degrees are evident in South-East Asian and African 
Muslim communities. However, in other regions Islam has in general traditionally been 
practised and interpreted in a manner which has been particularly harsh and restrictive to
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women. Most of the world’s Muslim population falls into the area described as the area of 
'classic patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1988). This region covers North Africa, the Muslim 
Middle-East (including Turkey and Iran) and South and East Asia (Indian sub-continent 
and China). It has been argued that despite the potential for more egalitarian gender 
relations encoded in the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet’s actions, the patriarchal 
trend in Islam became more pronounced and inscribed into the Shari 'ah as it spread in 
regions and civilisations16 that had had a long tradition of patriarchal and misogynistic 
practices. Whilst there is much diversity in the way Islam is experienced, practised and 
interpreted over time and space, this heritage of patriarchy continues in the discourse and 
practices of orthodox conservative Islam to this day.
As anthropologists have noted the close guarding and control of women has been 
especially strong in Mediterranean and Near Eastern societies even during ancient times. 
Veiling and seclusion were then considered necessary in order to protect wives and 
daughters from male contact outside of the family. However, the veiling and seclusion 
called for by Islam were stricter than that which existed in the European Mediterranean. 
The Qur’anic injunctions - which were often patriarchally interpreted- although taken as 
the literal word of God by no means determined all aspects of women’s lives though 
(Keddie 1990). Thus just as it appears that most Muslim women have never really 
inherited in the way the Qu’ran states that they should do (especially with regard to land 
('ibid)), so at the same time adultery and fornication have rarely been punished in 
accordance with the Qur’anic teachings requiring four eye-witness. It is important 
therefore to be aware of the extent to which Qur’anic injunctions have been twisted and 
interpreted throughout Muslim history: it appears that, in general, the Qur’an was followed 
on sexual and other matters only when it was not too inconvenient or repugnant to men or 
the patriarchal family to so do. However, this does not mean that the prescriptions of the 
Qur’an and Muslim law were taken lightly by Muslims. The rules on polygamy, divorce 
and child custody were generally followed. The secondary position of women in relation 
to men was especially marked within the marital relationship.
Social and economic change as well as law reform has challenged the traditional family 
structure in the Muslim Middle-East. The present politicisation of the issue o f gender and
16 The regions and civilisations referred to are Persian Sassanid society and Mesopotamia (Ahmed 1992).
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the family is based on the Islamist discourse of cultural authenticity and resistance to 
Western cultural encroachment. The discourse of the Islamists glorifies the natural and 
God-given domesticity of women. In the Islamist quest for a trans-cultural and ahistorical 
‘Muslim Identity’ which is seen as threatened, women are elevated to the status of a 
symbol of the community. In so doing men legitimate their control of women’s 
appearance and behaviour (Helie-Lucas 1993, Moghadam 1993). Islamists make selective 
use of tradition as well as religious interpretations in order to structure an image of women 
which conforms to this reconstructed identity. The home and family relations are seen to 
be the last bastion of indigenous Islamic culture resisting Western cultural encroachment. 
Therefore women’s equality and autonomy, gender roles and the family have become 
dangerous and sensitive issues.
Feminists and human rights groups argue that Shari ’ah-based laws whose evolution and 
application have been under the influence of political Islamists have increasingly affected 
women’s lives and their legal rights. Although there is no general world-wide trend 
towards repealing legislation favourable to women, however, women have been the 
primary targets of harsh state-sponsored Islamisation programmes in Iran, Sudan and 
Pakistan. In Iran Shari ’ah rules were again in force with the abrogation of the Family 
protection Act by Khomeini. The military regimes of Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan (1979-1988) 
and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan (1989-present) became similarly associated with much the 
same regime of oppression of women following the imposition of their version of the 
Shari ’ah. In addition to stripping women of legal protections in the area of family law, the 
Khomeini regime (at least in its early years) interpreted the application of Islamic standards 
to require drastic curtailment of women’s activities outside the home. Women’s 
educational opportunities were restricted, they were excluded from a wide variety of 
prestigious jobs, they were also dismissed from their existing posts and, on the whole, they 
were eliminated from politics and government altogether (Yaganeh 1982, Azari 1983). 
However, it should be noted that women’s suffrage was never in fact abolished.
In countries where Islamist movements are strong women who try to defend their rights, 
whether human, civil or Islamic, are frequently accused of being Westernised. Faced with 
this accusation of ‘cultural betrayal’ many women try to demonstrate that their ideas are 
genuinely rooted in their own culture rather than in ‘foreign’ ideologies and that they are
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not alienated from their own society (Helie-Lucas 1993). Feminists in many Muslim 
countries put themselves at risk by challenging the religious and political establishment and 
the (largely) accepted corpus of centuries-old religious interpretations of the Shari’ah. 
Many, such as Nawal El-Saadawi of Egypt, have consequently suffered public harassment 
and imprisonment. It has been accepted, however, that on the whole the impact of 
feminism has been minimal on the masses in Muslim countries. This alienation from the 
general population appears, in the view of those who have taken a narrow definition of 
feminism, to be due to a bifurcation along class lines (Ahmed 1992, Moghadam 1993)17. 
That view-point was quite common earlier this Century and was exemplified by the overt 
confrontational feminism displayed by leaders such as Huda Sha’arawi of Egypt.
Whether due to coercion and pressure from the growth of Islamism or a genuine seeking 
of an indigenous culturally based movement, women from Muslim countries are 
increasingly arguing for women’s rights and equality from within an Islamic framework. 
This falls within the general attempt by modernist Muslims to reconcile global values of 
human rights, democracy and sexual equality with Islam. Feminist movements in Muslim 
countries whilst attempting in certain ways to seek religious legitimacy, have on the whole 
been secularly-based in that they have viewed religion as being a matter which should be 
relegated to the private, individual sphere only - and away from the public domain. In the 
case of Iran the feminist movement was largely secular-based and fought against the power 
of the Shi’a Ulema. Many earlier advocates of feminism saw Islam as being irrevocably 
gender-inegalitarian. Today, the term ‘feminism’ has become associated with 
Westernisation and few women in Muslim communities label themselves explicitly as such. 
However, whilst most Muslim women find the stereotyped image of feminism - that of 
being aggressively anti-men and in conflict with the Islamic moral code - unattractive, the 
principal ideal of ‘sexual equality’ has not yet been rejected by them. In fact the ideals of 
equal opportunity and equal treatment in the spheres of education, the professions, 
political participation and the family have a growing acceptance amongst women in 
Muslim countries. Badran talks of a kind of feminism or public activist mode amongst 
Egyptian intellectual women today (Badran 1994). Prior to the 1980’s there was a clear 
demarcation and animosity between the feminist and Islamist camps. In the present day,
17 Badran argues that feminism in Egypt has been far less class bound that observers and critics have claimed (Badran 
1993:144).
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however, there is a new configuration of female forces which has blurred some of the 
hard-drawn lines of the earlier era. Badran argues that ‘many women who can be broadly 
categorised as feminist, pro-feminist and Islamist are taking similar positions on women’s 
societal role and engaging in common forms of activism’ (Badran 1994:202). She terms 
this phenomenon ‘gender activism’.
I borrow Badran’s term ‘Gender Activism’ to denote, in her words, ‘women’s common 
‘feminist’ modes of thinking in the public sphere’ (Badran 1994:203). In this context 
Badran has defined ‘feminist’ as broadly being an awareness of constraints placed upon 
women because of their gender, compiled with attempts to remove those constraints and 
evolve a more equitable gender system involving new roles for women and new relations 
between men and women. The phenomenon is not a social movement but involves 
individuals or a few loosely structured groupings (ibid). It is pragmatic rather than 
political in the more highly organised sense, and low profile and subtle rather than public 
and confrontational (Badran 1994:204). My own usage however is limited to women 
working within the framework of Islam using largely religiously-based arguments. Gender 
Activism is essentially similar to feminism and I use two terms loosely and interchangeably. 
My choice in preferring to use the term Gender Activism is by no means an attempt to 
essentialise feminism or argue that feminism cannot exist in Muslim societies. It is an 
attempt to clarify what seems to me to be an essentially new phenomenon - a religiously 
based feminism. The term feminism has become associated with individualism and a type 
o f ‘sexual liberation’ alien to the Muslim world. Feminism has as I have explained come to 
be inextricably associated with a rigidly anti-religious stance. This stance was especially 
prominent in the 1970’s. The writers that I have considered do not identify themselves as 
‘gender activists’ and many may object my labelling of them as such. However, many of 
the writers do not identify themselves as feminists either. In fact many writers who 
identified themsleves as feminist and took an anti-religious stance two decades ago have 
now changed their positions considerably. Many of the writers I have examined actually 
choose to write in English (and a small number in French). Thus they implicity position 
themselves outside the internal debates in their societies and direct themselves towards the 
Western academia. However, it is not my place here to examine in detail what impact the 
gender activist writers have nor who their audience is.
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Gender Activists represent a broad spectrum of religiosity ranging from liberal modernists 
to Islamist women. Though the majority are Muslim women some none-Muslim women 
are also involved. Whilst at present very small and newly emerging, I believe this 
phenomenon of gender activism is occurring in many Muslim communities as well as at a 
global level. My research seeks to focus in detail on the discourse propagated by a small 
number of ideologues for a largely Anglophone audience.
The emerging trend of Muslim gender activism has been observed world-wide by 
anthropologists. Kandiyoti writes that there is a clear attempt to rescucitate early Islamic 
history and the holy texts in order to formulate an indigenous feminist project (Kandiyoti 
1992). In Pakistan Keddie has observed an important development where “many 
oppositional women and men are undertaking more thorough study than before of the 
Qur’an and Islamic laws and traditions so as to find better Islamic bases for an egalitarian 
position” (Keddie 1990:104). Ayesha Imam has written about Hausa Muslim women’s 
associations in Kano, Nigeria. These women argue for a purification and reform of gender 
relations based on an appeal to relatively liberal interpretations of religious scriptures 
(Imam 1994). In the face of this growing evidence of Muslim gender activism, Moghadam 
comments that “the new generation of Islamic feminists are ideologically correct”, and 
possesses the required symbolic capital to launch feminist-type campaigns to improve the 
status of women (Moghadam 1994:21).
It is not just Muslim women drawing on the liberal, modernist tradition alone who are 
engaged in gender activism; some of the most vocal and outspoken are Islamist women 
themselves. For non-Islamist gender activists religion is primarily an individual and 
personal matter: they do not advocate an Islamic state and they have a pluralist attitude 
toward society. Islamists, on the other hand, differ in that they promulgate the need for an 
Islamic state, the imposition of Shari'ah law and an all-pervasive Islam embracing all 
aspects of life. According to the Islamists social reality and social development have no 
influence on religion, whilst religion shapes and guides from above. Whilst Islamists insist 
on the static and immutable nature of Islam as legislated in the scriptures, the modernists 
by contrast emphasise the fluidity and adaptability of Islam to new situations. Modernists 
argue for law reform and maintain that the majority consensus of all citizens, as the voice 
of the public interest, should lead to civil legislation on the basis of the Shari \ah. Again
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whilst modernist gender activists argue of total ‘sexual equality’ in modem human rights 
terms, the majority of Islamist women emphasise complementarity and campaign for 
women to regain their ‘Islamic rights’.
Islamist and non-Islamist gender activists women show a surprising amount of similarity in 
their ideals for gender relations. Both groups argue for the reinterpretation of the Qur’an 
and SharVah so as to realise the gender-egalitarian ideals of true Islam. Several 
researchers have spoken of the emergence of Islamist women’s gender activism in Sudan, 
Pakistan and Iran. Tohidi has spoken of the emergence of ‘Islamic feminists’ or the 
radicalisation of Islamist women previously disinterested in the advancement of women 
(Tohidi 1991). Haleh Afshar and Mir-Hosseini have written in some detail on this 
phenomenon with reference to Iranian Islamist women (Afshar 1994, Mir-Hosseini 1995). 
They state that there are clear signs of the emergence of a feminist re-reading of the 
Shari ’ah texts. Their arguments imply that political reasons have made it expedient, if not 
absolutely necessary, for feminists in Iran to be for Islam rather than against it.
In Egypt Islamist women (following Zeinab al-Ghazali’s line and developing it further) are 
evoking a new discourse on women. Zeinab al-Ghazali, an important Islamist activist of 
the 1950’s and 1960’s who is presently an active lecturer, teacher and propagator of Islam, 
remains today an important role-model for young Islamist women. Al-Ghazali’s basic 
tenet is that Islam has given a woman all her rights - economic, political, social, public and 
private (Hoffman 1985:234-235). Heba Rauf Ezzat, a leading gender activist, argues that 
“it is time to launch a new women’s liberation movement - an Islamic one’’(el-Gawhary 1994), 
Whilst each of these gender activist ideologues and movements have to be considered in 
their particular socio-economic and political situations, unity in their ideals are evident.
On the whole the gender activist discourse is a challenge to the domesticated ideal Islamic 
woman as defined by the Islamists.
The present discourse of gender activism has, I believe, gone beyond the ahistorical 
idealistic denial of inequalities in orthodox Islam. Many Muslim feminists, conservative 
Muslims and Islamists insist that Islam revolutionised gender relations and gave women 
equitable complementary rights to men. In my view, many of these Muslim thinkers have 
erred in projecting modem ideas of human rights and sexual equality into the Prophet’s era
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of the 7th Century. I consider that more often than not it is simply cultural nationalism that 
has been the impetus behind this desire to show that Islam originally anticipated all the 
valued achievements of modem society. The more sophisticated and critical aspects of the 
emerging discourse of modernist Muslim gender activists start from the premise that 
although Islamic sources may have foreshadowed ideas that were later developed into 
human rights principles and ideals of gender equality, the study of Islamic civilisation 
shows that the potential of the sources were not fully developed until the 20th Century 
(Mayer 1991). The ideologues amongst the gender activists, consequently, attempt to 
build on the egalitarian ideals inherent in Islamic scripture whilst arguing for reform in the 
gender inequalities evident in the pre-modem Shari 'ah.
Gender activists are concerned with achieving ‘equality’ of the sexes in terms of 
acceptance of the dignity of the sexes in equal measure, their enjoyment of equal rights and 
responsibilities in the social, economic and political spheres. They wish to have equal 
rights under the law and socially accepted codes of behaviour, to enter into and leave 
marriage as well as equal freedom to choose a profession or a way of life. To achieve this 
end, gender activists devote time to research their ‘feminist’ ancestors in order to recover 
and reclaim their own history and religion. They are currently entering into scholarly 
research into the male-dominated spheres of Islamic theology and jurisprudence. They 
essentially take the position that oppression is very real in the practice of Islam but 
extrinsic to the ideals and values of ‘true’ Islam. Al-Hibri states that Islam itself has given 
women full human rights, but that patriarchal interpretations and practices have taken 
these away (al-Hibri 1995). Many Muslim women and men consequently argue, as is 
widely accepted, that some 14 Centuries ago Islam recognised women’s legal and 
economic independence as separate from that of their fathers and or husbands and sons. 
However, some authors excessively idealise the Prophet’s era as being one of complete 
gender-egalitarianism and harmony. For example, Hussain argues that it is “feudalistic 
thinking not Islamic thinking that places women under the control of men” (Hussein 1984). 
For her, ‘true’ Islam was practised only in the Prophet’s era. The Prophet’s actions were 
liberal and humane towards women. Others argue that Islam brought a radical change in 
gender relations for that period in Arab history. Thus they argue, today such 
reinterpretations should attempt to bring gender equality to modem international
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standards18. All authors agree that after the Prophet’s death interpretations of the religious 
texts became more restrictive towards women’s autonomy and freedom. In her analysis of 
religious scriptures, al-Hibri attempts to show how in the development of the Shari *ah 
interpretations of the religious texts by male scholars tended to become more and more 
restrictive towards women through the ages (al-Hibri 1982).
3.1 Ethical Equality
Gender activists, like modernist reformers early this Century, are particularly eager to 
stress the more egalitarian strands in the religious scripture. In this they particularly 
emphasise specific Verses of the Qur’an and certain Hadith. The more liberal 
interpretations of these in the fiqh  argue for complete moral and spiritual equality between 
men and women. This re-interpretation provides the sanctioning forum for more 
egalitarian gender relations. Like many other reformers gender activists are selective in 
their use of traditions and religious interpretations. They attempt to use the message of 
‘ethical egalitarianism’ in the Qur’an to structure a model of Muslim women different to 
the one constructed by the Islamist discourse.
Many reformers point out that Qur’anic precepts consist in the main of broad, general 
propositions largely of an ethical nature, rather than specific legalistic formulations. They 
do not provide a simple straight-forward code of law. Many of these broad propositions 
are addressed to both men and women and reiterate their full and equal humanity: thus 
both sexes have equal rewards for good deeds and bear the burden of equal moral 
responsibility; there are similar punishments for both male and female thieves and 
adulterers19. In fact it has been pointed out by many that one of the remarkable features of 
the Qur’an, particularly in comparison with the scriptural texts of other monotheistic 
traditions, is that women are explicitly addressed. Stowasser argues that women’s 
essential equality with men is greater and more complete in Islam than in Judaism and 
Christianity (Stowasser 1984:22). Unlike Judeo-Christian belief, in Islamic sources Eve 
alone was not solely responsible for the expulsion from Paradise; both Adam and Eve
18 Gender activist ideologues such as Fatima Memissi, Leila Ahmed and Riffat Hassan hold this view.
19 Qur'an, 5:38
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were. One of the most oft quoted Qur’anic Verses used to highlight this ethical gender 
equality i s :
“For Muslim men and Muslim women, 
for believing men and women, 
for devout men and women, 
for true men and women, 
for men and women who are true and constant, 
for men and women who humble themselves, 
for men and women who give in charity, 
for men and women who fast (and deny themselves), 
for men and women who guard their chastity, 
andfor men and women who engage much in God’s praise, 
for them has God preparedforgiveness and a great reward’
(Qur’an 33:35)
This passage makes a clear statement about the absolute identity of the human moral 
condition and the common and identical spiritual and moral obligations placed on all 
individuals (Al-Faruqi 1990:44). Other such Verses include:
“I  shall not lose sight o f the labour o f any o f you who labours in My way, 
be it man or women: each o f you is equal to the other”
(Qur’an 3:195)
Much of the discourse of Muslim gender activism is led at an academic and intellectual 
level. It is not simply the religiously trained who have contributed to this discourse, but 
also historians and anthropologists as well. One of the strongest arguments for an 
egalitarian Islam in tension with hierarchical elements within it comes from Leila Ahmed in 
her work Women and Gender in Islam, published in 199220. Ahmed argues that although 
both Islam and Christianity were predicated on a hierarchical social order, Islam in addition 
preached an ethical message regarding the equality of all human beings (Ahmed 1992:65). 
Thus even as it instituted a sexual hierarchy within marriage, it laid the ground in its ethical
20 Ahmed is presently Professor o f Women's Studies and Director o f  the Near Eastern Area Studies at University o f  
Massachusetts, Amherst and Faculty Associate at the Centre for Middle-Eastern Studies, Harvard University. She has 
previously published work on feminist movements in the Middle-East
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voice for the subversion of this hierarchy (ibid). Both Qur’anic and Hadith passages imply 
an egalitarian view of human biology in terms of male and female contributions to 
conception. Ahmed writes that “there appear, therefore, to be two distinct voices within 
Islam, and two competing understandings of religion; one expressed in the pragmatic 
regulations of society, and the other in the articulation of an ethical vision” (Ahmed 
1992:66). Ahmed subsequently goes on to show that in the development of the Shari’ah 
the hierarchical strand was extensively elaborated into a body of political and legal 
thought.
According to Ahmed and a few other thinkers, such as Mahmoud Taha of Sudan21, 
tensions between the pragmatic and ethical perspectives can be detected even in the 
Qur’an. Thus, some Qur’anic Verses - like the one’s regarding marriage - undercut others 
that seemingly establish marriage as a hierarchical institution unequivocally privileging men 
(Ahmed 1992:63); e.g.:
“ Wives have rights corresponding to those which husbands have, 
in equitable reciprocity”
(Qur’an 2:229)
Such Verses stand in sharp contrast to the Verses establishing superiority of the husband 
to his wife and sanctioning the beating of disobedient wives22. Taha has formulated a 
radical new version of Islam and a new movement relying on the gender egalitarian Verses 
of the Qur’an. He argues that it is only these ethical precepts enjoining equality that were 
meant to be eternally binding upon humanity.
Murata, a Japanese scholar, takes a phenomenological approach in her study of Islam 
(Murata 1992). She focuses on the Islamic intellectual tradition as opposed to the 
legalistic approach of the Shari’ah. Murata looks at the principles involved in gender 
relationships at the theological, cosmological and psychological levels. She finds much 
similarity between Islamic ideas and ancient Chinese thought on the basis that cosmology 
is based on the complementarity or polarity of receptive and active principles {i.e. yin  and
21 see section 4.2post.
22 These include Verses such as Verse 4:34, “ as to those women on whose part you fear disloyalty and ill conduct, admonish them,
refuse to share their beds and beat them; but if  thty return to obedience seek not against them means of (annoyance): for God is Most High, 
Great.*'
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yang  qualities) (Murata 1992:7). This basic duality is connected to the One who is beyond 
all duality. With regards to the notorious Qur’anic Verse
“The men have a degree above them (the women) . . . .”
(Qur’an 2:228)
Murata argues that at the social level this implies strictly defined gender roles and
hierarchy (Murata 1992:174). However, more esoteric interpretations which attempt to
look at the inner spirit of the Verse have argued that women have the advantage of relative
weakness and incapacity in the outward domain. Recognising one’s own yin  qualities
(gentleness, servant-hood) in the face of God is an aid to tawhid (or the Oneness of God),
since it makes a person ascribe all power, creativity and glory to the Real (Murata
1992:178). Women thus will be less inclined to make unjustified claims. Murata justifies 
inequality by making servant-hood an asset for women.
Liberal ideas of equality and human rights for all citizens were easily Islamicized early this 
Century in the Middle-East. However, in many Muslim countries there has been and 
continues to be a reluctance to extend this full absolute equality to women (Ahmed 1986: 
665). Furthermore it should be emphasised that the concept of ‘equality’ itself often has 
different connotations in different contexts. For example, although the concept of 
egalitarianism was a fundamental tenet of the political legal order envisaged by the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence of the USA, almost no white males in 
the era of the Founding Fathers thought that that principle of equality extended to women 
and to black slaves; both of these categories were simply assumed to be inherently 
different and unequal (Mayer 1991). It is therefore possible to both affirm equality and at 
the same time support a regime of laws that discriminated on the basis of sex and race. 
Thus, one finds Muslims who will argue that Islam recognises the principle of equality 
even whilst maintaining that women must be accorded an inferior status. For example, 
although Mawdudi included the “the equality of human beings” in his list of Islamic Human 
Rights, however, in his discussion of this principle he argued that Islam outlaws 
discrimination between ‘men’ based on colour, race, nationality or class (Mawdudi 
1980:12). He did not include equality between men and women in his discussion and nor 
did he argue against discrimination on the basis of sex/gender. Instead, he simply 
emphasised the complementarity of the roles of men and women. Mawdudi objectifies
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women and argues that respect for the chastity of women should be a “basic human right”. 
He states:
“...a woman’s chastity must be respected and protected at all times, whether she
belongs to one’s own nation, or the nation of one’s enemy....” (Mawdudi 1980:18)
However, in practice, as feminist anthropologists have shown, in many Middle-Eastern 
countries the need to shield women’s chastity has been exploited in order to justify the 
denial to women of a broad spectrum of rights and to keep them restricted to their homes. 
There is an ambivalence which conservative Muslims and Islamists feel about the principle 
of equality, a principle which they are in general reluctant to condemn openly but seek to 
circumvent in practice. Although equal human rights between men and women are 
reiterated by the post-revolutionary Iranian Constitution, the inclusion of certain 
provisions indicate that discriminatory Shari ’ah principles would prevail over the secular 
equal protection principle: thus whilst Article 20 taken in isolation guarantees men and 
women equal protection before the law, however, Article 21 then states that a citizen’s 
rights are qualified by Islamic standards according to the pre-Islamic Shari’ah (Mayer 
1991:128-129).
Islamism as the rhetoric of popular political dissent has often emphasised egalitarianism 
and equality. This was the case in pre-Revolutionary Iran and is the case in present day 
Egypt. However, often this egalitarianism has not been with regard to gender relations. 
However, Islamists, even whilst they reiterate the rhetoric of the domesticity of women 
and argue against total ‘equality’ of the sexes, in no way ignore women. The Brotherhood 
in Egypt has encouraged women’s active participation and has come to emphasise the 
essential contribution of Muslim women. Nevertheless, it is with regard to the familial role 
of wives and mothers that Islamists exalt women. Women are seen as the helpmates and 
mothers of future Muslims. Modernist gender activists, on the other hand, wish to see a 
fundamental change in family structure and ideal values. They desire acknowledgement of 
women’s equal intellectual, economic, political and social contributions in the professions 
and public life.
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3.2 Feminist Theology
The women’s movement and the egalitarian ideals of feminism have radically affected 
traditional religions and civilisations throughout the world. One particular example is the 
breakdown of domestic segregation and the entrance of women into religious spheres 
outside the home (Young 1994). In Muslim countries women now seek access to what 
were previously considered to be exclusive spheres of religious power. This ‘feminization’ 
of Islam has resulted in demands for women’s access to theological institutions, positions 
of religious leadership and prayers in mosques. Thus in Egypt there are a few Muslim 
women who teach the Qur’an and Islamic tradition (Smith 1994); in Indonesia the 
Aisyihah movement (named after the Prophet’s wife) educates women about Islam; a few 
women in Indonesia and other countries are also performing the roles of imams (prayer 
leaders) (ibid); throughout the world there is a proliferation of women’s study circles and 
discussion groups. Often female counterparts or sister organisations are created to 
important Islamist organisations as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
Despite the prominence of women such as the Prophet’s wives Khadija and A’isha during 
early Islam, the Islamic tradition has until the present time by and large remained rigidly 
patriarchal and discouraged the growth of scholarship amongst women, particularly in the 
realm of religious thought23. Although even during the most misogynistic periods of 
history a small number of women have been able to participate to some degree in the 
world of thought and learning, Islamic theology has remained essentially a male preserve. 
According to gender activists the sources on which Islamic tradition is based - mainly the 
Qur’an, Hadith literature, and fiqh  (jurisprudence) - have been interpreted only by Muslim 
men who have arrogated to themselves the task of defining the role and status of women in 
society.
Today gender activist women from Muslim countries are attempting Qur’anic exegesis (a 
field exclusive to men in the past) and thus challenging Islamists in their own fields. These 
women have studied the Qur’an, the Hadith and the tafsir to re-establish the ‘truth’ of the
23 Conservative Muslim scholars argue that women have never been deliberately excluded from theological institutes or 
the re alm  o f religious learning. There have been a few well-known women Ulema (or alimat) in Islamic history.
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revealed texts. They denounce the human and historical input into the Hadith and tafsir 
and see this input as being responsible for the discrimination against women. Akin to 
certain purificatory strands within Islamism, these gender activists largely seek to revert 
back to the ‘original sources’ (i.e. the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet) and reject later 
interpretations and practice. Therefore, for many the real question that has emerged is 
whether these sources themselves are inherently inegalitarian. Over the past few decades 
feminist theologians have also infiltrated other religions as well, especially Christianity. 
Feminists in religion have objected to misogynistic doctrines, gender discrimination within 
religious hierarchies and liturgical language that is skewed toward the masculine. They 
have often left the mainstream and attempted to devise new forms of religion that do not 
put women in second place. Despite the gender inegalitarian bias evident in the majority of 
religious scriptures modernist feminists insist that modem knowledge and hermeneutics 
reveal in them meanings that are in startling opposition to traditional exegesis.
The major hermeneutical dilemma facing textual interpretation is devising some standard 
by which to adjudicate competing interpretations. This dilemma is a result o f the recent 
philosophical trend of emphasising the interpretative nature of all understanding, instead of 
the traditional pursuit of firm foundations. Derrida, for example, does not shy away from 
but embellishes the relativistic tendency within phenomenological hermeneutics. Derrida 
and other de-constructive interpreters have been criticised for advocating an unmitigated 
relativism that results in the acceptance of all interpretations as equally legitimate. 
However, in order to avoid an unmitigated relativism the science of interpretation can only 
lay claim to intellectual respectability if its results can purport to have validity. Several 
gender activists have been influenced by these developments in textual analysis. They have 
tried to keep new interpretations of the Qur’an within the confines of traditional methods 
of interpretation even though they have reached radically different results. The traditional 
conservative viewpoint, which is reiterated today by some Islamists, is basically that the 
Qur’anic text has a single, determinate meaning and any interpretation that does not 
reproduce this meaning is judged to be incorrect.
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Amongst the pioneers of the movement of Islamic feminist theologians is Riffat Hassan, 
whose work is now rapidly gaining international influence24. Her writings analyse the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah as well as the fiqh. Hassan has argued on numerous occasions that 
the Qur’an, if interpreted properly, is a very humane religious text. She attempts to 
demonstrate that the interpretations of the Verses most often used against women have 
been influenced by pre-Islamic discriminatory practices or the anti-feminist bias in the 
Jewish and Christian traditions. Thus in her research she shows that unlike in Judeo- 
Christian sources, in the Qur’an Eve was not created from Adam’s rib (Hassan 1985). She 
points out that the edifice of man’s superiority to woman rests largely on the belief that 
woman was created from and for man. Hassan stresses the progressive and egalitarian 
nature of the Prophet’s message and argues that one has to tap into the spirit o f the 
Qur’an instead of the literal meaning of the words (Hassan 1986:32). However, she also 
argues that one cannot establish the spirit of the Qur’an without dealing with the letter of 
the Qur’an - although not in too literal or simplistic a fashion. An international group of 
feminist theologians now researches religious issues and raises consciousness (WLUML
1990). Riffat Hassan is attempting to establish the basis for a women’s liberation 
movement rooted in religion and, at the same time, maintain links with women from other 
religions in the hope of developing a liberation theology in Islam (Helie-Lucas 1993:219).
Hassan points out, as do many other gender activists, that when Islam was established 
(between 622-632 AD) there is strong evidence indicating that both Islam and the Prophet 
of Islam made tremendous efforts to emancipate women (Hassan 1986:31). Hassan 
considers that the present Islamic revival although has produced misogynistic regimes and 
movements such as Zia’s Islamisation programme in Pakistan, has also had the positive 
effect of raising general consciousness on the issue of gender in Islam. Hassan writes that 
underneath all the more obvious causes for the inferior position of women - sociological, 
historical, economical - is a cause that has theological roots (Hassan 1986:32). She 
believes that dealing with the theological foundations of these negative attitudes will help 
to free and emancipate women. The majority of Muslims believe that God has given men 
superiority over women. According to Hassan, these patriarchal assumptions are based on 
the Biblical Genesis story of Eve having been created from Adam’s rib and therefore being
24 Hassan gained her doctorate in Islamic Philosophy and has been the Professor o f Religious Studies at the University o f  
Louisville, Kentucky.
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derivative and subordinate to him; i.e. woman created from a man and for the benefit of a 
man (ibid). Although the Qur’an states that humanity originated from “a  single soul or 
s e lf  (Qur’an 4:1 and 7:189), most Muslims believe that since Eve was created to be a 
helpmate to Adam this makes him the primary creation. Hassan, however, argues that the 
Qur’an even-handedly uses both feminine and masculine terms and imagery to describe 
human creation.
Hassan’s radical new argument is that the Qur’an says absolutely nothing about Eve and 
does not talk about the creation of woman from man (Hassan 1985, 1987). According to 
her the Qur’an, which is the ultimate religious authority for Muslims, talks about human 
creation in absolute egalitarian terms. However, subsequent interpretations, influenced by 
Hadith literature have reiterated the Genesis story. Hassan analyses the language of the 
Qur’an in depth. Her chief argument is that the common translation o f ‘Adam’ as ‘man’ or 
‘the first man’ is wrong25 (Hassan 1987:28). She argues that ‘Adam’ is a Hebrew word 
co-opted into Arabic and is a collective noun meaning humanity (ibid). Whilst the term 
itself is a masculine noun, linguistic gender does not connote sex in Arabic. ‘Adam’ is 
retained more as a concept than as a name of a concrete human individual. Hassan argues 
that the word refers to the human species irrespective of a specific gender. Furthermore, 
she writes, the Qur’an contains no categorical statement the Adam was the first human 
being created by Allah. Instead of Adam and Hawwa (Eve) the Qur’an speaks of Adam 
and zauj (translated “mate”) (Hassan 1985:126). Muslims almost without exception 
assume that Adam was the first human being and that he was male. If Adam was a man it 
follows that Adam’s zauj mentioned in the Qur’an becomes equated with Hawwa. 
According to Hassan, however, neither the initial assumption nor the inferences drawn 
from it are supported in clear or conclusive terms by the Qur’anic text (ibid). The term 
zauj is also a masculine noun but it has a feminine counterpart zaujatun. Since the Qur’an 
uses the masculine noun zauj, Hassan writes that the terms were deliberately left unclear 
(Hassan 1985:127). The purpose of the Qur’an is not to narrate certain events in the life 
of a man and women (such as Adam and Eve of popular imagination) in the literal sense, 
but to refer to the life experiences of all human beings in the symbolic sense.
25 Adama literally 'the soil’ is a collective noun meaning ‘from the soil’ (Hassan 1985:125).
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3.3 Reclaiming the Past
Gender activists look back into the past and read a relatively egalitarian social order into 
the Prophet’s era. Many past writers have idealised and projected an age of ‘sexual 
equality’ back into the past. Some early feminists influenced by the Marxist trend in the 
social sciences have spoken of a feudal system and a monolithic patriarchy which 
destroyed ‘true Islam’ (Hussain 1984). For example, Al-Hibri in her early writings wrote 
that patriarchy co-opted Islam after the death of the Prophet and that the Qur’an came to 
be interpreted out of context in support of this patriarchy (Al-Hibri 1982). Hussain writes 
that following the very early phase of Islam feudal structures manifested themselves in 
various ways in Muslim societies (Hussain 1984:4). According to her patriarchy was 
common in these societies and with the use of biological rationalisations women came to 
be seen as private property. However, following the new ‘de-constructive’ phase within 
feminism, the debate has moved beyond this monolithic conceptualisation of patriarchy 
which destroyed the harmony of gender egalitarianism in early Islam.
Conservative Muslims and many Islamist thinkers often reiterate that new and radical 
changes in gender relations were achieved by the Prophet (Mawdudi 1980, Muttahari
1991). They compare this new era of enlightenment to the pre-Islamic Jahiliyya (Age of 
Ignorance). Muslim sacred history has blacked out the Jahiliyya as the age of darkness, 
barbaric practices and rigid hierarchy. However, the present gender activists are more 
critical of attributing a wholesale improvement in gender relations to the onset of Islam. 
They attempt to provide a more realistic historically verifiable account of the actual 
changes that occurred. They argue that when studied against the pre-Islamic background, 
although both the social status and legal rights of Muslim women were improved through 
Qur’anic legislation26, however, the extent of these changes remains to be researched more 
thoroughly. Furthermore, with the deconstruction of concepts such as ‘patriarchy’ within 
feminist studies a more complex picture has emerged of pre-Islamic gender relations. The 
scanty evidence available, whilst by no means conclusive, indicate an overall improvement 
in the lives of women in the early Islamic era as opposed to the pre-Islamic Jahiliyya.
26 Al-Hibri 1982, Hussain 1984, Stowasser 1984, Ahmed 1992, Memissi 1992
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However, there is also some evidence to suggest that prior to Islam some women had 
greater sexual autonomy in matrilineal and uxorilocal marriages and that they were active 
participants, even leaders, in a wide range of community activities including warfare and 
religion (Memissi 1985, Al-Hibri 1982, Ahmed 1992). The dominant view amongst 
gender activists is that despite this sparse evidence of matriarchal customs in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, the likelihood was that during that time there was not a higher status for the 
majority of women. Stowasser argues that the examples of pre-Islamic women warriors 
and poets have been taken out of context as erroneously implying women’s greater 
independence and rights in the Jahiliyya period (Stowasser 1984). Islam was a religion of 
the city where the pre-Islamic trend towards urbanisation was crystallised. In contrast to 
the desert, in the cities women’s lives were in many ways more restricted. In short, the 
majority of pre-Islamic urban women lived in a male dominated society where their status 
was low and their rights negligible.
According to Stowasser’s study, some of the improvements for women under Islam were 
as follows: Qur’anic injunctions put a stop to female infanticide and gave greater rights to 
women in marriage and divorce (Stowasser 1984:15-18). The mahr (bride-price) was 
payable to the bride and not her father or guardian as was the custom previously. A 
restriction was made on the maximum number of wives a man could take (limited to four). 
Wives were ensured the right to proper maintenance, food and clothing at the husband’s 
expense (ibid). Women were guaranteed the right to inherit and bequeath property. 
Female infanticide was outlawed. However, it should be noted here that modernist gender 
activists view the Islamist argument that the Qur’anic banning of female infanticide 
improved the position of women in all respects to be simplistic and inaccurate.
Qur’anic laws did not, however, establish full political, social or economic equality of the 
sexes27: Qur’anic injunctions stipulate that the testimony of a woman is equal to half that 
of a man’s. In most cases a woman inherits only half the share of a man. With regard to 
gender relations within the marital relationship, orthodox conservative interpretations 
emphasise that marriage was instituted as hierarchical and patrilineal. Islamic marriage 
enjoins women to strict monogamy and within marriage the husband is in charge of the
27 Stowasser 1987:18, Mayer 1991, Ahmed 1992
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wife and has full authority over her. Whilst men have been given unilateral powers of 
divorce, women do not have the same rights or prerogatives.
Gender activists draw largely on the Hadith and other biographical literature on 
Muhammad and his Companions as their main sources when exploring the key moments in 
the development of marriage within Islam. The early records were mainly written by men, 
but there were accounts given by women as well. Islamic laws culminated the trend 
towards patriarchal and patrilineal marriage in Arabia by instituting it as the sole legitimate 
form of marriage (Ahmed 1992:45). The lives of two of Muhammad’s wives, Khadija and 
A’isha, were premonitions of and reflected the sorts of changes that would later overtake 
women in Islamic Arabia. Khadija was a wealthy widow, a businesswoman who employed 
Muhammad and subsequently proposed marriage, and married him. She remained his only 
wife until her death. Despite the examples in the pre-Islamic era of publicly visible and 
independently wealthy women such as Khadija, many gender activists argue that these 
were probably in reality the rare exceptions (Stowasser 1984, Ahmed 1992). In stark 
contrast autonomy and monogamy were conspicuously absent in the lives o f the women 
the Prophet married after he became the established leader of Islam: thus A’isha, who was 
bom to Muslim parents and married Muhammad when she was nine, soon began to 
observe the customs of veiling and seclusion along with Muhammad’s other co-wives 
(Abbot 1985).
Apart from the question of whether Islam brought a change from matriliny to patriliny in 
Arabia, the evidence does reveal a variety of marriage practices were common in Arabia 
prior to Islam and post. From the different types of marriage described by A’isha for the 
Jahiliyya period two were polyandrous and involved visiting relationships (Ahmed28 
1992:44). Divorce could be initiated by both parties and there was no ‘waiting period’ for 
women before remarriage - idda which was instituted by Islam. Ahmed argues that from 
the very beginning the institution of a type of marriage which recognised paternity was an 
important part of the message of Islam. The pledge of a Muslim included the clause to 
refrain from zina (translated as fornication or adultery). It is not clear in the context of a 
society where several types of unions were seen as legitimate, however, precisely what
28 Ahmed quotes from The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari, translated by Muhammad M Khan, Medina: Dor al- 
Fikr, 1981
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zirta actually was (Ahmed 1992:44). When first used in Islam the term might have meant 
sexual intercourse in all unions outside the patriarchal one instituted by Islam. Thus zina 
could in fact have referred to other types of marriage, including polyandrous ones and 
temporary marriages, which became outlawed in Sunni Islam.
Gender activists stress the fact that a woman - the Prophet’s wife Khadija - was the very 
first convert to the new religion of Islam. In fact, there were also many other women were 
among the first converts. Following the death of Khadija, the subsequent marriages of the 
Prophet to widows and divorcees demonstrates that there was no emphasis placed in Islam 
on the need to marry virgins, and further shows that widows were apparently free to 
dispose of themselves in marriage without consulting any guardians (Afshar 1994). 
Gender activists stress this point in order to show that the obsession with virginity that is 
displayed in many Muslim societies today is not really an ‘Islamic’ practice at all. 
Following the great Muslim migration to Medina in 622 AD many women, including the 
Prophet’s wives, were actively involved in a wide range of community affairs (Stowasser 
1984, Memissi 1991, Ahmed 1992). This included warfare: again their roles were not 
limited to simply nursing the wounded, but several women were actually renowned as 
good warriors as well29. During these early years of Islam many women accepted the new 
religion and joined the community of believers without the consent of their husbands, some 
even making the hijra on their own. However, women were subsequently at a later stage 
forbidden by the Ulema from travelling alone without a husband or male guardian.
Contemporary conservative authorities who argue for segregation and the seclusion of 
women from public affairs have as their principle aim the preservation of ‘the traditional 
order of Islam’. The fact that such a sanction is founded on shaky grounds is not lost on 
more progressive thinkers who have striven to modernise the Islamic social order from 
within. They argue that the fault for unjust laws such as women’s inequality lies not with 
God’s revelations but with the Ulema's interpretations of them, in conjunction with 
contrived and inauthentic traditions. Thus modernist gender activists argue that whilst 
modesty is enjoined on both men and women, the specific injunctions on seclusion and 
veiling were directed towards the wives of the Prophet alone - this despite the fact that the 
Islamic texts speak interchangeably of veiling and seclusion. Stowasser writes that the
29 Renowned women warriors include Umm Umar ah and the Prophet* s aunt Safiya (Minai 1981)
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Qur’an is free of any clear or specific legislative detail as to whether all Muslim women 
should keep seclusion in their houses or veil their faces (Stowasser 1984:25). However, 
both these practices were legitimated by exegetes who interpreted vague and general 
Islamic provisions as sanctioning these practices. Gender activists point out that the 
Qur’an makes a clear distinction between the Prophet’s wives and other believing 
women30: she “took the veiF  is used in the Hadith to literally to mean “became the wife of 
the Prophet” (Ahmed 1992:55). The lives of Muhammad’s wives became circumscribed 
by the newly imposed injunctions on veiling and seclusion. Memissi argues that the 
Companions of the Prophet urged seclusion for his wives in order to prevent them being 
molested on the streets by the non-believers (Memissi 1991:178). The sociological 
approach taken by many gender activists argue that veiling was already practised by the 
upper-classes of Jews and Persians and was copied by the Muslims as an attempt to 
increase the power and status of the Prophet and the Muslim community: “By instituting 
seclusion the Prophet was creating a distance between his wives and the thronging 
community at his doorstep as befitted a new and powerful leader”(Ahmed 1992:55).
Whilst they stress that the Hadith are ambiguous sources of information on early Islamic 
practices, gender activists nevertheless use the Hadith as the important primary source for 
their arguments. They argue that the Hadith indicate that women used to pray with men in 
the mosques, they visited mosques even at night and acted as prayer leaders31. Hadith 
show that Muhammad assumed women’s right to speak out and spent time in instructing 
them on the Qur’an. Evidence from biographical accounts of the Sahabiya (female 
Companions of the Prophet) show that women enjoyed the right to enter into the councils 
of the Muslim community, to speak freely to the Prophet-leader, to dispute with the men, 
and to be involved in the management of military and political affairs (Memissi 1991:viii). 
In response to a query to the Prophet by one of his wives as to why women were not 
addressed in the Qur’an, the Verses specifically addressing women were revealed32. The 
gender activist discourse argues that following the death of the Prophet the harsh 
disapproval of the Ulema eventually caused women to disappear completely from public 
prayer. In their arguments against female seclusion, modernist gender activists argue that
30 O Consorts of the Prophet! You are not like any of the (other women): I f you do fear (God) be not too complacent of speech lest one is whose 
heart is a disease should be moved with desire: but speak ye a speech (that is)just (Verse 33:34).
31 The Prophet is said to have appointed a woman; Umm Waraqah to lead a mixed congregation in prayer (Minai 1981:16).
32 see section 3.1 ante.
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it is evident that in the Prophet’s era men and women met each other and greeted each 
other. Stowasser, from her study of the well-known and respected Hadith collections such 
as Bukhari and Muslim, argues that “even in the homes there was ample social contact 
between the sexes” (Stowasser 1987:36). Men and women knew each other personally 
even if they were not closely related. There are reports on women acting as hostesses to 
their husband’s guests. The Prophet spoke freely to and proposed personally to his wives 
Zaynab and Umm Salama.
Gender activists today exhibit an awareness that Islam in the Prophet’s era did not 
establish ‘sexual equality’ in any way comparable to modem ideals and standards. Ahmed 
writes that her study reveals the participation and independence of women in the society in 
which Islam arose and the diminution of these liberties as Islam became established 
(Ahmed 1992). By transferring the rights to women’s sexuality and their offspring from 
the woman and her tribe to men and then basing the new definition of marriage on the 
proprietary male right, Islam placed the relations between the sexes on a new footing. 
Thus in a way the ground was laid for the closures that would follow: women’s exclusion 
from social activities, their physical seclusion and the resulting restriction of their lives - 
similar to the practices of the rest of the Mediterranean Middle-East. Muslim gender 
activists in reclaiming the past argue that following the death of the Prophet Islam was 
interpreted and implemented as being more restrictive towards women. The selective 
sanctioning of some prz-Jahiliyya customs by Islam consolidated the trend towards 
patriliny.
The laws regulating marriage and women’s conduct adopted by later Islamic societies 
represent their interpretations of the Qur’anic Verses and the legal significance of the 
Sunnah and Hadith. These sources were used by the early believers to accommodate the 
enormous rate of political, economic and social change that occurred in the first centuries. 
The Qur’an, the ultimate authority, was regarded by Muslims as a closed book after the 
death of the Prophet33. Innovation and change was accommodated through tafsir 
(Qur’anic exegesis) by the scholars. In order to illustrate the changes in interpretation of 
certain Qur’anic Verses Stowasser looks at how the notorious Verse 4:34, used for
33 The Qur'an was initially transmitted orally, and die totality o f die reveladon was actually gathered together into one 
single compilation many years after die Prophet's death under die third Caliph Uthman.
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centuries to justify men’s dominant position over women, has been interpreted during 
Muslim history (Stowasser 1984:25-28). The Verse and its common English translation 
are:
“Al-rijaalu qawwamuna ‘ala al-nisaai bimaa fadhala allahu ba ’dhahum 
‘ala ba ’dhihim wa bimaa anfaqu min amwaalihim. ... ”
“Men are the managers o f the affairs o f women for that God 
has preferred in bounty one o f them over another and for that 
they have expended o f their property. . . .”
(Qu’ran 4:34)
Al-Tabari in 923 AD interpreted this Verse as implying that men had authority over 
women in the family setting since it was the men who were under obligation to provide for 
their women by way of material support. Some 350 years later Al-Baydawi gave an 
interpretation of the same Verse that provided generally applicable restrictive detail and 
sanctioned the view of women as creatures incapable of and unfit for public duties. Later 
commentators not only accepted Baydawi’s interpretation but also further categorised and 
hardened the restrictive detail provided by his exegeses, and thereby excluded women from 
public office and leadership positions. Stowasser writes that the process of ever increasing 
exclusion of women from all public concerns and the law of the veil are both traceable 
through comparative study of the Qur’an commentaries.
In modem times Verse 4:34 has constantly proved to be a stumbling block preventing a 
more liberal and gender egalitarian interpretation of the Qur’an. Reformers have remarked 
that this Verse has been so misread and misinterpreted that it has given men virtual control 
over women’s lives. Scholars such as Ashgar Ali Engineer34 and Riffat Hassan support a 
new translation of the word qawwamun (Engineer 1992, Hassan 1988). The singular form 
of the word, qawwam, has traditionally generally been translated as lord, master, ruler, 
governor. All of these meanings imply a hierarchical relationship. However, the new 
interpretations insist that the word qawwam literally means “one who looks after” or “one
34 Asghar Ali Engineer is the Director o f the Institute o f Islam ic Studies, Bombay. H e gives a liberal/modernist 
interpretation o f  the Qur’an and argues that Islamists have misunderstood and misinterpreted the Qur’anic message on 
gender relations.
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who takes care o f’. Thus on this basis a radical new interpretation of the Verse has been 
achieved by translating the word as “breadwinner”, thereby implying an economic term. 
Furthermore the word ba’a d in the Verse, it is argued, does not mean “one” but “some”. 
According to Hassan the Verse therefore implies that during the time when women are 
undergoing the process of childbearing they should not have the obligation of being the 
breadwinners (Hassan 1988 ). Engineer argues that the statement that “men are 
qawwam” is a contextual one reflecting the social situation in Arabia in the 6th Century. It 
should not be taken in the normative sense that men are always and should forever be 
qawwam over women (Engineer 1992:46). He also writes that “the meaning of Qur’anic 
Verses unfolds with time and what the Verses meant to an Islamic scholar in the medieval 
period may be quite different from the meaning conveyed to a scholar in modem 
conditions” (Engineer 1992:46). Religious scripture, he argues, often uses symbolic 
language which has many layers of meaning.
3.4 Gender Activists and the Hadith
Following Muhammad’s death in 632 AD, his words and actions achieved even greater 
paramount importance as representing the normative ideals for Muslims in their everyday 
lives. The Prophet’s wives (especially A’isha) were consulted on the Sunnah and Hadith 
and they gave decisions on sacred law (Abbot 1985, Ahmed 1992). Thus early Islam had 
no difficulties in accepting the views and thoughts of women in such important religious 
matters. It was during the second Caliph Umar’s reign (634-644 AD) that many of the 
major institutions of Islam originated, for Umar promulgated a series of religious, civil and 
penal ordinances. Most gender activists see Umar’s reign as the beginning o f the decline in 
women’s status and freedoms. They argue that although he is considered by Muslims to 
be an extremely just Caliph, Umar was harsh towards women both in his private and public 
life (Stowasser 1984, Memissi 1991, Ahmed 1992). He is reported to have been ill- 
tempered with his wives, sometimes even allegedly physically assaulting them (Memissi35 
1991:142). He sought to confine women to their homes and ban them from attending 
prayers at the mosque but, unsuccessful in this, he then instituted segregated prayers and 
appointed a male imam for women - another departure from precedent. Umar also
35 Memissi refers to Tabari, Tarikh, v o l 5, p.27
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prohibited the wives of the Prophet from going on pilgrimage. Conservative Muslims 
counter these accusations by claiming that whatever rulings Umar enforced were in order 
that the wives of the Prophet should follow all the norms of propriety in order to safeguard 
their special status. In Ahmed’s view the purported silence of women in the face of all 
these restrictions indicates that the guardians of Islam erased any female rebellion from the 
pages of history (Ahmed 1992:61).
The third Caliph after the Prophet, Uthman, revoked some of Umar’s restrictions on 
women (e.g. prevention of performing the Hajj or praying at the mosque). However, 
these revocations only briefly stemmed the tide which was moving in the direction of 
increasing in-egalitarianism. Many gender activist writers have singled out A’isha’s 
role in politics after the assassination of Uthman as proof of women’s active involvement 
in politics and leadership roles in early Islam. The assassination of Uthman pitched the 
Muslim community into turmoil. ‘Ali (the Prophet’s son-in-law), chosen as the fourth 
Caliph in the middle of the civil war, never really had complete power. It was against him 
that A’isha took up arms at the Battle of the Camel. It was during this early period that 
the Sunnah was adjusted by the addition of normative details to fit the needs of each new 
generation. In order to protect themselves against civil war the Muslims plunged into a 
systematic collection of Hadith (Memissi 1991).
In the classical compilation of Hadith each generation of experts had to personally collect 
the testimony of those who had heard the Hadith directly spoken by the Prophet (i.e. his 
Companions), or to collect the indirect testimony of those who had followed the 
Companions. A Companion might have been a man or a woman, a prominent person or a 
slave. The important points were the person’s proximity to the Prophet, his or her 
personal qualities, and especially the reputation for having a good memory and not simply 
the ability to recount something. This was the reason for the importance attached to the 
immediate entourage of the Prophet as sources of Hadith. his wives, his relatives, his 
scribes. In theory the believing Muslim has the right to have all the pertinent information 
about the source of a particular Hadith and the chain of its transmission, so that he or she 
can continually judge whether it is worthy of credence or not.
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However, there was an uncontrolled proliferation of alleged Hadith during the early period 
following the Prophet’s death and the question of their authenticity arose. Scholars are in 
agreement that this period saw an increase in false and fabricated Hadith. Consequently 
expurgated editions of Hadith and biographic dictionaries were developed by scholars to 
attest to the credibility of and to ensure the transmission of authentic and ‘sound’ Hadith26. 
For the more rigorous and scholarly jurists it was imperative that for each and every 
Hadith the identity of the Companion of the Prophet who had uttered the saying, in what 
circumstances and with what objectives in mind, as well as the chain of people who had 
passed it down, all had to be thoroughly checked as far as was possible before a Hadith 
was declared as being sahih or ‘authentic’. Following this fastidious and painstaking 
process of selection, verification and counter-verification the authentic Hadith were then 
separated and compiled in several scholarly works. Despite this process of compilation, 
due to the possibility of fabrication the Hadith has always remained an ambiguous source 
for Islamic legislation.
The Hadith played an important role in circumscribing women’s lives. Gender activists 
look at the Hadith and attempt to point out the human input into Hadith which might 
explain the tradition of misogyny within them. Detailed study of the Hadith show that 
they reflect and represent both the actual way of life of the first generation of Muslims and 
the nostalgic reinterpretation and idealisation of the early beginnings by later generations 
(Stowasser 1984, Memissi 1991). The Hadith are also indicators of later changes and 
developments since they were expounded by people at various times following the death of 
the Prophet. The Hadith entail much varied and contradictory information about the 
society they describe. The nature of women as reflected in the Hadith spans the spectrum 
from saintly to the unclean (Stowasser 1984). Women were described as the spiritual 
equals of men and they built mosques and acted as prayer leaders. On the other hand, they 
were also seen as evil temptresses and being intellectually weaker could not aspire to be 
rulers or leaders. When looking at the Hadith as a record of the changing status of women 
it is clear that the later the source (or the rawi) the more abundant, detailed, and 
normative-restrictive the information on women which it contains.
36 The most highly respected Hadith compilations include amongst them al-Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidi and Abu Daud
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It is with regard to women’s abilities to be political leaders that Memissi has recently 
contributed to the gender activist discourse37. She is a gender activist well known in the 
Arab world who seeks to pass on a feminist message by attempting to get together with 
the progressive faction of the clergy and women believers; thus purporting to show a 
double concern in solidarity for the masses and confrontation of the Islamists on their own 
terrain. Memissi by launching a historical and theological enquiry into the condition of 
women at the dawn of Islam tries to show that several of the misogynistic sayings 
attributed to the Prophet are in fact inauthentic (Memissi 1991). Nawal El-Sa’adawi of 
Egypt followed the opposite direction and this took her from a critique of the ‘orthodox, 
traditional’ interpretation of the Qur’an to an essentially secular human rights approach.
In Women and Islam, A Historical and Theological Enquiry3* Memissi is intent on 
proving that:
“We Muslim women can walk into the modem world with pride, knowing that the 
quest for dignity, democracy and human rights, for full participation in the 
political and social affairs of our country, stems from no imported Western values, 
but is a true part of the Muslim tradition” (Memissi 1991: viii)
Memissi addresses the question whether Islam is opposed to women’s rights. She writes 
that Islam alone is condemned by many Westerners as blocking the way to women’s rights. 
However, neither Judaism nor Christianity played an important role in promoting the 
equality of the sexes, yet millions of Jewish and Christian women enjoy a dual privilege: 
full human rights on the one hand and access to an inspirational religious tradition on the 
other (Memissi 1991 :vii). She argues that the religion of Islam is no more repressive than 
Judaism or Christianity, yet there are conservative political regimes and Islamist groups 
who have a vested interest in blocking women’s rights in Muslim societies.
The central question Memissi poses is can a women be a leader of Muslims? Can a 
woman be the head of state? She then examines misogynistic Hadith which have been 
used throughout the centuries to justify discrimination against women in politics. In order
37 Memissi, a renowned Moroccan feminist/sociologist, well known for her earlier work Beyond the Veil (a radical secular 
feminist critique o f Islam) has traversed the road from sociology o f  sex roles to historic excavations o f  Muslim women 
rulers and theologians
38 First published in French in 1987, this important book was translated by Mary Jo Lakeland and published in English in 
1991.
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to look at the credibility of misogynistic Hadith Memissi studies the religious texts and the 
biographical accounts of the Sahabiya. In particular Memissi cites the following notorious 
Hadith:
“Lan yujli-ha qaumun wa lau amrahum imra ’than”
“Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity”
(Bukhari, Sahih, vol.5, no. 709)
Similar to many gender activists Memissi does not wish to make a complete break with 
religion nor the religious establishment and wishes to avoid the potential criticism of being 
Westernised. Thus to gain greater legitimacy within the Muslim populace and religious 
establishment, she uses the classical methods of textual criticism and rigorous examination 
of the Hadith material. She attempts to portray that a proper and rigorous application of 
the classical methods can show us the ‘true’ and the ‘false’ Hadith.
The Hadith “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity ’ has 
been classified as an authentic tradition by the scholar Al-Bukhari, whose work has been 
one of the most highly respected references for twelve centuries. This Hadith is so 
important that it is virtually impossible to discuss the question of women’s political rights 
in Islam without debating it and taking a position on it (Memissi 1991:4). Several 
conservative authorities and Islamists have used this Hadith to legitimate women’s 
exclusion from public office (ibid). Memissi writes that not only have the sacred texts 
been manipulated but that their manipulation is a structural characteristic of the practice of 
power in Muslim societies: the manipulation of the texts allowed women to be excluded 
from public life and relegated to the household. Memissi attempts to show that once the 
‘truth’ is revealed using the authentic Hadith and the ‘correct’ interpretations of Qur’anic 
verses, this would not restrict women’s lives, autonomy or freedom.
Since the above Hadith was included amongst the thousands of authentic Hadith compiled 
by the meticulous Al-Bukhari it has, a priori, been considered true and unassailable 
without proof to the contrary. Memissi, however, insists on making a double 
investigation. Abu Bakra, a Companion of the Prophet, reports that this Hadith was
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apparently spoken by the Prophet upon learning that the Persians had named a women to 
rule over them (Memissi 1991:49). In looking in greater depth at the occasion on which 
Abu Bakra recalled these words and why he might have felt the need to recount them, 
Memissi discovers that Abu Bakra related the saying some 25 years after the death of the 
Prophet. Moreover the specific occasion that Abu Bakra narrated the Hadith was after the 
Caliph ‘Ali retook Basra having defeated ‘A’isha at the Battle of the Camel. Memissi 
looks at Abu Bakra* s life and the dilemma faced by him with the onset of the civil war and 
concludes that personal motives, as detailed below, might well have contributed to this 
utterance of a probably false Hadith.
Abu Bakra was a person whose paternity was difficult to trace. Not having an illustrious 
genealogy meant that his social position in tribal and aristocratic Arabia was very low. 
Abu Bakra thus owed much of his good fortune to Islam since following the Prophet’s 
conquest of his city Ta’if in 630 A.D, his status changed overnight from that of a slave to a 
free person (Memissi 1991:51). Abu Bakra was thus a man to whom Islam had given not 
only fortune and prestige but also, more importantly, an identity. With such a background, 
Memissi writes, it is understandable that a civil war that could undermine the establishing 
of Muslim society would have been viewed very negatively by him (ibid:53). At the onset 
of the civil war and before besieging Basra A’isha sent letters to all the notables of the city 
explaining the reasons as to why she felt compelled to rebel against ‘Ali, and asking for 
their support. The decision amongst Muslims not to participate in the civil war was not an 
exceptional one. However, Abu Bakra was the only one who justified his decision to 
remain neutral by stating, notably after A’isha was politically wiped out and he was in no 
danger from her anger, the Hadith above and that one of the parties was a woman 
(Memissi 1991:58).
The respected Imams who formulated the Sunni schools of law reject people who tell lies 
in their daily personal relationships as narrators of authentic Hadith. Memissi writes:
“If we apply this rule to Abu Bakra, he would have to be immediately eliminated, 
since one of the biographies of him tells us that he was convicted of and flogged 
for false testimony by the Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab” (Memissi 1991:60)
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In these circumstances Memissi rejects the historically accepted view that the above 
Hadith is authentic. The Prophet’s favourite wife A’isha is also recorded as having refuted 
several such misogynistic Hadith. Memissi advises redoubled vigilance against the simple 
unquestioned acceptance of the purportedly authentic religious interpretations (Memissi 
1991:61). She states that grave historical consequences can result from the manipulation 
of sacred knowledge. Gender activists argue that more attention needs to be paid to the 
actual content of the Hadith rather than simply its chain of transmission: in particular, it is 
important to see whether the content of the Hadith fits into the spirit o f Islam and the 
example of the Prophet’s life.
On another occasion, Memissi has looked more specifically at the relevance of modem 
political systems in Muslim countries and the compatibility of Islam and democracy 
(Memissi 1993). She argues against certain conservative and Islamist arguments that 
Islam and democracy are incompatible. Oppressive regimes in the Arab world have often 
identified democracy as a Western malady in order to justify their dictatorial policies 
(Mayer 1991, Memissi 1993:15). Memissi looks at the historical evolution of intellectual 
and political ideas within Islam and finds that the rationalist tradition of freethinkers who 
espoused certain ideals and values similar to ‘participatory democracy’ have been 
repressed by authoritarian dynastic regimes (Memissi 1993:26). With the death of the 
Prophet in 632 AD the problem of succession arose; it was necessary to replace the 
Prophet in both his political and legislative role. As an attempt to solve to the first 
problem, Muslim experts developed the political theory of the Caliphate and elaborated the 
qualifications that were necessary to be the chief of the Muslim State and successor to the 
Prophet. The election of the first four Caliphs illustrates certain ideas of ‘participatory 
democracy’ in early Islam. Memissi writes that after the assassination of the fourth Caliph 
‘Ali Islam, which had sought to avoid the system of tribal aristocracy, fell back into that 
very pattern of dynasty; except this time on the scale of empire (Memissi 1993).
A major analytical problem faces the modernist gender activist. I f  debates about the 
institutions and structures of Muslim society are framed within Western notions of 
equality, individualism and freedom the absence of equivalent concepts may lead to the 
misleading conclusion that ‘democracy’ and ‘Islam’ are incompatible or that ‘sexual 
equality’ within Islam is impossible (Watson 1994:155). Due to this analytical problem
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Critics of the gender activist position use such arguments and point out that the Islamists 
are more rational in their approach than modernist feminists who try to wed European 
ideals and Islam (Hijab 1988). Evidently many of the modernist gender activists are 
actually starting from a human rights perspective and drawing on the Western liberal 
tradition. However, it is my view in agreement with many other writers such as An-Naim 
that concepts of ‘equality’ and ‘human rights’ are themselves complex and ambivalent 
notions that give rise to ideas that are in conflict to each other. It has been argued that the 
notion of human rights is essentially based on the secular law of contract premised on the 
absence of God, and thus not compatible with religion which implies hierarchy. However, 
in their origins these ideas of human rights were themselves closely related to Christian 
notions39. Whilst it is important to focus on indigenous representations and ideas of 
equality and complementarity, in my view the act of reinterpretation by Muslim, gender 
activists is more than a mere apologetic to the West. It is part of the dynamism (and 
durability) of the major world religions that they provide a vast source of values and 
ethical propositions into which a variety of interpretations can be read. To brandish 
innovative reinterpretations as either irrational or heretical essentially reflects the views of 
some secular feminists, conservative Muslims and Islamists that Islam is monolithic, static 
and unchanging. On the other hand, the strict codification of laws and regulation of life 
which has been essential to the resistance of Islam to secularisation may prove a barrier to 
a new radical reinterpretation of its core precepts.
39 Throughout the centuries there has been a close connection between the idea o f “natural law” and the idea o f  the 
natural rights o f  man. These ideas were found in the works o f the ancient Greeks and Romans and in the teachings o f  
early Christianity, St Thomas Aquinas and medieval English Scholars o f law . ).
—
4
Shari’ah Law and Women’s 
Quest for Autonomy
Law occupies a very special privileged place within the Islamic heritage. As one of the 
most important disciplines within this heritage, jurisprudence has dominated Islamic 
scholarship to the point that most Muslims cannot conceive of being Muslim without 
adhering to Islamic laws. Despite the different forms which adhesion to Islamic law has 
taken historically, in recent years the ideal of a unitary Shari 'ah law has come to provide a 
supreme validating and legitimating device. The reinstitution of the Shari 'ah is one of the 
primary goals of Islamist groups in the present day Muslim world. Muslim states too 
appear to have taken advantage of Islamic law as a means of political validation, as 
evidenced by the manipulation of Islamic law by several political leaders and regimes - 
these include Pakistan under Zia, Iran following the revolution and Sudan under Numeiri. 
Since the implementation of Shari 'ah law has enormous implications for gender relations it 
is a major issue for gender activists.
There is little doubt that in the past the Shari 'ah played a pivotal role in bringing together 
diverse groups of Muslims in a single legal-religious framework. Today, most Muslim 
communities have specific laws allegedly transposed from the Shari 'ah. These laws which 
are decidedly patriarchal in character have often been greatly influenced by misogynistic 
customary practice. The increasing influence of Islamists over the evolution and 
application of such laws is greatly affecting women’s lives and their legal rights (Helie- 
Lucas 1993:207). Codified law is only one of the means through which society imposes 
external controls on individuals and structures. However, internalised laws not requiring 
external enforcement are often greater obstacles to women’s autonomy than formal 
legislation (Shaheed 1994). Few Muslim countries have passed laws to debar women from
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specific occupations, to limit their physical mobility, to restrict their political participation 
or to prescribe a particular dress code. Notwithstanding this, however, in all of these 
aspects women’s lives continue to be circumscribed by internalised social codes. Gender 
activists working within the Islamic framework are striving for reform in the pronounced 
patriarchal character of Islamic law. They argue that by disregarding the secondary 
material of Qur’anic exegesis and returning to a fresh interpretation of the Holy Book, and 
by taking a critical look at Hadith and engaging in ijtihad (independent legal reasoning), 
then modem Islamic authorities can arrive at a more gender egalitarian position40.
4.1 The Development of the Shari’ah
Although it has undergone some reform in modem times, classical Shari 'ah law continues 
to have great influence over the lives of many Muslims world-wide. Deification of the 
Shari'ah as transcendent and eternal has rendered it beyond challenge for the average 
Muslim. However, Islamic law as we know it now has a temporal aspect in that it is the 
product of many centuries of juristic interpretation. In the first few centuries of Islam the 
developing law evolved in response to changing social conditions. However, subsequently 
law in classical Islamic theory came to be seen as the revealed will of God, a divinely 
ordained system controlling society from above. There was thus no notion of law itself 
evolving as a historical phenomenon closely tied with the progress of society (Coulson 
1964:85).
In order to look at the historical evolution of the Shari 'ah one has to go back to Prophet 
Muhammad’s era in 7th Century Arabia. Muhammad was regarded as an arbiter of 
community affairs and was asked to give rulings, orders and injunctions on a myriad of 
different matters which, if were not adequately resolved to the satisfaction of all the 
parties, had the potential for causing discord. Therefore as well as making 
pronouncements on ritual activity, Muhammad also established ordered methods of 
taxation, marriage, divorce, commerce, treaties of war and peace. Different 
pronouncements were made on a topic depending on the circumstances upon which 
Muhammad was called upon to give his judgement (Mueller 1985:225). Thus, as gender 
activists emphasise, the example of the Prophet’s life and the Qur’anic injunctions did not
40 Al-Hibri 1982, Hussain 1984, Stowasser 1987, Ahmed 1992, Memissi 1992.
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establish all pervasive rigid legal codes: they were essentially ad hoc rulings. Moreover 
many important political and social issues never arose in the Prophet’s lifetime. After the 
death of the Prophet his first four successors, the pious Caliphs, carried on the tradition of 
flexibility established by Muhammad. During this period one finds statements by these 
leaders that have no precedent in the Prophet’s career or even some which refine his 
practice markedly (Coulson 1964:26). Though Muhammad had laid down the law the 
successors felt fully able to interpret, adapt, and even supersede them in an effort to make 
sure that what they perceived to be the original intent of the Qur’an was followed. During 
this time the Shari ’ah retained its original ad hoc nature, whereby the merits of each case 
were adjudged in the light of general principles.
The structure of Islamic law as we now know it took shape during the formative phase of 
the Islamic civilisation, beginning with the Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) and then the 
early part of the Abbassid era (750-1258 AD). Under the Umayyad State the laws grew 
more rigid as they were employed by rulers as a theoretical justification for state control. 
After the first four pious Caliphs, the leaders of the Islamic Empire lost their religious aura 
and the Ulema came to represent the spiritual dimension of Islamic rule. The Ulema were 
essentially scholars with no formal connections to the ruling apparatus and who derived 
their authority from their religious knowledge alone.
According to the classical theory, in elaborating the law the jurists were guided by two 
sacred sources: the divine revelations compiled in the form of the Qur’an; and the 
precedents of the Prophet in the form of the Sunnah and Hadith. For the Sunni School 
four basic principles represented the correlated manifestations of God’s will, known as the 
roots of jurisprudence or the usul al-fiqh. These were: firstly, the word of God Himself in 
the Qur’an; secondly, the divinely inspired conduct or Sunnah o f the Prophet; thirdly, 
reasoning by analogy or qiyas\ and, fourthly, the consensus of opinion of learned scholars 
or ijma ’. The classical account holds that the function of the Sunnah was merely to 
provide explanation or elaboration of the specific rules, principles and teachings of the 
Qur’an and, therefore, the Sunnah could not abrogate the Qur’an. However, despite this 
theoretical primacy of the Qur’an, in practice the Sunnah appears to have taken a more 
dominant position (Coulson 1964:76).
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The course which ijtihad or independent legal reasoning must follow is clearly defined. 
The mujtahid (or person exercising ijtihad) should seek the solution of legal problems in 
the specific terms of the Qur’an and the Sunnah apply the accepted canons of 
interpretation. Ijma ’ in the classical theory was the agreement of the qualified legal 
scholars in a given generation and such consensus of opinion was deemed infallible. 
Theoretically the ijma ’ of a given generation should not have hindered the exercise of 
ijtihad by later scholars. However, despite the theoretical flexibility offered by the 
juridical tools many structures restricted the actual practice and change in pre-modem 
Shari ’ah law. Once formed the ijma ’ came to be seen as infallible; to contradict it was 
near to heresy and the possibility of its repeal by a similar ijma ’ of a later generation, 
though admitted in theory, became highly unlikely in practice (Coulson 1964:80) 41. Thus, 
the traditional account postulates, by the beginning of the 10th Century the doors of ijtihad 
were declared to be closed. The consensus of the jurists was that the law had reached its 
perfection, since all that could be deduced from the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet had 
already been worked out. Ijma ’ set the final seal upon the process of increasing rigidity in 
the law and taqlid or imitation replaced independent reasoning42. Circumscribed and 
fettered by the principle of taqlid, jurisprudential activities subsequently became confined 
to the elaboration and detailed analysis of established rules. The Shari ’ah, it is argued, 
became stilted, stultified, moribund and rigid.
Without doubt the actual process of the elaboration of the law was far more dynamic and 
complex than the classical account acknowledges (Coulson 1964, Mir-Hosseini 1993). 
The bulk of the law originated from customary practice and reasoning by scholars. Riffat 
Hassan argues that the concept of the closing of the gates of ijtihad is purely fictitious, 
suggested partly by the crystallisation of legal thought in Islam and partly by intellectual 
laziness (Hassan 1993). Despite its doctrinal immutability the Shari’ah not only 
accommodated prevailing customs but developed legal devices for adapting itself to 
personal needs and circumstances. However, although new and original thoughts were 
developed over the centuries these were abstract and on the whole did not affect the 
established decisions of positive law. The Shari ’ah remained at the level of theoretical 
abstraction that grew more and more out of touch with the developments of state and
41 This was based on a Hadith o f the Prophet; “My community will never agree upon an erro/’.
42 In contrast to Sunni law in Shi’a law only the ijma’ o f  the Prophet’s family (ahl-al bayth) is accepted. The Shi’a emphasis 
on ijtihad has meant greater scope within Shi’ism for innovation and change.
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society (Coulson 1964:85). The elaboration of the law is seen by Islamic orthodoxy as a 
process of scholastic endeavour completely independent of historical or sociological 
influences. Popular Islamism too continues to disguise the important human contribution 
to the development of the Shari ’ah and so perpetuates the idealised vision of the Shari ’ah 
as divine and revealed intact.
Many schools of thought were established in early Islam but only a few survived into the 
modem era43. I do not propose to examine in detail the variations and differences between 
the schools; nevertheless, it should be pointed out that these differences still continue to be 
of enormous consequence for women’s freedom and autonomy. The juristic elaboration of 
the Shari ’ah, like so many laws formulated in the pre-modem era and associated with 
societies where traditional patriarchal family structures prevailed, treated women as 
needing male tutelage and control. Mayer has elaborated on the many disabilities imposed 
on women by the pre-modem Shari ’ah from a human rights point of view. She argues 
that women were put into a distinctively subordinate role vis-a-vis men within the family 
(Mayer 1991:111). In the pre-modem classical Shari'ah law child marriages were 
permitted and, in practice, this effectively meant that girls of a young age could be married 
off against their will by their male guardians (ibid). Men had greater rights in marriage 
reflected in their rights to polygamy and unilateral divorce. In the scheme o f inheritance, 
blood money and legal testimony a woman’s worth was equated to be half that of a man’s.
4.2 Challenging the Shari’ah and the Primacy of the Law
The emerging Muslim gender activist discourse argues that the historical evolution of the 
Shari ’ah and the considerable human input that went into it is often ignored by Islamists 
and conservative authorities. The activists point out that in conceptualising Islam and its 
institutions the conservatives often overlook Islam’s tentative beginnings and, instead, 
simply see it as having emerged intact in the form by which it is now characterised. Riffat 
Hassan argues that:
43 Four schools established themselves among the Sunnis: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and ShafL Two schools dominate the 
Shi’a; the Tmami and die Zaydi.
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“the assertion that one is Muslim only if one accepts the Shari’ah as binding upon 
oneself, and, further that the Shari ’ah is divine, transcendent and eternal can be 
seriously (and in my opinion should be)| questioned” (Hassan 1993:8).
She points out that the Qur’an, the Sunnah and Hadith, fiqh  and the various schools of 
law, and customs and traditions - all parts of the ‘sources’ of the Shari ’ah - do not form a 
coherent homogenous body of knowledge (ibid). The average Muslim still remains 
unaware of the sociological process by which the ‘divine’ Shari’ah came to be codified. 
For Hassan, being a Muslim is essentially dependent upon the belief in Allah (God) as 
creator and sustainer and the prophecy of Muhammad. This, however, is not identical to 
the assertion of accepting the Shari ’ah as binding on oneself.
Gender activists are looking at the complex history of ideas evident in Islamic history. 
They attempt to show that the actual reality of the interpretation of the religious message 
and the attitudes towards Shari’ah law has varied widely between different groups and 
sects. Ahmed argues that from the very beginning there has been a debate as to the 
correct interpretation of the Prophet’s message (Ahmed 1992:66). Furthermore some 
movements contested the primacy given to the law by ‘orthodox’ Islam. Historical 
research shows that parallel with the crystallisation of state-sponsored ‘orthodoxy’, 
numerous movements appeared in opposition to the state. These movements adopted 
alternative religious views that were (naturally) labelled ‘unorthodox’. Amongst these 
there were those who emphasised the ethical, egalitarian voice and insisted that 
hierarchical regulations and prescriptions (which became inscribed into the Shari ’ah) were 
only an ephemeral aspect of religion relevant to a particular society at a particular moment 
of history. Ahmed argues that throughout history it was not the people with the 
egalitarian views who have held power (Ahmed 1992:67). Religion has been interpreted 
as intending to institute andocentric laws and an andocentric vision in Muslim societies. 
The bulk of the accepted Shari’ah law became established in the Abbassid era and, 
interestingly, it was during this era that laws which were more restrictive towards women 
than had existed in Arabia at the birth of Islam were developed. Therefore, as several 
gender activists have argued, the social context in which the textual edifice of the Shari ’ah 
and fiqh  was created happened to be highly negative for women.
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Modernist gender activists emphasise that the more egalitarian interpretations of the 
Shari ’ah were not simply the result of a different understanding of particular words but, in 
fact, followed a more radical supra-textual sense of how to ‘read’ the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
Therefore a radically different interpretation of religion to ‘orthodox’ legalistic Islam was 
evident amongst the Sufis, Kharijites and Qarmatians44. These groups put greater emphasis 
on the egalitarian aspects of Islam. They opposed the politics, religion and culture of the 
dominant society. Their ideas represented a different understanding of the social aspects 
of religion and this was directly relevant to women.
In their endeavour to show the diversity within early Islam several authors have picked out 
the Kharijite sect specially as an example of a relatively gender egalitarian social 
organisation45. The Kharijites were one of the rebel sects that broke away from 
mainstream Islam in the 7th Century due to political reasons. Memissi writes that pre­
modem concepts of democracy were evident in the Kharijite society, in that they 
contended that successors of the Prophet should be elected by the community46 (Memissi 
1993). In contrast to establishment Islam the Kharijites instituted a holy war (jihad) that 
was a religious duty for women as well as men along with prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and 
alms-giving (Ahmed 1992:70). Kharijites rejected child marriage and concubinage by 
arguing that the Prophet was allowed certain privileges which not allowed to the rest of 
mankind (ih id :l\). Little is known about the Qarmatians save that they were a dissent 
movement which banned polygamy and the veil. It is clear, therefore, that matters of 
emphasis and interpretation of the same words and texts are capable of yielding what are 
for women, in effect, fundamentally different ‘Islams’.
Gender activists argue that Sufism offered women an otherwise impossible chance of an 
independent, autonomous life free of male control (Ahmed 1992:96). Sufi ideas, implicitly 
challenged the way establishment Islam conceptualised gender by permitting and 
encouraging women to give a central place in their lives to their spiritual vocation. From 
the early days of Islam onwards Sufi mysticism and sainthood were open to men and 
women without discrimination; whereas the ranks of orthodox Islam were in practise
44 Memissi 1991, Mayer 1991, Ahmed 1992
45 Mayer 1991:50, Ahmed 1992:66, Memissi 1993
46 Pre-modem concepts o f democracy are also believed to have been evident in mainstream Islam as well before the 
founding o f  the Umawi dynasty. The four Guided Caliphs were elected from the community, based on their closeness 
and affinal links to the Prophet However, the actual electoral procedure varied between these Caliphs.
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closed to women. Tales and legends within the Sufi tradition suggest the rejection of the 
values of the dominant society with regard to women: women were counted as important 
contributors to the Sufi tradition and were elected as spiritual leaders. Narratives of the 
life of Rabia al-Adawiyya, one such important leader, refute the general ideology of male- 
female interactions as being dependent on sexuality (Smith 1928). Establishment Islam 
gave precedent to women’s obligations to be wives and mothers, whilst Sufism celebrated 
celibacy and stressed the interaction of men and women in the intellectual and spiritual 
planes; as opposed to sexuality. The modem day global Islamist movements draw largely 
on the orthodox legalistic tradition of Islam and generally brand alternative religious 
practises (such as Sufi practices) as being irrational and superstitious.
The gender activist discourse argues that an alternative reading of gender ideology to the 
gender inegalitarianism enshrined in the Shari ’ah was also possible; as illustrated by the 
example of the ‘unorthodox’ movements. The problem of interpretation meant that some 
sects understood Muhammad’s ethical message as fundamental to his teaching and thus 
lasting and eternal. Unfortunately for women, state-sponsored orthodox establishment 
Islam gave paramount importance only to those regulations that the Prophet put into effect 
which were primarily related to the immediate context. These regulations were elaborated 
into laws seen as being immutable and sacred. Little heed was given to the egalitarian 
message and the injunctions decreeing the equal and fair treatment o f women. Gender 
activists argue that if one gave greater heed to the ethical voice of the Qur’an then one day 
this could result in the elaboration of laws which dealt more equitably with women 
(Memissi 1991, Ahmed 1992).
•
An example of a radical gender-egalitarian reinterpretation of the Shari’ah in modem 
times is found in the case of renowned Sudanese Muslim thinker Mahmoud Muhammad 
Taha. Taha was an important political activist who founded a movement based on his 
reinterpretation of Islam. He was executed for his radical ideas by the Islamist President 
Numeiri. The main theological arguments outlining Taha’s thesis (as translated by 
Professor An-Na’im47) can be outlined as follows. He states that according to general 
Muslim belief Islam - being the final and universal religion - was initially offered in tolerant
47 Professor Abdullahi an-Na’im (formerly o f  Khartoum University Law School) has been a prominent spokesperson for 
human rights and for the view that Islam, propedy understood calls for equal rights for men and women.
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and egalitarian terms in Mecca where the Prophet preached equality and individual 
responsibility between all men and women without distinction on the grounds of race, sex, 
or social origin (An-Na’im 1987:21). As that message was rejected in the practice and the 
Prophet and his followers were persecuted and forced to migrate to Medina, some aspects 
of the message changed in response to the socio-economic and political realities of the 
time. Thus the migration to Medina signified a shift in the content of the message itself. 
This shift can be clearly seen by a close examination and comparison of the Qur’anic texts 
of the Meccan and Medinian stages and is accepted by the orthodox scholars. Historical 
Shari ’ah Law was based on the texts of the Medinian stage. Thus some aspects of the 
earlier level of revelations were subjected to repeal from the legal point of view. Taha’s 
revolutionary new thesis was that this repeal was actually merely a post-ponement, and 
not a final and conclusive repeal (An-Na’im 1987:21). If this premise is accepted, then it 
would be possible for a whole new era of Islamic jurisprudence to begin. This new 
interpretation (referred to by Taha as “the Second Message of Islam”) would allow the 
development of complete liberty and equality for all human beings regardless of sex, 
religion or faith. As it now stands historical Shari ’ah law discriminates not just on the 
grounds of sex, but also on that of religion.
Taha argued that Islam’s original precept is complete equality between men and women as 
indicated by their equal responsibility before God (An-Na’im 1987:139). Early Islamic 
legislation, he argued, was a great improvement for women in comparison with their 
earlier status. However, he writes, the existing dictates of the historical Shari’ah with 
regards to gender are far below Islam’s ultimate objective. In a similar fashion he argued 
against polygamy, divorce, veiling and segregation48. Using these examples, Taha 
attempted to demonstrate the divergence between the primary and subsidiary precepts of 
Islam: the First Message (which includes the gender hierarchy ingrained in the scriptures) 
lowered the standards of the Second Message in order to suit the times and serve its 
society (i.e. 7th Century Arabia). The First Message thus takes account of human 
weaknesses and limited capacities and was undeniably necessary for early Islam. However, 
it is now time for humanity to implement the Second Message and establish equality of all 
believers. Taha’s thesis argues for the abrogation of some Qur’anic Verses, such an
48 Most o f what Taha said was in line with Islamic principles as interpreted by Modernist reformers such as Muhammad 
‘Abduh, Mahmud Shaltut and M u h am m ad al Ghazali (Gayoom 1995).
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abrogation is seen as heresy by conservative scholars49. Taha’s innovative thesis illustrates 
the importance of human reasoning in interpreting the Qur’an and its message in 
contemporary modem society.
Taha’s work has achieved world-wide renown and acclaim. His theory of the Second 
Message is particularly appealing to women, non-Muslims and liberally-educated Muslims. 
Taha and his followers formed a small community, calling themselves the Republican 
Party, and sought to apply as far was as possible the main tenets of his vision of Islam. In 
particular the community largely succeeded in applying the principles of equality between 
men and women without discrimination on the grounds of sex. Women members 
participated fully in the groups activities and were often leaders of activist groups. The 
legacy of Taha is best reflected in the moral and intellectual transformation of female 
Republicans (An-Na’im 1987). He often said that his work was his female disciples. 
Young, educated women found in his ideas an Islamic answer to their social and spiritual 
needs.
What is the place of human reasoning in formulating the Shari’ah and determining 
women’s position in society? This complex issue of the place of reason and rationality 
within religion has been debated for centuries by religious scholars. It is in a manner 
understandable why religious scholars have been wary of giving free reign to human 
reason: orthodox theologians in Sunni Islam have remained generally suspicious of human 
reason fearing that it would lead Muslims to stray from the truth of Revelation. Given that 
the Qur’an is believed to be the direct word of God, the orthodox tradition sees Shari ’ah 
law as largely above reason and beyond human control. However, carefully controlled 
mechanisms for human reasoning and change are permitted through the jurisprudential 
tools of ijtihad and ijma ’. Although the anti-rationalist tradition has a long history within 
orthodox Islam, a greater emphasis on rationality has not been entirely absent (Memissi 
1993:26). Gender activists argue that the Abbassids, or Mu’tazila as they were known, 
who came to power after defeating the Ummayyads, insisted on the pre-eminence of 
reason or aql (Mayer 1991:48). Mu’tazila intellectuals found in religious texts everything 
they needed to bolster the idea of the thinking, responsible individual. Following the
49 These scholars argue that the principle o f repeal or abrogation (naskh) is established in the Qur’an in Sum Al-Baqara; 
“None of Our revelations do we abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar. Knowest thou not that God 
bath power over all thing/’(Vc rse 2:106).
93
4. Shari ’ah Law and Women’s Quest for Autonomy
defeat of the Mu’tazila reason, personal opinion and the cult of private initiative came to 
be condemned as a ‘foreign’ enterprise by orthodox establishment Islam. Memissi points 
out that even today Islamic thinkers who openly espouse the idea of the supremacy of 
reason over Revelation, argue for gender egalitarianism and call for laws to conform to 
human notions of justice, are at risk of being branded as heretical by staunch adherents of 
the view that both Islam and its divine law cannot be evaluated by reference to the tenets 
of human reason. With this anti-rationalist basis some Islamist regimes, such as 
revolutionary Iran, Sudan and Pakistan, find it easy to defend their discriminatory policies 
as being ‘Islamic’. By so doing they are able to automatically elevate these policies to the 
realm of the sacred, incapable of being challenged by the rational mind o f the ordinary 
Muslim. In so emphasising reason and rationality Memissi implicitly argues that if in the 
modem context rational thinking was applied, Muslim societies would strive for the ‘real’ 
Islamic ideals of gender egalitarianism and democracy.
4.3 The Shari’ah and the Modern Nation-State: Family law
With the onset of colonial influence in the 18th Century and the integration of the Islamic 
lands into the world market, there have been massive social changes in Muslim societies. 
The encounter with Western imperialism confronted Islam with an entirely different 
situation. Coulson argues that politically, socially and economically Western civilisation 
was based on concepts and institutions fundamentally alien to Islamic tradition and Islamic 
law which expressed that tradition (Coulson 1964:149)50. Because of the essential rigidity 
of the Shari 'ah and the dominance of the theory of taqlid, an apparently irreconcilable 
conflict was produced between traditional law and the needs of Muslim societies who now 
aspired to be organised by Western standards and values. In keeping with the secular 
outlook that was dominant at that time, Shari’ah law became subject to reform and 
amendments in almost every Muslim country in the world. Through a series of legislative 
reforms the Shari ’ah was revamped and grafted on to modem legal systems and, at the 
same time, by using procedural rules the jurisdiction of the Shari ’ah courts was severely 
limited. In this way the modem state steadily but firmly managed to extend its reach to the
50 N oel Coulson was Professor o f the Department o f Oriental Laws in the School o f African and Oriental Studies. He 
was a renowned scholar who wrote in detail on Shari’ah Law
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domains in which the Shari’ah had ruled supreme for centuries (Mir-Hosseini 1993). In 
almost every area of the law, Western inspired legal codes came to replace the Shari ’ah.
In 1850 the Ottoman authorities introduced extensive reforms (the Tanzimat reforms) 
which for the first time interfered with substantive Islamic law in an attempt to make it in 
line with modem needs and contemporary issues. The Ottoman Empire had for centuries 
supplemented its version of orthodox Shari ’ah with qanun laws, the secular decrees of the 
sultan of the day. In the modem context although some countries, such as Turkey, 
adopted a whole-sale secular path by abandoning classical Islamic law in every sphere and 
replacing it with Western inspired codes, most countries retained Shari’ah Law with 
respect to family, inheritance and religious endowments. At one level the reform and 
reinterpretation of laws (particularly family law) which affected women’s lives directly had 
been an ongoing process since the death of the Prophet. However, the pre-modem 
Shari’ah had managed, at least in theory, to avoid being identified with the temporal 
power. With the rise of the Muslim nation-state it was the powerful governments that 
influenced the interpretation and application of the law (Mir-Hosseini 1993:10). These 
governments were influenced and guided by Western theories and were under internal 
pressure to modernise. A large majority of countries including Egypt, have chosen the 
path where the Shari ’ah still forms the basis of family law, albeit reformed, codified and 
applied by a modem legal apparatus.
The 1980’s has brought to Muslim countries an increased communitarian unease and a rift 
on the world scene between Islamists and Muslims. The Islamic revival of the last two 
decades is illustrated by violent opposition to Shari’ah reform (Mallat 1989). In this 
context attempts at further reform of the already codified family law to achieve greater 
gender egalitarianism has become a highly emotive political issue. Islamist opposition to 
state intervention of the Shari ’ah has transformed family law into the last bastion against 
Western cultural encroachment. The previous trend towards secularisation has been 
reversed. In some countries such as Iran and Sudan there is a return to the pre-modem 
Islamic law as a method of asserting an independent identity, an alternative to Western 
imported models. The provisions of the Qur’an are abundant and explicit in the area of 
personal relationships and are seen as being closely intertwined with the ‘sacred’ in the 
law. Mir-Hosseini has pointed out that it was precisely because of the abrupt
95
4. Shari 'ah Law and Women’s Quest for Autonomy
abandonment of Shari’ah law in other areas that family law became a sensitive and 
disputed issue (Mir-Hosseini 1993:12).
The debate over family law is conducted almost entirely within the Islamic framework. At 
issue are women’s emancipation and gender egalitarianism. For conservative and Islamist 
authorities the Shari ’ah in its reduced form to family law only is a sacred institution, whilst 
for secular modernists the Shari’ah as it now stands is incompatible with modem life 
(Kusha 1981, Mallat 1989). For feminists and most gender activists the general gist of the 
Shari ’ah as applied presently to family law is overtly discriminatory and unjust. Whilst 
earlier this Century it was the modernists who had won the day, as the end of the Century 
approaches it appears that it is the Islamists who have the upper hand and are arguing for a 
return to traditional values and structures. Islamists see the abandonment of the Shari ’ah 
as the abandonment of the Islamic social order that was divinely ordained as plainly 
patriarchal. Modernist gender activists on the other hand see its abandonment as a 
necessary step towards a more egalitarian social order.
Several leaders and governments have been advocating Islamisation but as a means of 
gaining greater legitimacy and popularity. Military dictators have striven to gain prestige 
by making concessions to the genuine popular sentiment favouring the idea of a revival of 
Islamic law (Mayer 1991). The military governments of Pakistan in 1979 and Sudan in 
1983 adopted ambitious Islamisation programs that led to the official enactment of various 
Islamic laws as positive law. Other relatively more democratic regimes, such as in Egypt, 
felt that in order to win the support of groups calling for the reinstatement of Islam, it was 
politically expedient to enact laws that might placate them. However, the degree of 
movement towards Islamisation has been uneven in Egypt and has tended to be moderated 
by democratic political processes. Iran’s Islamisation, which came in the wake of major 
revolutionary upheaval and is controlled by conservative clerics, has been more far- 
reaching. Amongst the conservatives in Iran emphasising the ‘family’ signalled the aim to 
return Iranian women to a domestic role after decades in which much progress was made 
in education and employment (Afkhami 1994, Paidar 1995).
According to various women’s organisations recent changes in personal status law 
together with the adoption of different forms of Shari ’ah have meant that women have
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become subject to the same types of discrimination throughout the world. The Paris-based 
international organisation Women Living Under Muslim Laws argues that these laws are 
basically similar and form a common terrain despite the diversity of cultures. Thus laws 
based on the Shari ’ah often deprive women of the right to marry on their own accord and 
choice by submitting them to the authority of a marriage guardian51 (Helie-Lucas 
1993:215); they deprive them of easy access to divorce, which remains the privilege of 
husbands52; they confirm the latter’s right to several wives; they confirm inequalities in 
inheritance (ibid). To a large extent Muslim laws submit women’s mobility and access to 
employment to their husband’s or father’s permission. Furthermore in most cases a 
woman’s sexual life is the subject of legislation: sex outside marriage is punished in some 
countries by death (ibid); e.g. in Pakistan where the Hudood Ordinance is applied.
I do not intend to delve into the diversity of Shari ’ah law as manifested by the different 
schools of law, nor into the nuances and variations of its practice throughout the world. 
However, these variations are of profound consequences for women’s autonomy and 
freedom. In order to explore the gender activist responses and attitudes towards the 
Shari'ah I will briefly examine the institution of marriage according to classical pre- 
modem Shari'ah doctrine. It should be emphasised that actual practice varied 
considerably from the Shari ’ah ideal and often women’s Islamic rights were denied them 
as well in the name of religion and custom.
4.4 Classical Shari'ah Law: Marriage and Gender Relations.
There is continuing debate as to whether the Qur’an elevated the overall position of 
women or not. Evidently in comparison to the pre-Islamic period substantial reforms were 
introduced which affected the position of women by creating new regulations and 
modifying existing customary practice. Muslims point out that not only did the Qur’an 
attack institutions of pre-Islamic Arabia that contributed to women’s degraded status (such 
as female infanticide), but Islam also conferred rights on women in the 7th Century which 
women in the remainder of the world have been unable to obtain only until fairly recently:
51 According to Hanafi law an adult non-virgin woman may marry by herself, however, for the majority o f  schools the 
consent o f  the m arriage  guardian or woli is necessary for the validity o f  marriage.
52 Although women have access to certain forms o f divorce and separation this in no way approximates a man’s right to 
unilateral repudiation
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e.g. Islamist gender activist Zahra Rahnavard argues that women enjoyed full legal 
personality and could own and manage property (Afshar 1994:16) and, according to some 
interpretations, women also enjoyed the rights to divorce on very liberal grounds. 
However, throughout Islamic history there has been the unresolved question of how to 
reconcile the rights that women were granted by the Shari ’ah, such as managing their own 
property and conducting business, with other rules that seemed to be in direct conflict with 
them such as those allowing the husband to control his wife’s activities (Mayer 1991:112). 
In recent decades Muslim conservatives and Islamist writers have been speaking out on the 
‘status of women in Islam’ and have attempted to demonstrate that fidelity to Islam 
requires rejection of the tenets of feminism.
It has already been stressed that a variety of marriage practices were evident in pre-Islamic 
Arabia. Esposito argues that the predominant marriage agreement was a contract that 
closely resembled a sale (Esposito 1982:14): the wife’s tribe relinquished its rights to her 
and to her future children by receiving a price or gift called mahr53. In pre-Islamic Arabia 
the mahr or bride-price was paid to the bride’s father. Strong emphasis was placed on 
chastity and the potential fidelity of the women. Therefore a woman’s family strictly 
limited her behaviour to ensure her reputation and the family’s honour. The dominant 
marriage system in ancient Arabia produced a situation in which a woman was subjugated 
by males, by her father, brother or close male relatives when she was a virgin and by her 
husband when she became a wife. It has been argued that in pre-Islamic Arabia a woman 
had no voice in the initiation or termination of her marriage, whilst men had the right to 
unlimited polygamy and unilateral power of divorce (Esposito 1982:15)54.
Marriage and sexual relations are viewed positively in the classical Islamic sources. In 
classical Shari’ah law marriage was a civil contract legalising intercourse and the 
procreation of children (Doi 1987). Both conservative and liberal authorities have argued 
that the contract of marriage considerably raised the status of women under Islam by 
making her a party to the marriage agreement, rather than an object for sale. A Muslim
53 Translated as marriage gift: mahr is defined as a token payment that the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in 
consideration o f  the marriage. It is intended to safeguard her economic position after marriage
54 Classical Islamic sources themselves have described pre-Islamic forms o f marriage that offered women more autonomy 
(see section 3.3)
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man or woman who is of sound mind and who has attained bulugh55 is considered to have 
the legal capacity to contract a valid marriage for himself or herself. Essential to the 
marriage is the offer (ijab) of one contracting party and qabul (acceptance) of the other, 
occurring before two witnesses. Another right granted to women as a result of Qur’anic 
prescription is her right to mahr. Mahr is essential under Shari'ah law to a marriage 
contract. Mahr can also be used as a means for controlling the husband’s power of 
divorce, since upon dissolution of the marriage he is required to pay the total amount at 
once. Maintenance (nafaqah) is the primary obligation of the husband towards his wife: 
the husband has to provide food, clothing and lodging regardless of his wife’s private 
means, unless she is disobedient and refuses him conjugal rights. The wife in return owes 
complete obedience to the husband, especially in sexual matters.
A crucial feature of Islamic law that clearly highlights the dominance of men over women 
is the power (jabr) that is bestowed upon a woman/minor’s father or grandfather (wall). 
The majority of the schools of law require a virgin girl to be given away in marriage by the 
wali56. Although modernist writers have argued that a wali cannot force his daughter or 
ward to marry someone she has no desire to, in practice the institution of the wali has 
effectively severely limited a women’s autonomy in the choice of a marriage partner57. 
Reformists have pointed out that the institution of wilayat is not supported by any 
Qur’anic prescription or Sunnah of the Prophet.
In Sunni Shari 'ah law marriage was viewed as a permanent institution. Thus, contrary to 
pre-Islamic practice and Shi’a law, temporary marriage (mut'a) was forbidden. Esposito 
writes that although divorce is viewed as undesirable, provisions are given in the Shari 'ah 
so that the contract of marriage can be annulled (Esposito 1982:29). Divorce is generally 
referred to as talaaq, and signifies one spouse’s release from the other spouse from the 
marriage bond. He goes on to describe the different types of divorce: talaaq, ta'aliq, faskh 
and khula (ibid). ‘Talaaq’ means ‘to release’ or ‘to abandon’ in Arabic and is the term used to 
describe divorce affected by a man uttering an unconditional form of repudiation. A talaaq
55 In Shari’ah the attainment o f bulugh for a boy is either upon reaching fifteen years o f age, or the achievement o f sexual 
ability (emission), whichever is the earlier. For a girl, it is also the reaching o f fifteen or the onset o f  the first menstrual 
period, whichever is the earlier.
56 The right o f  guardianship is known as wilayat and the guardian is the wali.
57 It has been argued that according to Hadith the consent o f a woman is necessary, but that the silence o f  a bikr (virgin) 
when her consent is sought in marriage can be construed as acceptance, and that the silence o f  a thayyih (a woman who has 
had an earlier marriage) cannot, and that to give her consent she will have to express it in clear terms (Gayoom 1995).
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divorce is further qualified by the description of the number of times a husband has repudiated 
his wife. Following a divorce certain rights and obligations of both spouses come into effect. 
The wife’s main obligation rests in her observation of iddah (a waiting period) so that if she is 
pregnant no question regarding the paternity of her child could arise. It also provides a period 
during which reconciliation can take place. During the period of her iddah the wife is entitled 
to maintenance from her husband and, if she is pregnant, this right continues until the birth of 
the child. Because of the husband’s unilateral right to divorce, Qur’anic Verses cite many 
conditions granting the wife compensation (such as the total amount of the mahr) once the 
divorce is carried out. Women, however, have restricted access to divorce. The available 
methods include khul (common consent of the husband and wife) and application to a qadi by 
the wife on certain grounds such as impotence. However, these grounds are limited in number 
and difficult to prove, especially in Hanafi law58.
Reformists and gender activists are particularly concerned with the obvious patriarchal 
nature of marriage and family relations in classical Shari ’ah law. Whilst Shari ’ah laws 
may not necessarily be overtly discriminatory if interpreted compassionately, nevertheless 
they are patronising in their treatment of women. Gender activists argue that it is evident 
that a lack of confidence in women’s judgement which was supported by several, possibly 
fraudulent Hadith, was the basis of the ‘minority’ status of women in classical Islamic law. 
In traditional Muslim societies women who spent most of their lives engaged in domestic 
duties and segregated from the world of legal and business agreements came to be seen as 
less competent to deal with such matters (Mayer 1991). The higher social regard for men 
in worldly affairs thus came to be reflected in the granting to men of more extensive rights 
in the law such as the unilateral power of divorce.
A relatively gender egalitarian modem day reinterpretation of Islamic provisions on 
marriage and divorce is illustrated by Taha’s work59. The Sudanese Republican 
community attempted to put these egalitarian precepts into practice. Women had 
autonomy and freedom of choice in choosing their marriage partners. All Republican 
couples extended the right of divorce to their wives in the marriage contract itself (An-
58 In Hanafi law a court may dissolve a marriage only i£ die marriage is irregular; a person who has the option to dissolve the 
marriage exercises it, the parties are prohibited horn marriage by fosterage, the marriage was contracted by non-Muslims who 
subsequently adopt Islam, or a husband is unable to consummate the marriage or is missing (Esposito 1982:).
59 See section 4.2 ante.
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Na’im 1987:7). Both husband and wife had the right to unilateral divorce, subject to the 
binding ruling of the arbiters of both parties. Mahr was kept to the absolute minimum, 
required simply for the validity of the contract of marriage under the Shari ’ah (ibid). The 
drastic reduction of monetary mahr in comparison to the high mahr common to Sudanese 
customary practice was designed to emphasise that no price is sufficient to purchase a 
wife, thereby signifying that marriage is an equal partnership (the ultimate goal being the 
abolition of mahr altogether). In this way the Republicans revolutionised marriage 
practices within the confines of the Shari 'ah without offending the essence of prevailing 
social customs.
Recent work has stressed that it is an error to equate family law, as applied in today’s 
Muslim societies, with the classical Shari 'ah. Mir-Hosseini has pointed out that whilst it is 
true that everywhere in Muslim countries (apart from Turkey) family law is derived at least 
nominally from the Shari 'ah, its actual substance and mode of application are no longer 
the same (Mir-Hosseini 1993:13). It is necessary to examine the differences between the 
national contexts to understand how today’s Shari ’a/z-based family law operates and how 
gender activists are campaigning for reform.
4.5 Family Law Reform in Egypt
Egypt from 1875 onwards took the radical step of adopting wholesale French law and in 
addition to promulgating Penal, Commercial and Maritime Codes and setting up a system 
of secular courts to apply them, it also enacted Civil Codes which were basically modelled 
on French law and contained only a few provisions drawn from the Shari 'ah (Coulson 
1964:152). As a result of these initial steps taken during the Ottoman period, laws of 
European origin today form a vital part of the legal systems of most Middle-Eastern 
countries. Prior to the modem age Shari 'ah courts were generally speaking dominated by 
the doctrine of taqlid This precluded the state from administering the law in any way 
other than in strict accordance with the terms of the medieval texts. Thus change could 
only be affected by the intervention of political authority.
From the mid-19th Century onwards the state in Egypt tried to draw women into the 
economic and technological transformations that were underway. The State tried to wrest
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women away from the exclusive control of the family, thereby threatening the authority 
and domination of men over their women (Badran 1991). In the drive towards 
secularisation of law and education much of the power of the religious establishment and 
the Ulema was eroded. The only exception to this was in the area of personal status laws. 
Thus for women an awkward dichotomy was created in their roles as citizens of the 
nation-state and as members of the Umma. The State came to influence their public roles 
whilst religion was left to regulate their private or family roles.
Much of the legal reforms in Egypt had been influenced by modernist discourse dominated 
first by men and subsequently carried on by feminist women. The modernist discourse has 
some widespread features that continue to be reiterated by modernist gender activists. 
One such common modernist contention is that the Qur’an has several other meanings 
along with its literal one. Modernists stress that the ‘spirit of the Qur’an’ is largely 
egalitarian and argues that several passages show that equal rights were meant for women 
(Kusha 1981, Stowasser 1987). Modernists hold that women should have the same rights 
as men in the choice of their marriage partner. They contend that the Qur’an opposes 
polygamy because it says the conditions for it cannot be met {i.e. the equal treatment of 
wives)60. Modernists argued that polygamy is a destructive custom that must be 
eradicated and may be lawfully forbidden by the ruler as a measure taken ‘in the public 
interest’. Women must be awarded greater rights in initiating divorce along the line of 
Maliki, and not Hanafi, law. The feminist movement drew on this modernist discourse. In 
the liberal phase of feminism (1930’s - 1950’s) although women were able to conduct 
public activities, there was no headway in formal political rights for women nor in the 
reform of personal status laws (Badran 1991). With the achievement o f considerable 
political and public rights the family remained the area for feminist campaigns for reform
Family law has remained relatively true to the pre-modem Shari ’ah dictates throughout 
the Muslim world. However, in Egypt modernist reform did introduce some changes 
throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries in the areas of marriage and divorce. Egyptian 
jurisprudence and legislation provided the impetus for modernist legislation throughout the 
Arab world. In 1897 the Egyptian Code o f Organisation and Procedure for Shari'ah
60 The Verse sanctioning polygamy instructs that all wives be treated equally. Verse 4:3 “.. .many of women as may be agreeable 
to you two, or three, or four; and if  you fear that you will not dealjustly then marry only one or what your right hands possess. That will be 
more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice'’ _
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Courts required written documentation in marriage and divorce. By refusing to register 
child marriages and by denying such marriages judicial relief, the reforms severely limited 
child marriages (Esposito 1982:52). Modem legislation sought first to establish grounds 
that would enable women to sue for judicial divorce and second to limit a husband’s 
exercise of talaaq.
Divorce is one issue that particularly preoccupies gender activists in the Egyptian context. 
In the Hanafi school, the authoritative school for Egyptian Shari'ah courts, there are 
virtually no grounds by which a wife can free herself from an undesirable marriage except 
for the husbands impotence (Esposito 1982:53)61. In contrast to other schools, wives 
living under Hanafi law had to endure desertion and maltreatment with no recourse 
through divorce. Broader grounds were, however, established for divorce through reform: 
such as the husband’s failure to provide maintenance; desertion; and maltreatment. A 
major reform of Muslim family law in Egypt was the limitation of the husband’s unilateral 
power to divorce his wife at his own discretion at any time and for any reason. The 1929 
Article 1 o f Egyptian Law no 25 decreed that all formulae of divorce uttered under 
compulsion or in a state of intoxication were henceforth invalid. A significant departure 
from traditional practice was the decree that regardless of the number of times indicated by 
word or sign a pronouncement of divorce would only be considered as a single utterance; 
and therefore revocable (Article 3)62.
Throughout the 1970’s feminist activists were campaigning and calling for a new law of 
personal status which would treat more effectively major ‘problems’ like polygamy, 
divorce and custody of children. Feminists won a considerable victory when in June of 
1979 a presidential decree revised family law for the first time in fifty years. Excesses of 
patriarchal privilege were curtailed in an unprecedented manner with the expansion of 
women’s initiative to divorce, added protection for women in divorce, and with controls 
placed on polygyny. Law no: 44 contained a number of important provisions: firstly, a 
wife had to be informed if her husband took another wife; she now had the right to sue for 
divorce if she disapproved of any marriage (Art. 6b); a husband had to obtain a notarised 
certificate of divorce; he was also obligated to inform his wife of the divorce (Art. 5b); if a
61 see section 4.4
62 This was not however, a totally radical view since many traditional Ulema such as Ibn Taimiyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim had 
supported this view-point (Gayoom 1995).
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woman was subjected to divorce without her consent and without just cause, then she was 
entitled to at least two years additional alimony in addition to maintenance during the idda 
period. The reform legislation also contained a curious means by which a wife could 
obtain a quick divorce. The reform law decreed that if a wife refused to return after she 
deserted her marital home and her husband sent her a formal notice through a bailiff then 
her marriage was terminated from the date of refusal.
The ascendancy of Islamism in the 1970’s also saw the rise of a second wave feminism 
associated with Nawal al-Saadawi whose writings took Egyptian feminism towards a new 
direction. Sa’adawi campaigned for radical change in the patriarchal family structure and 
personal law63. Her socialist feminism calling for social, economic and cultural revolution, 
was not in essence articulated within an Islamic framework although she drew on certain 
Islamic arguments. Organised feminism resurfaced in Egypt in the 1980*8 under Saadawi’s 
organisation, the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association (AWS A). In the face of growing 
Islamist (and general) opposition to the 1979 decree law revising the personal status law, 
Mubarak’s government in 1985 cancelled it. The ensuing crisis provoked by the 
rescinding of the liberally revised Personal Status Law no: 44 led to the formation of a 
broad feminist coalition, called the Committee fo r  the Defence o f the Rights o f Woman 
and the Family, to fight back. A number of feminist organisations with differing political 
agendas were galvanised into collective political action. Finally, within two months a new 
law was passed restoring most, but not all, of the benefits to women provided by the 1979 
law. The coalition succeeded in obtaining the reinstatement of the law, albeit in a 
truncated form. Later disagreements amongst feminists split the united front and the 
coalition fragmented.
In contrast to the modernist feminist position arguments for women’s rights in more 
indigenous Islamic terms had always been present. The brand of feminist discourse of 
Zeinab Al-Ghazali which envisioned an Islamic state and insisted on the implementation of 
social justice for all was considered radical and dangerous by both Nasser and Sadat. 
Today, a growing majority of Islamist women continue to argue for women’s rights whilst 
at the same time calling for the reinstitution of the Shari'ah (Badran 1994). President
63 Sa’adawi in her controversial book The Hidden Face of Eve approached the taboo subject o f sexuality. She dealt with 
issues such as female circumcision, prostitution and sexual aggression against female children (Sa’adawi 1980).
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Mubarak has inherited the question of implementing the Shari ’ah from his predecessor, 
Sadat, under whom a committee had been formed to canonise Islamic law. Aside from 
some members of Parliament the committee included Islamic scholars from al-Azhar64 and 
various legal advisors. Instead of opposing the project directly the Mubarak Government 
and Members of Parliament have employed delaying tactics and argued that that Egyptian 
society is not yet ready for full implementation of the Shari ’ah. They point out that it is 
necessary first to educate and nurture the society in preparation. The Egyptian State has 
been trying to contain the growing anti-state Islamist activism. In seeking not to 
antagonise the Islamist forces and alternating tough and conciliatory attitudes the State has 
generally displayed a conservative attitude towards gender issues. Ironically, Egypt is 
considered to be the leader in family law reform in the Middle-East, but, so far has 
been unable to pass legislation in its own country making it necessary to obtain court 
permission for divorce or polygamous unions.
Despite the widening base of the feminist movement throughout the early 20th Century, so 
far there had been little but adversarialism between the Islamist and feminist camps. The 
last two decades, however, has seen a resurgence of gender activism within the Islamic 
framework and the blurring, to an extent, of the rigid boundaries between the two camps 
(Ahmed 1992, Badran 1994). The 1990’s is envisaged to be a period of Islamist gender 
activism65. A continued public role for women in the moderate stratum of Islamic activity 
is evident under Mubarak. Many Islamist women have taken advantage o f a new forum 
for airing their views provided by the first Islamist magazine for women, the Hajir. Far 
from advocating a domestic role the authors of Hajir argue that the Islamic path to 
women’s freedom is through politics and that work is a woman’s issue. As for power 
relations within the family, new trends within the Islamist movement stress the Islamic 
concept of shura (consultation) as opposed to ‘a totalitarian patriarchal system’ (el- 
Gawhary 1994).
64 A  renowned centre o f  Is lam ic theological learning in Cairo
65 see section 5.3
105
4. Shari ’ah Law and Women’s Quest for Autonomy
4.6 The Islamic Family’ and the Emerging Feminist Voices in 
Iran
Shi’a fiqh  developed its own particular style of argument and reasoning in the Safavid 
period. The spirit of rebelliousness in Shi’a thinking can be related to the emphasis on 
ijtihad. Shi’a and Sunni jurisprudence developed differing laws concerning women, 
particularly in relation to marriage and inheritance (Paidar 1995:34). The three most 
important deviations from Sunnism were: temporary marriage (sigheh); restriction of a 
husband’s right to the irrevocable ‘triple talacf j ;  improvement of
women’s inheritance rights. In other matters regarding women, Sunni and Shi’a laws 
differed very little (ibid). The orthodox model in both schools emphasised men’s rights to 
have virtuous, obedient and submissive wives. Thus in practice the majority of women 
were unable to leave their houses or spend of their wealth without their husband’s 
permission (Mahdavi 1985). However, a wife did have the right to maintenance (food, 
clothing, shelter) and the right to be forgiven for her wrong-doings. Despite the 
dominance of the patriarchal model, some Shi’a mujtahideen have argued for the principle 
of equality and justice for women, even recommending that women should become judges 
and pass judicial verdicts.
A new discourse on the position of women in society emerged following contact with the 
West and the founding of the modem state of Iran. The discourse of modernity that 
dominated the terms of the political debate started in the 19th Century with a broad vision 
and pro-Western values. However, by the 1970’s this had turned into an anti-Western 
discourse (Paidar 1995:29). Whilst in much of the Middle-East there was Islamic 
reformism on the question of women, this did not occur in Iran: this was mainly due to the 
nature of religion in Iran and the existence of a semi-autonomous clergy that was largely 
independent of the State. Intellectuals propagated the secular ideologies of ‘humanity,’ 
‘freedom’ and ‘emancipation’. Women’s emancipation was seen as part of this universal 
movement to reach human ideals. Intellectuals, such as Mirza Akhundzadeh (1812-1878), 
looked back on the Persian Empire as the glorious age of Persian society and expressed 
disdain for the Islamic conquest; because it represented the origin of social evils such as 
the subjugation of women. These reformers argued for women’s education, emancipation, 
unveiling and the monogamous nuclear family unit.
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Women’s participation in the constitutional revolution and nation-building established 
them as fellow participants in the national struggle. Since the idea of women’s 
emancipation was grounded in the need for national progress, those aspects of women’s 
position that enhanced the country’s development and progress were given priority. 
Similar to Egypt, in the early stages of the feminist campaign in Iran women’s education 
was the absolute first priority and was demanded by men and women alike. Under Reza 
Shah compulsory acts of unveiling and desegregation of public space were the most far- 
reaching aspects of state modernisation with regard to gender relations. The Shah 
believed that women’s work was needed for national progress. Reforms in family law, 
such as an increase to fifteen of the legal age to marry, ensured that women could not be 
denied education by early marriage. However, despite these reforms women were still 
primarily defined as bearers and nurturers of the nation’s children. The Civil Code (1928-1935) 
and the Marriage Act (1931) constructed women as dependent beings. The Shah did not 
seek to abolish sigheh and polygamy; nor did he put the right to marry for both men and 
women on an equal footing; nor did he establish similar familial rights for men and women 
(Afkhami 1994, Paidar 1995).
The State’s policy of women’s integration into society stopped short of substantial reform 
of the family law (Azari 1983, Mir-Hosseini 1993). In relation to marriage the Civil Code 
specified a number of rules within the framework of the polygamous family. Thus the 
consent of both parties was required for marriage. However, Articles 1042-1043 required 
the woman to obtain her father’s or grandfather’s permission before contracting her first 
marriage. Muslim women were furthermore forbidden to marry non-Muslim men. Article 
1105 pronounced the husband as head of the household and put responsibility for the 
wife’s maintenance on his shoulders. Articles on sigheh marriage allowed the man to take 
an unlimited number of temporary wives, each for a period of between one hour to ninety- 
nine years.
By the 1960’s the only area affecting women’s rights that had not been radically altered by 
the State was the family. Feminist activism had become an organised political force that 
promoted its ideas through writing and public meetings (Paidar 1995). The main feminist 
demands on education, unveiling, desegregation of the sexes, raising the age o f marriage,
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entry into the professions and political rights had been achieved - albeit to a limited degree. 
Hence the attention of women activists turned next to the question of the family. In 1967 
a bill was drafted and became known as the Family Protection Law. The bill was claimed 
to protect family life by making illegal practices such as arbitrary divorce, polygamy and a 
man’s right to child custody. The Family Protection Law re-introduced secularisation of 
marriage and divorce registration, which had remained largely in the control of the clergy. 
It specified that divorce could only be initiated through submission of an application to a 
family protection court. This had to be followed by a process of attempted reconciliation. 
The responsibility for reaching an agreement on the maintenance and custody of children 
rested on the couple. The family laws of the 1960’s and 1970’s were the flagship of the 
State’s modernisation policy. However, it should be said that there were other motives 
behind these emancipatory reforms, such as population control.
Gender relations was the main site of political power struggle between the Shah’s regime, 
the Shi’a clerical opposition and the left. The threat of clerical revolt and the social 
conservatism of state officials and the Shah meant that reform for women in the area of 
family law was in fact meagre. Many authors have described that despite consecutive 
legislation family laws of Iran in the late 1970’s still considered the man to be the head of 
the household. Consequently, divorce was still considered to be the man’s natural right, 
whilst a woman needed permission to initiate divorce on ‘behalf of her husband’; a man 
still had the right to demand sexual intercourse from his wife and lawfully force her to 
comply; polygamy, despite being curbed, was still considered the right of the husband; a 
woman needed to obtain her husband’s permission to travel and take up a separate place of 
residence. Countless other male privileges prove the dominance of patriarchal family 
relations in this period. The law concentrated on curbing the excess of male power in the 
family rather than fundamentally changing it.
Despite legal reforms the clergy’s hold over the religious lives of the people meant that 
except for the elite and the upper classes, women’s lives continued to be circumscribed by 
orthodox religious views (Fisher 1980, Paidar 1995). In the 1960’s there were increasing 
numbers of books of religious instruction that devoted substantial attention to women and 
the family. Political suppression of the clergy resulted in the strengthening of their claim 
over the family as a religious territory. Khomeni’s writings reiterated the orthodox view
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that it was a religious duty for women to occupy a domestic role and submit to the wishes 
of their husbands. Khomeini warned the faithful against compliance with the Family 
Protection Law o f 1967. The 1960’s also saw ‘Shi’a modernism’ and this involved a 
major rethink and rationalisation of the concept of the ‘Islamic family’. Shi’a popular 
culture had long elaborated the important roles women had played in early Islamic 
history66. Intellectuals such as Mutahhari and Shari’ati propagated a new notion of the 
modem Shi’a woman through their publications and sermons by drawing on role models in 
Shi’a history. But the gist of the arguments were against complete equality of the sexes 
but, instead, advocated the idea of ‘equal but different’. Muttahari rationalised the 
different positions of the sexes with reference to the biological and psychological 
differences between men and women.
The issue of women’s liberation was made central to the revolutionary demand for the 
overthrow of the Shah and was voiced by both men and women. The Pahlavi dynasty was 
labelled as spreading ‘alien Western culture’ and corrupting women (the concept of 
‘Westoxication’). Despite the rhetoric of Khomeini’s orthodox religious discourse there 
was the enactment of new gender relations within the Revolution. Women fully 
participated in political activities and mass demonstrations. Following the 1979
Revolution the reversal of the Pahlavi secularisation resulted in the clergy having an 
unprecedented degree of influence over the legal position of women (Azari 1983). The 
Islamic Republic’s approach to the issues of women’s rights indicated that it not only 
involved the revival of pre-modem Shari'ah rules determining women’s status in the 
family, but also the imposition of new rules designed to perpetuate women’s subordination 
by curbing their opportunities. The Islamic Republic set about constructing a coherent 
family law of the ‘Islamic family’. A few days after the victory of the Revolution, 
Khomeini suspended the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975. The clerics argued 
that since Islam had granted the absolute right of divorce to men, they should not be 
required to go to the courts for divorce. In effect this was a call for men to by-pass the 
Family Protection Courts which dealt with divorce, custody and other family matters. The 
Family Protection Laws were jdismantledand in 1981 the Civil Code stopped being the 
main family law. More and more emphasis was placed on orthodox Shari'ah 
interpretations of family law.
66 Special adulation was given to Zaynab, the Prophet’s grand-daughter who bravely confronted the Umayyad Caliph Yazid
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The state policy on marriage focused on the construction of marriage as being the only 
legitimate union in which sexual pleasure and reproduction was permissible (Haeri 1994, 
Paidar 1995). A campaign was waged by the Islamic leaders to encourage the nation to 
engage in the many forms of marriage available to them. The State adopted a number of 
strategies to achieve this. It lowered the minimum age of marriage, removed restrictions 
on polygamy and offered financial assistance to newly-wedded couples. The abolition of 
the Family Protection Law removed the previous restrictions on polygamy, such as a man 
needing to obtain permission from his first wife or from a court before embarking on his 
second marriage: the removal of this restriction meant that a man could marry up to four 
permanent wives without any legal problems. Shi’a marriage was seen as a commercial 
transaction based on an exchange of commodities between partners (Haeri 1994). In the 
archetypal bargain the man’s role was to be the head of the family and, thus, he was to be 
obeyed, fed and looked after. Although women also did have certain rights, as explained 
previously, these were in no way as extensive as the husband’s. Anthropological work has 
described how women utilised many legal loop-holes to their advantage in marriage and 
divorce: e.g. the stipulation of conditions in the marriage contract in order to restrict 
polygamy.
Gender activist discourse arguing for egalitarian relations within the Islamic framework 
have emerged during the past decade in Iran67. Paidar writes that the most vocal 
opposition to the Islamic regime’s policies on marriage and polygamy was presented by 
sections of the Islamic women’s movement (Paidar 1995:275). The Zan Ruz magazine 
turned into a platform for the expression of Islamic feminist opposition to the State’s 
policies on the family. Women Majlis Members (of Parliament) and other Islamic women 
leaders too voiced their opposition. Several researchers have written on the phenomenon 
of gender activism in Iran. They argue that there are clear signs of the emergence o f a 
feminist re-reading of the old texts as a response to the changed status of women and the 
need to accommodate their aspirations for equality (Afshar 1994, Mir-Hosseini 1995). 
The pre-Revolutionary orthodox Shi’a discourse (led by Muttahari) glorified gender 
inequality and complementarity by arguing that it was in harmony with the law of nature. 
However, the hegemony of this discourse is now losing ground to a new argument which 
although located in the Shari ’ah, argues for gender equality on all fronts. Debates over
67 Tohidi 1991, Afshar 1994, Mir-Hosseini 1995, Paidar 1995
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women’s position in law that were stifled early on in the Revolution are now resurfacing 
(Afshar 1994, Mir-Hosseini 1995). Although limited and confined within the parameters 
of Islam, the current gender debates reveal a growing dissent from the earlier discourse of 
the Republic. At present the journal Zanan is leading the gender activist discourse. In 
each issue aspects of gender inequality in the Shari'ah are discussed and new 
interpretations are attempted.
Mir-Hosseini’s research finds that Zanan started debating for gender egalitarianism in a 
hesitant voice. The magazine rejects Muttahari’s notion of complementarity of rights and 
brands it a pretext for the very denial to women of their rights (Mir-Hosseini 1995:19). In 
an article entitled ‘Tamkin’ (a woman’s duty to submit to her husband’s will) authored by 
Shukufeh Shekari and Sahereh Labriz, the issue of male head-ship of the family is 
subjected to critical examination (Mir Hussieni 1995:9). Shekari and Labriz discuss the 
issue of why and under what logic men were given head-ship of the family in orthodox 
Islam68. In search of answers the authors examine a wide body of legal opinions in Shi’a 
flq h  upon which the Civil Code articles were founded. In addressing this difficult issue in 
gender activist terms the authors try hard to arrive at a justification that is acceptable in 
modem terms of ‘equality’. They argue that head-ship does not imply that a man has 
absolute and despotic rule in the family, but only that it entails a certain authority as 
defined by law and custom (ibid). A woman is not her husband’s mere subordinate but his 
partner, companion and aid. They do not challenge the fiqh  position that sees sexual 
submission as a women’s duty. They argue that a woman is not required to blindly obey 
her husband and that she could even demand wages for housework. Orthodox Shari 'ah 
law postulates that if a women is nashizd9 her husband has the right to beat her lightly and 
deny her maintenance. Islamist gender activist Zahra Rahnavard considers the 
obedience required of women as being very specific and applying only to compliance with 
the sexual demands of a husband (Afshar 1994:14).
In the early issues of Zanan the authors did not challenge on their own grounds fiqh  
concepts such as tamkin and nushuz, but instead simply added qualifiers (Mir-Hosseini 
1995:8). In so doing they ensured that the debate remained within acceptable boundaries
68 The I r anian civil law reflects this view o f male head-ship. Article 1105 states “In a marital relationship, the head o f the 
family is a duty characteristic o f men”.
69 Rebellion, n o n -fu lfilm en t  o f marital duties
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without appearing to be too radical. These arguments, however, were a prelude to defying 
the conventional understanding of Qur’anic Verse 4:34 that was commonly used to justify 
male superiority70. The reader was once again reminded that such beliefs had little to do 
with Islam but were products of historical processes that not only predated Islam but 
which, in fact, only gained momentum after the Prophet’s death (Mir-Hosseini 1995:10). 
Thus authors in Zanan have gone on to argue for women’s suitability as judges and in all 
professions. As regards disapproval of women’s work outside home due to the Qur’anic 
injunction for the Prophet’s wives to stay at home and not to display their ornaments 
(Qur’an 33:33)71, a Zanan cleric has argued that that Verse was revealed to women of the 
Prophet’s household and, therefore, was not incumbent upon women in general: general 
women-kind could never hope to aspire to the same level as the Prophet’s wives (Mir- 
Hosseini 1995:13). Finally, they argue that the Verse’s command was merely to guide, 
and not to be binding (ibid).
Mir-Hosseini writes that Zanan 18 (June-July 1994) marked an important phase in the 
magazine’s progression towards a Shari'ah based feminist discourse (Mir-Hosseini 
1995:22). From then on the magazine did not shy away from engaging with fiq h  texts but 
tackled head-on the Qur’anic Verses used to legitimate women’s subordination. Thus, the 
question of the wife’s obedience and the right of a husband to beat his wife was critically 
examined. The authors showed what the Shari 'ah concepts of tamkin and nushuz entailed 
in practice and how humiliating and disturbing its effects were on women and children. In 
looking at the fiqh  dimension Mohsen Qa’eni, a man versed in religious studies, argues 
that Article 1105 of the Civil Code had no Shari 'ah based justification (Mir-Hosseini 
1995:23). In his discussion of Sura 4:34 he states that a man’s head-ship of the household 
was a male construct and, like other male privileges which were attributed to Shari 'ah 
law, actually has its roots in the culture and customs of the time of revelation. Qa’eni 
argues that the aim of the Qur’an was to achieve changes in gender relations gradually 
(ibid). To show the extent to which Sura 4 (an-Nisa) is predicated on the customs and 
conventions of its time, Qa’eni urges the reader to examine the practices of the Prophet 
themselves; and reminds the believer that he or she is in fact required to so do by the 
Qur’an itself (Mir-Hosseini 1995:24). He then analyses several Hadith and argues that the
70 see section 3.3 ante.
71 A n d stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dasgting display, like that of the former times of ignorance; and establish regularprayer, 
andgive regular charity and obey God and his Apostle... (Vtrse 33:33)
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Prophet himself never acted according to the dictates of Sura 4: not only did he never raise 
his hand to strike any of his wives but he actually condemned wife-beating. Qa’eni says of 
male head-ship and the authority of the husband to discipline his wife that the Qur’an 
simply endorsed the conduct and custom of the time - as it did with certain other marriage 
rules - but that this does not mean that the Qur’an held them to be just, unchangeable and 
applicable to all times. Qa’eni concludes that Islam intended disputes in family 
relationships to be resolved by persuasion and advice (ibid).
A woman’s duty to relieve men’s powerful uncontrollable sexual urges is the rationale 
behind the Shi’a institution of sigheh or temporary marriage. The Islamic Republic has 
particularly promoted and encouraged this form of marriage. Sigheh flourished around 
sacred shrines predominantly amongst theology students. Sexual sigheh was also 
sometimes used as a means of repentance and punishment: according to reports, 
prostitutes detained in rehabilitation centres were encouraged to become sigheh to 
revolutionary guards, and in prisons virgin women prisoners were forced into sigheh with 
their jailers72. Gender activists are particularly opposed to sigheh marriages because they 
consider them to be forms of prostitution and are campaigning against them. For example, 
the magazine Zan-e-Ruz has been concerned with the children bom of such unions. They 
criticise the Islamic regime for ignoring the role of ‘love’ and companionship within 
marriage whilst overtly focusing on the sexual aspects. However, sociological research 
has revealed that this type of marriage does in fact offer women autonomy and 
independence in some unexpected ways (Haeri 1989).
It would seem that the impact of the Revolution on women has to a degree been 
emancipatory in the sense that it has paved the way for the emergence of a popular 
feminist consciousness. As in most of the Muslim world the legal position of the man’s 
head-ship of the family has not been the subject of reform in Iran. However, it should be 
noted that due to opposition by gender activists some of the initial family rights granted to 
men in such a total and complete way have been gradually watered down (Paidar 1995). 
For example, the husband’s right to prevent his wife from taking up employment has been 
limited: the High Council of the Judiciary ruled that if a woman worked before marriage or
72 This has been recorded in several Amnesty International reports and the Pariiamentary Human Rights Group pamphlet 
November 1994.
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took a job with her husband’s agreement after marriage, he could not lawfully prevent her 
from continuing work. Furthermore, even if the wife started work without the husband’s 
permission he could only prevent her if the job could be proved to be contrary to the 
interests and reputation of her family. A new marriage contract was devised to help 
women have some control over the kind of marriage they entered into and described those 
infringements of women’s rights that could give them the right to initiate divorce. These 
included clauses such as the husband’s refusal to pay maintenance, serious misbehaviour 
on his part and his long-term illness or insanity. Whilst most of these stipulations had 
already existed within the Family Protection Law, the 1992 amendments broke new 
ground by introducing the concept of domestic wages (ujrat al-mithl) and substantially 
restricting men’s right to repudiation {talaaq). In some ways, these amendments amount 
to a complete reversal of the early ruling of the Revolutionary Council dismantling the 
Family Protection Law of 1967.
4.7 Internationalisation
New trends are emerging within the gender activist discourse. Women are organising 
themselves at both national and international levels. In the Muslim world this has included 
a large number of independent non-governmental organisations (Hatem 1993). These 
groups reflect the greater confidence of Muslim middle-class women who are developing 
critical analyses of their societies and their positions within them. They attempt to cover 
social and political events and offer sophisticated perspectives on women’s lives. Many of 
these movements aim to create information and support networks at an international level 
in the Muslim world. The American-based organisation Karamah: Muslim Women 
Lawyers fo r  Human Rights attempts to provide detailed jurisprudential evidence in support 
of their claim that when interpreted properly Islam is humane and gender-egalitarian. 
Karamah argue for a ‘womanist’ position as opposed to a feminist position. They argue 
that “a ‘womanist’ is committed to survival and wholeness of an entire people, male and 
female” (Karamah 1995). At the recent Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 
Karamah argued that “Islam is not an ancient Eastern religion, but a vibrant Western 
religion too. There are today no less than five million Muslims in the United States alone. 
Many observant, often veiled American Muslim women are doctors, lawyers and 
professors. This should not come as a surprise to anyone, because Islam does not oppress
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women, Patriarchy does?' [my italics] (Karamah 1995). Another American-based 
organisation Muslim Women's League takes the position that Islam has mandated equality 
between men and women and that any practice of belief which oppresses women cannot be 
justified through Islamic teachings (MWL 1995).
One important organisation that provides an international information and support network 
is the Paris-based Women Living Under Muslim Laws. This organisation aims to defend 
women’s rights by raising awareness of the situation of Muslim women in different 
communities. Through an exchange of information women are made aware that practices 
such as female circumcision, seclusion of women and the giving of dowries have more to 
do with tradition and culture than religion per se. Thus internationalisation allows the 
identification of cultural traditional elements incorporated into Muslim practices and 
unfairly presented as part of religion in a specific region. Internationalisation has meant 
that interesting variations in Muslim law can be used for women’s benefit. Women have 
been made aware of rights of women in Islam (such as inheritance rights and access to 
divorce) which had previously been denied them in traditional practice (Helie-Lucas 1994). 
The variations in the condition of Muslim women’s lives in different societies explodes the 
myth of a single homogenous Muslim world (Shaheed 1994, Helie-Lucas 1994). Thus 
many women argue that in view of these variations and since the oppression and non­
oppression of women is channelled through religion, there ought therefore to be a 
universal improvement in women’s condition in all Muslim countries - with the ‘oppressed’ 
women gaining the benefits enjoyed by women in other Muslim societies. Furthermore, 
the political necessity and eventual submission of religious authorities to political power 
comes out quite clearly (Helie-Lucas 1993). For example, the attitude towards 
contraception has varied from mere toleration followed by encouragement and then to its 
banning depending on the demographic requirements (Helie-Lucas 1993:222).
In the past few years women from Muslim countries have organised many meetings and 
conferences for the purpose of exchanging information and creating active forms of 
solidarity. In 1985 AWSA (Arab Women's Solidarity Association) gathered together 
women from the Arab world to attend in Egypt; in 1986 the Simorgh Association gathered 
in Pakistan women from the Muslim communities in Asia and the Arab world; in 1986 
WLUML (Women Living Under Muslim Laws) gathered women from Muslim
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communities of the Arab world, Africa and Asia. WLUML also organised a conference on 
the theme “Women, Religion and Personal Law” in 1987. These initiatives are increasing 
the comparative analysis of laws most unfavourable to women and the setting up of 
international working groups. This kind of internationalisation provides an invigorating 
atmosphere and broadens the gender-activist discourse from the narrow confines of each 
local setting. The global Islamisation phenomenon is thus being paralleled by a global 
gender activist discourse.
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Patriarchal Women or Islamist 
Feminists?
Many women are critical of the ideals of equality formulated in the Western liberation 
paradigm. They ask whether ‘sexual equality’ is a good thing after all. Islamist women 
seem to have opted for complementarity and strictly defined gender roles. The mass 
support of women for Islamism, as evidenced in the Iranian revolution and the 
contemporary Islamist movements in Egypt, has perplexed social scientists and Western 
feminists - not to mention the non-Islamist women of Muslim countries. The question that 
is constantly begged is why should women seek to want to partake in their own 
subordination? Many non-Islamist women feel the Islamist ‘return to Islam’ to be 
regressive and backward. They feel threatened by the rapid spread of Islamism and fear 
the deprivation of many of the rights women have struggled for, and achieved, this 
Century. These non-Islamist women have often internalised the popular media image of 
‘fundamentalism’ being as fanatical, irrational, anti-modem and misogynistic. So, is 
Islamism always opposed to women’s rights and autonomy? Does it deny women 
educational and employment opportunities. Have the movements succeeded in making 
their ‘ideal Muslim woman (the home-making, self-sacrificing mother and wife) a reality? 
What are the implications of Islamist politics for feminism and concepts of women’s 
emancipation? Can one find any ‘feminist’-type activity within the Islamist movements 
themselves? Can Islamist and non-Islamist women ever unite?
The growing strength and popular appeal of Islamism can be seen in the increasing 
presence of hijab-d&d women on the streets of Middle-Eastern and Western cities. The 
hijab acts as a powerful visual symbol. Islamists feel it important that a Muslim can be 
immediately identifiable by his or her attire and appearance. This identification o f religious
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identity is felt to be most important for women since they are the most vulnerable to 
‘Westoxication’. The issue of the hijab is intimately connected to questions of women’s 
sexuality and their roles in society. At present there is intense pressure on Muslim women 
to keep to the strict confines of their culture and tradition. As such, debates are continuing 
to take place on women’s public behaviour, their rights to education and employment and 
their legal subordination to their husband’s authority.
5.1 Hijab: the Islamist Uniform
The hijab or veil is today the uniform and hall-mark for Islamist women world-wide. It 
has become the symbol of returning to an ‘original’ Islam and an authentic indigenous 
culture. Seen as a symbol of oppression, traditionalism and backwardness in the discourse 
of colonial domination, the veil was given up by most upper-class and middle-class Muslim 
women in the early part of this Century. However, it has recently made a global come­
back during the period of Islamisation over the last two decades. The hijab and its 
associated qualities of religious modesty are emphasised by Islamists partly as a rejection 
of the immorality of the West and the Western woman. In a reversal of Orientalism (or, as 
is sometimes referred to, Occidentalism) Islamists project the Western ‘Other’ as sexually 
perverse, immoral and corrupt. It was the earlier discourse of colonial domination that 
initially determined the meaning of the veil in geopolitical discourse and thereby set the 
terms for its emergence as a symbol of resistance (Ahmed 1992:253). From a global 
historical perspective changes in style of dress and notions of ‘appropriate female attire’ 
are driven as much by the market as by changing social mores and political climate 
(Watson 1994:151). The West has had a tremendous impact on the style of dress and 
fashion in the Middle-East in the past. Thus it is possible to see the new veiling as part of 
the resistance to and reversal of this process. Although male attire has undergone a similar 
‘de-Westernisation’ - with, e.g., the tie being shunned as a symbol of Western dress - 
greater emphasis has been placed on women’s appearance.
Many authors have been concerned with the baffling phenomenon of re-veiling and have 
considered it to represent a regression into traditional systems of patriarchy. In the case of 
Iran commentators saw a contradiction between the political and social behaviour of 
Muslim women who, on the one hand, actively participated in revolutionary politics and
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yet, on the other hand, socially clothed themselves in traditional ways with hijab and 
chador. “To Western and non-Islamist minds such traditional clothes still represented an 
imprisoned existence and a subordinate female status” (Ramazani 1983:20). The Muslim 
woman thus continues to be seen as trapped, oppressed and subjugated. In Iran the issue 
of the veil became a major arena of conflict between the forces of modernity and Islamic 
authenticity. In 1936 Reza Shah banned the wearing of the veil as a part of his 
modernising crusade: it was seen as a badge of backwardness and a marker of class. 
Veiled women were arrested and their veils were forcibly removed. The revolutionary 
years that followed saw politically-active women students consciously adopting the hijab 
and chador as a symbol of protest to the Shah’s Westernising regime. Following the 
Islamic Revolution, appearing in public unveiled became a criminal offence in 1983.
Aside from being a symbol of identity, compulsory veiling in Iran today is also a 
mechanism of social control. It represents the regulation of women and the imposition on 
them of an idealised construct of womanhood and community (Papanek 1994). It 
symbolises a lack of choice in the selection of identity: identity in the form of hijab is 
imposed. Although there is no overt dissent on the issue of the hijab, many middle-class 
educated women remain opposed to it (Gerami 1994). They believe compulsory veiling 
has no religious sanction and negates the very purpose of hijab whose observance, in their 
view, must remain a personal decision incumbent only upon those who believe in it. Mir- 
Hosseini has described the subtle defiance of veiling amongst Iranian women opposed to 
the imposition of public veiling by describing them as ‘bad-hijabV (or ‘incorrect veiling*) 
(Mir-Hosseini 1995). The phenomenon of the bad-hijabi, which is quite widespread and 
seen as a major problem by the Islamic Republic, involves leaving hair partially uncovered 
to show off the latest hair-styles and fashions (Mir-Hosseini 1995:11). Bright colourful 
clothing and patterned scarves are also classified as bad-hijabi.
There is a general Islamic consensus that there are certain parts of the body that must be 
concealed in order to avoid shame and preserve modesty. Although both Islamist and non- 
Islamist Muslim women agree on the importance of the Qur’anic concept of this modesty, 
they disagree on the definition of ‘modesty’. Thus one aspect of the debate is whether or 
not the wearing of the veil is demanded as an absolute religious obligation. Islamists, in 
agreement with the majority orthodox conservative interpretation, have a perception that
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the hair and the entire female form must be covered. For example, Badawi in his 
instructions on The Muslim Woman’s Dress stresses that the dress must cover the whole 
body except for the areas specifically exempted (Badawi 1980:5). Those areas which are 
exempted are the face and the hands alone73. To be a true Muslim a woman one has to 
wear the ‘Islamic dress’ (of the veil) and not to do so would mean that her faith had been 
shattered. Non-Islamists, however, generally support the modernist contention that whilst 
modesty is encouraged in Islam, seclusion and the hijab were enjoined on the Prophet’s 
wives alone. The modernist gender activist discourse explains veiling as being a non-Arab 
elite custom adopted by Muslims to symbolise their growing power and status. Thus they 
consider the veil to represent a status symbol, and therefore clearly at odds with the 
egalitarian inspiration and ethos of Islam.
The concept of modesty is clearly associated with sexuality in Islamic thought74. The 
Qur’anic injunctions to men and women to guard their modesty and cover their nakedness 
provides the basis for the regulation of behaviour, the segregation of the sexes and proper 
dress. According to orthodox interpretations and traditional practice in considerable parts 
of the Muslim world, the interaction of men and women not related by blood or marriage 
is permissible only in carefully controlled circumstances. The Qur’anic concept of modesty 
and its implication for licit and illicit sexual relations applies equally to both men and 
women. However, interpretation has tended to give primary focus to the dangers that 
women’s sexuality pose to the social order (Memissi 1985, Sabbah 1984). Memissi has 
pointed out that far from being seen as passive women’s sexuality is actually seen as 
strong, active and dangerous to the Islamic social order (Memissi 1985). Unless carefully 
controlled, sexuality and passion could lead to fitna  (disorder or chaos). The voracious 
sexual appetite of women and their permanent search for pleasure has the potential for 
subversion of the social order (Sabbah 1984). Similar to Orientalist projection of 
uncontrolled sexuality onto the Arab/Muslim ‘Other’, the orthodox Islamic discourse 
projects such onto the female. The control of active female sexuality is thus part of the 
orthodox interpretation of the Islamic message. Muslim wariness of heterosexual and 
emotional bonds is embodied in sexual segregation and arranged marriage. Segregation
73 There is disagreement amongst conservative Islamic scholars as to whether the face should be covered.
74 Sabbahl984, Memissi 1985, Watson 1994
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and purdah are also supported in the Arab-Islamic discourse through the notion that the 
male gaze automatically defiles and dishonours (Malti-Douglas 1991).
In conjunction with the hijab, segregation of the sexes is also an important issue for 
Islamists in their endeavour to practise a pure Islam, unadulterated by corrupt Western 
customs. They argue that the mixing of unrelated men and women is religiously unlawful. 
The Hadith and the Qur’an in their conservative interpretation both teach that the Muslim 
woman is forbidden to mingle with strange men and that she may not work outside of her 
home. With reference to the West Mawdudi argued that “The free intermingling of the 
sexes has brought in its wake an ever-growing tendency towards showing off, nudeness 
and sex perversion” (Mawdudi 1986:15). The conservative discourse differs radically 
from the modernist one on the issue of women’s participation in public life and her right to 
work. The dominant Islamist position, echoes the conservative view-point that men and 
women are created with natural instincts of sexual attraction and, thus, free-mixing would 
lead to the inciting of fornication and adultery. They stress that the Shari ’ah sets out rules 
for male and female interaction that pre-empt the possibility of sexual attraction. Islamist 
gender activists, however, promote the more liberal view that work outside the home 
which involves the mixing of the sexes is acceptable, although not obligatory, providing 
the woman is suitably attired. The hijab or Islamic dress has, ironically, actually made it 
possible for women to venture out into mixed-sex environments. Nevertheless since 
segregation is the ideal, Islamists are campaigning for sexually segregated educational 
institutions, businesses, and hospitals. As a covering for shameful nakedness the hijab may 
be viewed as a robe of piety that signals the wearer’s modesty and religiosity. Islamists 
emphasise that the veil or Islamic clothing is only the outer hijab. More important is the 
inner hijab: a particular state of mind and behaviour indicative of modesty and piety. 
However, the inner and the outer are not mutually exclusive but are intertwined: the inner 
is not possible to be achieved without the outer.
Linguistic analysis shows that the Arab-Islamic concept of hijab is a multifaceted one with 
many different connotations. Hijab literally means ‘curtain’ and the verb hajaba means 
‘to hide or to seclude’. Memissi argues that the Verse in the Qur’an used to argue for 
hijab75 was revealed commanding the division of space into public and private realms and
75 Qur’an 33:53. “ .. .and when you ask (the wives of the Prophet') for anythingye want, as them from before a screen: that makes for greater 
purity for their hearts and yours. ...”
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did not refer to the covering-up of women at all (Memissi 1991:85). Furthermore, in its 
negative context in the Qur’an the hijab is a veil that hides God from men. It is also 
signifies deafness and diminished intelligence. Memissi comments that it is noteworthy 
that today the hijab, the very sign of the person who is excluded from spiritual grace, is 
claimed as a symbol of Muslim woman and Muslim identity (Memissi 1991:97).
There is a multiplicity of arguments about the meaning and significance of the veil in past 
and present societies (Watson 1994). The institution of veiling is complexly differentiated. 
There are a wide range of styles of veil, ranging from the uniform black cloaks worn by 
women in post-Revolution Iran to the exclusive designer scarves of women of the new 
elite in Egypt. What is called the ‘veil’ in English does not correspond to any single term 
in Arabic. Veiling has traditionally been required of women when they appear in public 
and it has taken diverse forms according to the cultural setting: the tent-like Afghan burqa; 
the Iranian chador\ the face mask of the Gulf region; and, the kerchief covering the lower 
part of the face in North Africa. Often when the loose clothing of the veil is taken off in 
private family settings it reveals fashionable clothing underneath. Thus the private bodies 
of these women, which are flirtatious and seductive, are unrelated to their public bodies 
(Abu Odeh 1993). The hijab is only one element in the contemporary urban Islamist 
uniform, or al-ziyy al-Islami16 as it is sometimes known. The Islamist uniform adopts 
what is essentially quite a new style but which is intended to conform to what is 
considered to be the Islamic requirements of modest dress; that which is not sexually 
enticing. Whilst Western attire pushes women to be seductive, sexy and sexual the Islamic 
dress pushes them to be prudish, conservative and asexual.
Considering the recent anthropological post-structuralist emphasis on polyvocality, it is 
important to consider the Islamists’ own views on the veil and its significance. Interviews 
of young Islamist women in Egypt reveal a wide diversity of responses towards veiling. 
The range of views represented in the women’s accounts suggests that there is no single 
Islamic attitude towards the hijab (Watson 1994). Although social pressure may be an 
important factor in re-veiling, it is explained by young women to be a matter of personal 
choice, a way of making a statement about one’s social position and, at the same time, a
76 Al-^jyy al-Islami refers to a certain dress code and largely consists o f a variety o f styles o f  headgear (and sometimes face 
coverings) and garments that are loose-fitting, ankle-length and long sleeved (El-Guindi 1981).
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way of conforming to a religious duty (El-Guindi 1981, Ahmed 199277). The modem 
head-scarf or Islamic dress has become the prime marker differentiating Islamist women 
and non-Islamist women. In Egypt re-veiling first made its appearance amongst university 
students in major urban centres in the 1970’s (El-Guindi 1981:465). The veil that 
appeared then differed greatly in appearance and practical implications from the veil 
rejected by upper-class women earlier this Century. The older version of the veil, 
practised mostly by the upper classes in Egypt, involved complete veiling combined with 
seclusion. In contrast, the new al-ziyy al-Islami Islamic dress is said to be potentially 
liberating in that it often offers a new mobility to young women from traditional 
backgrounds. It is seen by wearers as liberating them from the heavy burden of sexuality. 
At a more practical level the Islamic dress is also said to protect women from male 
harassment. Furthermore, wearing the dress signals the wearer’s adherence to an Islamic 
moral and sexual code, thus allowing women to strike up friendships with men without 
fear of being dubbed immoral. As in other Muslim countries, in Iran the current orthodox 
form of hijab is largely an urban phenomenon and an issue for educated, working women. 
Evidently there are clear advantages for women who venture daily into co-educational 
campuses and sexually integrated work places. However, whilst the veil is liberating and 
empowering in many ways the spatial and functional segregation between the sexes - as 
envisaged by the Islamist ideology for the workplace - could seriously affect the career 
prospects of veiled women. Since they work in a world where men are already the 
decision-makers, and the higher situated in the hierarchy of the workplace, minimising 
contact between men and women may potentially further isolate women from the positions 
of power and decision making.
5.2 Women’s Support for Islamism
As detailed before78, there are elements of a class war in young people’s support for 
Islamist movements. In Egypt and other parts of the Middle-East there are a number of 
common factors in the composition of people affiliating with the Islamic trend, in the 
problems confronting them, and in the strategies to which they are resorting to in seeking 
to cope with those problems. Typically from the middle and lower middle-classes, they are
77 Ahmed cites Zeinab Radwan Thakirat al hijab
78 see section 2.3 ante.
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educated and professionally upwardly mobile although often frustrated in achieving their 
aspirations. They are usually confronting cosmopolitan city life for the first time and are 
generally the first generation of women in their family to emerge socially into a sexually 
integrated world (Ahmed 1992:223). For women, joining Islamic groups often brings 
comfort by providing a sense of community. Religious movements provide space for them 
to legitimately study, work and be politically and publicly active with virtue and modesty 
(ibid). The oppositionist status of Islamists has made female activism more necessary and 
therefore acceptable within the universities and outside them. The range of activities of 
these women include meetings, reading group attendance, participation in public prayers, 
etc. These activities are socially and politically important because they represent an 
identification with a set of goals and an authority outside of the family, government or 
state institutions (Zuhur 1992).
Islamist discourse and conflicts of interests on women’s rights and their position in society 
have been largely between ‘fundamentalist’ men and ‘non-fundamentalist’ women 
(Memissi 1988). With reference to Pakistan, Mumtaz writes that women belonging to 
older professional classes of the dominant elite have over the years managed to expand the 
economic, social and psychological space for themselves and present a dilemma to men 
(Mumtaz 1994:236). They have entered spheres of activity in politics and in professions 
previously considered to be solely male domains. They assert their right to be treated as 
equals, to be allowed to exercise choices and not to be discriminated on the basis of 
gender. Despite being numerically small, such women disturb men even when they are 
neither in competition with them for jobs nor likely to interact socially with them (ibid). 
They pose an indirect threat for Islamist men because they suggest a real possibility for 
change for women of the lower classes. In many Muslim countries upper-middle-class 
educated women are viewed as agents of imperialist culture who have lost their identity 
and become Western, complete with ideas about feminism, liberalism, Marxism, etc. 
Westernisation is seen to destroy society through these women, by depriving them of 
chastity, modesty and honour via notions of autonomy and sex appeal. Much of the 
discourse and polemic of Islamist men against professional non-Islamist women is 
internalised and reiterated by Islamist women themselves. Thus Islamist women and their 
organisations attack Western style feminism and feminist activists using the religious 
idiom. Islamist women condemn non-Islamist women as being Westernised and alienated
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from their own culture. Although Islamist women attack non-Islamist Muslims on the 
question of the veil, throughout Islamic history it was only a part of the urban classes who 
were veiled and secluded, whilst rural and nomadic women - who made up the majority of 
the population - were not. Even today many rural Muslim women work the fields and go 
unveiled; yet they are not the focus of the Islamists’ wrath.
Islamist women point out the inner ease and resolution that is described as a feeling of 
peace or centeredness, which is brought about by the formal or public aligning of oneself 
with Islam (Ahmed 1991, Zuhur 1992). However, one should stress that a personal choice 
in becoming Islamist is very different from state-imposed Islamism, as in Iran. Shahin 
Gerami’s survey found that not-withstanding years of mass propaganda and restrictive 
policies middle-class Iranian women in Tehran did not support Islamism (Gerami 
1994:346). Neither had they internalised the gender identity that the Republic had decreed 
for them. This clearly shows that a sex-segregated ideal society envisioned by the 
revolutionary leaders had failed to enlist the middle-class women’s support. However, 
there continues to be strong support by lower or lower middle-class women for Islamism, 
even in cases when it is state imposed such as in Iran and Sudan.
Sudan provides an interesting example of women’s responses to social change and the rise 
of Islamist movements. In Sudan Islamisation began in 1983 with the attempt to enforce 
the Shari ’ah. Islamic law gained precedence over civil and customary law, leaving women 
in a contradictory position. Similar to the situation in Iran, several discriminatory 
measures were taken against women. However, notwithstanding such action by the State, 
Sondra Hale has found that there is enthusiastic mass support by women for the Islamist 
National Islamic Front (NIF) organisation in Sudan and, indeed, that the women activists 
were amongst the most visible and active supporters (Hale 1994). In her interviews with 
several leading activists Hale found that these women believed that the Shari ’ah gave them 
equal rights to men. Whilst one could argue that such views are simply the result of an 
internalisation of patriarchal thinking and false consciousness, an alternative interpretation 
would be that these women are trying to formulate a type of Islamist feminism. Hale 
found, much to her surprise, that the activist women all agreed that men oppressed 
women, that Arabs had a low opinion of women and that Arab men tried to give a false 
idea to women about their rights under the Shari ’ah (Hale 1994:160). These women are
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actively pursuing change in the status of women, but within their own perception of an 
Islamist framework.
Does being Islamist mean compliance with patriarchy and male dominance? Kandiyoti 
argues that many Islamist women consciously choose to accommodate ‘patriarchy* in 
order to gain certain benefits (Kandiyoti 1988). Thus Khomeini’s exhortations to keep 
women at home found enthusiastic support amongst many Iranian women despite the 
obvious elements of repression in it because the implicit promise of increased male 
responsibility was attractive to women faced with the uncertainties of survival in the 
modem world. Thus younger women adopted the veil since the restriction imposed on 
them by an Islamic order was only a small price to be paid in exchange for the security, 
stability and presumed respect this order promised them. For some conservative Islamist 
women identity-politics offers security and stability (Moghadam 1994:19). This stability 
lies in clearly defined sex roles, family life and a religious orientation. They are 
psychologically alienated from the notion of sexual liberation, individualism and the secular 
world-view. They fear the breakdown of the family and the moral universe and blame 
feminism for it. Although the majority of Muslim and Islamist women may be socially 
conservative, it can be seen that unexpected forms of gender activism and consciousness 
have emerged from within the religious framework itself.
5.3 The Islamist Gender Activist Discourse
The gender activism of Islamist women is promoting a discourse that has some important 
common strands with the types of feminism of modernist gender activists as well as the 
more secular based gender activists. The Islamist gender activists aim to reclaim religion 
and find a liberation theory for women from within Islam. The pioneers amongst these are 
struggling against the patriarchal dictates of the dominant Islamist discourse. We have 
seen that all over the Muslim world, even in Iran where there is state-imposed gender 
hierarchy, Islamist women are speaking out. A more radical and critical approach to 
gender is now evident in the Islamic Republic. Educated and employed Islamist women 
are involved in generating this discourse. Important leaders of this movement in Iran
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include women such as Azam Taleqani79 and Zahra Rahnavard80. Taleqani founded the 
Women's Society o f the Islamic Revolution, a body which has had some success in 
defending women’s rights in Iran (Afshar 1994:17). Similarly Rahnavard denounced 
discrimination against women on religious and political grounds (ibid). Most importantly 
the legitimacy accorded to Islamist women and the consolidation of the Islamic Republic 
has resulted in a relaxation of previously rigid gender codes.
In Egypt today veteran Islamist al-Ghazali is continuing her earlier activism after six years 
in prison, inspiring and mobilising young women who gather at her home. Al-Ghazali 
exalts women’s domestic roles (and does so by demonstrating by personal example) and 
encourages the importance of da *wa - the winning of people over to the true Islam. The 
main gender activist ideologues for Egyptian Islamist women include Safinaz Kasim and 
Salwa Bakr. Kasim is a writer and journalist who writes within the context of Islamist 
journalism and Bakr records women’s recent history in fictional form. In Sudan Islamist 
activist women of the NIF, such as Wisal al-Mahdi (Dr Turabi’s wife) and Hikmat Sid- 
Ahmed, argue for opposition to Arab patriarchal customs by the promotion of ‘true’ Islam 
(Hale 1994). International conferences are being organised on gender issues inviting 
women from all over the Muslim world. In Egypt and Iran the Islamist gender activist 
discourse is being carried forward by journals such as Hajir, Payam-e-Hajar and Zanan. 
Islamist women’s organisations and voluntary groups have been actively promoting 
women’s rights and ‘feminist consciousness’. At a more practical level activists and 
organisations have been fighting for equal opportunities in public and political life. In 
many countries Islamic welfare work has been a dominant function of women’s 
organisations.
Islamist gender activist women argue that the West and secular Western feminism have 
failed them. They dismiss Western feminism for being one of the main instruments of 
colonialism and causing family breakdown. With reference to the drastic influence of 
feminism in the West Islamist author Sarah Sherrrif writes:
79 Daughter o f  the late leader Ayatollah Taleqani and member o f the first post-revolutionary Parliament
B0 A  leading Islamic feminist and wife o f the previous Iranian Prime Minister
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“Western families and Western society are in crisis because women have been 
forced to live a life devoid of personality and individuality. Alienation is 
increasing, suicides are increasing, loneliness and depression are up, Divorce and 
separation are rising, women are being exploited like never before for commercial 
and other less savoury purposes....” (Sheriff 1989:4)
Islamist women believe that by concentrating on labour market analysis and offering the 
experiences of a minority of white and affluent middle-class women as the norm, Western 
feminists have developed an analysis which is all but irrelevant to the majority of women in 
the Third World. They expound the view that Western style feminist struggles have only 
liberated women to the extent that they are prepared to become sex objects and market 
their sexuality to benefit patriarchal capitalism (Afshar 1994:16). Islamists thus argue that 
a stricter adherence to Islam and a return to the roots of the faith will yield true 
enlightenment and liberation for women:
“Muslim women, in contrast (to Western women) secured the same and indeed 
greater rights and freedoms over 1400 years ago with the advent of Islam.... These 
rights and the honourable role envisaged for Muslim women implied by them, 
prove without doubt that Islam in neither backward nor repressive in respect of its 
treatment of women” (Sheriff 1989:5)
One of the main exponents of the Islamist discourse Zahra Rahnavard argues that Western 
feminism and capitalism marginalise and denigrate motherhood, femininity and familial 
responsibilities (Afshar 1994:5). She argues that Western feminists have failed to alter the 
labour market to accommodate women’s needs and at the same time women have lost the 
benefits they once obtained in matrimony. The failure of Western feminism to carve an 
honoured and recognised space for marriage and motherhood and its denigration of 
domestic work is one of the biggest grievances of Islamist women.
Islamist discourse portrays a contradictory attitude towards gender. This discourse 
combines traditional conservative ideas about the role of women whilst, at the same time, 
accepting the needs of a modem economy. On the one hand the dominant discourse 
within Islamism emphasises motherhood as a religious duty and a special privilege of 
women. Thus Islamists argue that women have been made for domesticity and
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motherhood and should adopt this role willingly. For some such as Shari* ati, Muttahari 
and Mawdudi women can only achieve success in terms of their men-folk through 
daughter-hood, marriage or motherhood. Afshar argues that in many ways 
fundamentalism is a ratification of motherhood as a respectable role for women to be 
performed within the domestic sphere and part of its appeal is rooted in its validation of 
this role (Afshar 1994:21). Thus in contrast to the modernist discourse, Islamist activists 
generally view women primarily as mothers and wives. The proponents of Islam remain 
convinced that it is the recognition of the marital and reproductive obligations of women 
that would bring them earthly and heavenly rewards. While women Islamists such as al- 
Ghazali and Rahnavard also support this division of labour and women placed within the 
sphere of domesticity, the example of their own lives has been to deny women’s relegation 
to pure domesticity. Islamist movements now exhibit a degree of flexibility in their 
position on women. They encourage education for women. However, this encouragement 
is often rationalised as addressing the need to have informed mothers, women teachers and 
doctors in a segregated society. Whilst extolling the virtues of home-making, Islamist 
women however, continue to go out and pursue higher education and the professions in 
Pakistan (Shaheed 1988). Although the voice of overt feminism (in Western terms) is 
absent in present day Egypt the entry of women into university, the professions and public 
life in unprecedented numbers and the availability of education and professional 
occupations to women from a broad segment of the population is indicative of ‘pro­
feminist’ ideals and aspirations (Ahmed 1992, Badran 1994).
Since women are the guardians of the home it follows, according to the dominant Islamist 
discourse, that they have to be dependent on men for their livelihood. Women’s economic 
dependency on men is of paramount importance to the Islamist argument. Due to their 
violation of the strict segregation codes, working women are seen as threatening the 
morality and productivity of society. It is mainly for this reason that formal employment is 
not encouraged for women. The common basis for the conservative viewpoint of 
women’s economic dependency is Verse 34:481. The gender activist discourse challenges 
the notion of permanent economic dependency of wives on husbands. Riffat Hassan has 
argued that the interpreters of this Verse have chosen the wrong meaning and that what is 
in fact implied here is merely a permission granted to men to spend their wealth on women
81 see section 3.3 ante.
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for the short period of child bearing; i.e. the authority to spend is not one that is given to 
men absolutely and for all times, but only for a specific purpose and for a limited period 
(Hassan 1988). Rahnavard also points out that the word “authority” is itself a 
misinterpretation and that what is meant by the Qur’an is a specific allocation of 
responsibilities for a particular period of time (Afshar 1994:24). Men have not been 
appointed to rule over women but are given the heavy responsibility of securing a 
livelihood whilst women get on with the important task of motherhood.
According to the Islamist gender activist discourse, however, women upon marriage do 
not lose their identity or wealth on marriage and they do have the choice to enter into paid 
employment outside the home (Afshar 1994:10). Thus it is argued that “if a woman 
wanted to work, however, any profession permissible for men would be equally 
permissible for the woman so long as it does not compromise her femininity....” (Sheriff* 
1989:10). Rahnavard argues that in Qur’anic terms marriage is a flexible arrangement 
where even though women are expected to be obedient, they can nevertheless expect to be 
kept in the style to which they had been accustomed to before their marriage. 
Furthermore, women had the right to include a right of divorce for themselves in their 
marriage contract. Within the marriage not only are men expected to maintain their wives, 
but they must also treat them with kindness. Husbands must pay an additional fee to wives 
who agree to suckle their babies82. Islamist gender activists argue that marriage is a 
domain of mutual intimacy and comfort. Despite the actual traditional practice, Islamist 
scholars have argued, Islam does not shackle women within marriage, does not bind them 
to domesticity and, by allowing them a separate property entitlement, in fact makes them 
independent of their husbands and thus able to fend for themselves.
There are still Islamically condoned practices and institutions which gender activists find 
difficult to explain and reinterpret. For example, even the most committed gender activists 
have difficulties in accommodating and explaining the issue of polygamy. Modernist 
apologists have long argued that the relevant Verse permitting polygamy commands 
absolute and complete equal treatment for all wives and that this is a near impossibility for 
all humans except for the Prophet; hence, polygamy was not permitted. The dominant 
Islamist position, however, sees polygamy as a man’s God-given right valid for all places
82 Islamist women cite Qur’an 2:233
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and times. Muttahari explains it as being a necessity due to a man’s natural greater sexual 
appetite (Muttahari 1991). Legal scholar Doi argues that a wife may not legally object to 
the husband’s right to take another wife (Doi 1995:11). The attitudes of Islamist women 
to how men should approach the situation is quite different from those of men. Women 
argue that polygamy is permitted only in exceptional circumstances and that the husband 
must ask for the first wife’s permission before so doing. It is also possible for a woman to 
insert a clause in her marriage contract prohibiting her husband from contracting a 
polygamous union. In Iran opposition to polygamy continues with active campaigning by 
many activists. According to Rahnavard polygamy was only allowed in early Islam due to 
that particular moment of history in order to protect orphans and widows: a large number 
of men had been killed due to wars and women and children were thus left unprotected 
(Afshar 1994:15). Islamist writer Aisha Lemu sees polygamy as a way of dealing with the 
surplus of women in society. (Lemu 1978:28). Many Islamist women seek to emphasise 
the positive aspects of Islam and explain away the negative ones.
5.4 Islamist and Non-Islamist Discourse: Possibility for 
Reconciliation?
Despite their fundamentally different premises both groups of Islamists and non-Islamist 
gender activists do show a striking degree of similarity in their pro-feminist stances. 
Badran writes that since the end of the 1980’s in Egypt the position of intellectual women 
as feminists, pro-feminist and Islamists concerning women’s roles in society have been 
converging (Badran 1994:221). I would argue that this is a global phenomenon. Be it in 
the Middle-East or in Muslim communities of the West, there is pursuit of the goals of 
female autonomy and subjectivity either under the idiom of ‘feminism’ and ‘Western dress’ 
or that of ‘Islam’ and ‘the veil’.
Unlike many Islamist and conservative men who emphasise the natural intellectual 
inferiority and irrationality of women, gender activist women see men and women to be of 
equal mental capacity. As was expected, interviews of veiled and unveiled women in 
Egypt revealed that veiled women were consistently more conservative and less feminist
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than their unveiled sisters83 (Ahmed 1992:227). Regarding women’s education and 
professional achievements, unveiled women argued for more gender egalitarian positions. 
However, Ahmed points out that what was even more interesting about the interviews was 
the striking number of similarities between the two groups: in both cases the overwhelming 
majority of veiled and non-veiled women supported women’s rights to education and to 
work. They also supported equality in public life and political rights. The contrast to the 
dominant Islamist male point of view is thus evident and it is also apparent that many 
women’s views do not conform to the conventional notion that a woman’s place is at 
home, without political rights, and without rights to paid employment outside the home. 
Apart from fundamental disagreements over the issue of hijab and the necessity for an 
Islamic state, many non-Islamist women in Egypt hold similar views to Islamist women in 
their ideals and values84. Non-Islamist women too reiterate a disenchantment with the 
Western model of women’s status. Muslim women throughout the world today echo the 
view that the family is the centre of society: “Women consider their reproductive roles and 
the nurturing of children as of paramount importance” (Zuhur 1992:113). At least in 
rhetoric they constantly point out that their maternal duties should be placed before 
concerns such as marital happiness, public service or self-fulfilment (Ahmed 1992, Gerami 
1994).
From her intensive research in Egypt based on interviews, Sherifa Zuhur found that despite 
the rhetoric of ‘family’, unveiled women gave a lot of importance to careers and self- 
fulfilment (Zuhur 1992:114). They pointed out that the Qur’an itself supported the right 
of women to work and to gain recompense for their labour. These women listed examples 
from Islamic history of women who ruled or who controlled property in their own right or 
who were consulted for their knowledge as evidence that women did, throughout history, 
hold other roles in addition to the family one (ibid). They stressed the examples of the 
Prophet’s own wives: Khadija was a business woman; A’isha was politically active and 
head of an army that went to war. It is evident that unveiled women are employing such 
historical references mainly to support women’s right to work with the same degree of 
conviction that veiled women had shown when they used historical examples to support 
veiling or education for women. Women obviously enter the workforce in different
83 Ahmed cites Zeinab Radwan Thahirat al bijab
84 Ahmed 1992, Zuhurl992, Badran 1994
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sectors and with differing motivations (Zuhur 1992) 85. Whilst educated middle-class 
women enter the professions and view employment as an ideological commitment for the 
assertion of rights and independence women of the lower classes, however, often enter 
work due to economic necessity. Zuhur found that unveiled women were generally more 
politicised and possessed of a civic consciousness than were the veiled women (Zuhur 
1992:114).
Non-Islamist women agree with the general Islamic idea that male and female sexuality 
should be controlled to some degree through the socialisation process and individual self- 
control (Zuhurl992:115). They also believe that sex must be confined to marriage and 
they reiterate the Islamist argument that Western crime, drug abuse and psychological 
problems are due in part to relaxed sexual standards. However, non-Islamist women tend 
to emphasise the importance of self-control rather than strictly imposed hijab and sexual 
segregation (ibid). Women are used to many areas of sexual segregation traditional to 
Egyptian social intercourse. Nevertheless, the use of the hijab and sexual segregation in 
public institutions such as schools and hospitals are seen by non-Islamist women to be 
retrogressive and an imposition on their rights as individuals. Non-veiled women feel 
insulted by Islamist suggestions that they themselves are immodest and represent sources 
of temptation for men at their jobs.
Although they do agree on the importance of women’s roles as wives and mothers, non- 
Islamist women are keener to stress their equality to men with respect to their rights and 
responsibilities (Zuhur 1992:117). They take pride in their accomplishments in and out of 
the home and expects others to admire their efforts at education or self-education. 
Middle-class women in Iran reject the idea of women’s intellectual inferiority (Gerami 
1994:345). According to Gerami’s findings, men’s unilateral power is questioned and 
woman’s rights in decision-making at the family level are recognised. However, despite 
their articulation of certain feminist positions these women also believe that ultimately men 
are the better decision-makers. Despite their pursuit of careers non-Islamist women too 
continue to dominate the running of their households. However, non-Islamist women give
85 Zuhur quotes from research undertaken by Marei, Wafaa Abou-Negm ‘Temale Emancipation and Changing Political 
Leadership” Ph.D. dissertation Department o f Political Science, Rutgers University 1978
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great importance to their participation in the public sphere and see this participation as a 
moral, intellectual and national duty.
The views amongst Islamist and non Islamist women about the role of women in society 
do not conform totally to the views identified with traditional Islam and encoded in the 
Shari ’ah. It would seem that the majority of young Islamist women have only a vague 
idea of the technicalities enshrined in establishment Islam. Ahmed is of the view that the 
young women and men affiliating with Islam are listening to its ethical voice reiterating the 
equal humanity of all, instead of the gender hierarchy ingrained in the technical, legal and 
doctrinal Islam (Ahmed 1992:229). Some Islamist women, especially those of the older 
generation, have internalised patriarchal thinking even though at times they act in contrary 
ways. On the other hand, gender activist women who are aware of the discriminatory laws 
are contesting the traditional interpretations. Younger Islamist women are beginning to 
question male dominance and to see it as transgressing the bounds of correct Islamic 
thinking. They are creating a radical gender activist strand within Islamism. Thus it seems 
possible that the new generation of intellectual women will probably produce a gender 
reconfiguration from within the Islamist movement (Badran 1994). Women’s activism 
within the movement has increased gender consciousness and is bringing about changes in 
the attitude towards gender. Islamist women are becoming more political and more 
demanding of the men within their own movements. They are asserting their right to 
criticise gender discrimination and are using language similar to that used by women’s 
rights activists in other countries.
5.5 Radical Islamist Gender Activism
Some Islamist activist women are demonstrating a greater degree of openness to change 
and an eagerness for dialogue. Islamist progressive discourse on gender is being moved in 
a new direction by Heba Rauf Ezzat86, a young Islamist graduate student of political 
science at Cairo University (El-Gawhary 1994). Active within the Islamist movement, she 
is known for her academic research on women’s political role from the perspective of 
political Islam and its theory. Ezzat is evoking a new discourse on women, politics and
86 Ezzat edits die women’s page in al-Sba’ab, a weekly opposition newspaper published by a coalition o f  the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Labour Party.
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political sociology that is seen as rather liberal and radical within the Islamist movement. 
Such liberal attitudes on gender that are also espoused by men such as Dr. Hassan al- 
Turabi and Al-Ghazali are currently causing much uproar within the Islamist movement 
(Abu Shehab 1993). Dr al-Turabi argues for an enlarged social role for Muslim women, 
including her right to fully participate in the political process as well as to stand for any 
public office except that of Khalifa (Bashier (1980:13). He asserts the permissibility of the 
intermingling of the two sexes in places of worship, in education and in family gatherings.
Similar to various other gender activists, Ezzat examines the early sources of religion and 
Islamic history in order to evolve a theory of women’s liberation (Badran 1995:213). Al- 
Ghazali recognises that women do not enjoy the rights accorded to them by religion. 
However, she disagrees with the dominant discourse of Islamists that relegates women to a 
domestic role. She sees Muslim women’s enjoyment in practice of their lawful rights as a 
step towards the realisation of a true Islamic society. Ezzat does not accuse the whole of 
the fiq h  of being patriarchal (el-Gawhary 1994:26). Like the theologian Riffat Hassan, 
Ezzat uses the orthodox methodology to interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah and they both 
reach quite different conclusions to the orthodox view. Both Hassan and Ezzat challenge 
hierarchical power relations within the family. They consider it necessary to establish more 
egalitarian relations within the family. Ezzat stresses the Islamic concept of shura 
(consultation) as opposed to ‘a totalitarian patriarchal system’ (el-Gawhary 1994:27). She 
wishes to see a kind of “democratisation of the man-woman relationship inside a family 
structure” (ibid).
Despite the shared concerns, Ezzat’s political orientation is fundamentally different from 
secular feminists and modernist gender activists such as Riffat Hassan. Hassan wishes for 
the feminist movement to be religiously rooted in Islam. She argues that it is necessary to 
present the positive content of the Qur’an that has been lost due to centuries of 
misogynistic interpretation. Ezzat’s interpretation of Islam, however, is very different. 
She defines herself as an Islamist and rejects the label 'Islamic feminist’. Ezzat argues that 
women’s liberation in society should rely on Islam alone (el-Gawhary 1994:26). This, she 
argues, necessitates a revival of Islamic thought and a renewal within Islamic 
jurisprudence. Although she rejects the term ‘feminism’ Ezzat is, in essence, looking for a
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way to express much of what feminism at its base level in fact connotes (Badran 
1994:213).
Ezzat is of the view that the New Right has more to offer Muslim feminists than radical or 
Leftist feminism (Badran 1994:214). The New Right in America is a conservative 
movement that emerged as a counter reaction to feminism and the civil rights movement. 
Women are an important visible presence throughout the movement. Similar to the 
Islamist mission the New Right activists believe their special mission is to restore America 
to health, to regenerate religious belief and to renew faith, morality and decency. Klatch 
has demarcated two trends within the New Right movement: the social conservatives and 
the laissez-faire conservatives (Klatch 1994). Whilst the social conservatives blame 
feminism as being one of the primary forces of moral decay, laissez-faire conservatives in 
contrast actually adhere to part of the feminist vision (Klatch 1994:374). This 
identification by Ezzat of herself with the New Right seemingly puts her into a very 
conservative position on the gender question. In many ways the gender activism of 
Islamist women and the New Right reminds us of the very early stirrings of ‘feminist 
consciousness’ in the West and the Middle-East. At the beginning of this Century Women 
such as Margaret Mead argued for women’s access to education and public spheres whilst 
ascribing to the vision of women as feminine and supportive home-making mothers and 
wives.
However Ezzat’s position on women’s education and work can be seen as quite 
‘progressive’ sharing much in common with modernist gender activists and secular 
feminists. For example, whilst most conservative religious activists call for the return of 
working women to the home, Ezzat does not. Although Ezzat stresses the importance of 
the family, she feels that women should have the freedom of choice between different roles 
such as pursuing careers or being primarily wives and mothers (el-Gawhary 1994:27). In 
her view, the respect of society should focus on women’s active participation within and 
outside their homes. Ezzat contests any separation between the public and private spheres 
and argues that rules that apply in the political arena should also be valid for the family 
(ibid). She wishes to deconstruct the public-private dichotomy that is dominant in 
Western and Islamic thought. This dichotomy gives priority either to family life or to 
public life. Breaking the dichotomy, Ezzat argues, would give housewives more social
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esteem and encourage working women to fulfil their roles as good wives and mothers. 
Her own interpretation of Islam does not embody such polaristic perceptions. She argues 
that private is political, not in the feminist aggressive sense, but in the sense of ‘Islamic 
solidarity’ and the importance of social infra-structure (Hassan 1994:27).
The magazine Zancm, which basically holds very similar viewpoints to Ezzat, is leading a 
parallel radical Islamist discourse in Iran. Mir-Hosseini argues that the post-fundamentalist 
discourse of the Zancm magazine is changing the very terms of not only the Shari ’ah 
discourse on women but that of the Islamic Republic as well in arguing for a type of 
demarcation between state and religion (Mir-Hosseini. 1995:28). Similar to the discourse 
o f Hassan and Ezzat, Zancm takes for granted gender equality on all fronts including the 
rights accorded by the Shari’ah. Zcman too advocates a brand of feminism that is 
primarily based on Islam, and not the West, as its source of legitimacy. The authors of 
Zanan do not shrink away from tackling very difficult issues and defending them using 
religious arguments. They have thus brought about a radical shift in the very premises of 
the debate on ‘women and Islam’.
In agreement with most Islamists, Ezzat is critical of the West and Western feminism 
(Badran 1994:213). However, unlike most of them she tends to critically examine 
phenomena attributed to the West without rejecting them wholesale. Furthermore, she is 
willing to accept the tremendous changes the feminist movement has made possible for 
women (ibid). Not-withstanding this though she defines feminists as mainly secularists 
who are fighting male domination. Religion on the whole is regarded by them as an 
obstacle to women’s rights. According to Ezzat, ‘conflict’ between the sexes is the main 
concept of secular Western feminist theory. Like many other religiously committed 
women Ezzat is wary of what she sees as the ‘individualism’ in Western feminism. She 
emphasises the importance of the collective good over the benefit of individual liberation 
and self realisation. Hence Islamist gender activists do not use the term ‘women’s 
liberation’ and nor do they see themselves as engaged in a struggle against men. Family 
concerns remain important to them even though they are increasingly invading public 
space.
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The feminism of Muslim gender activists can be placed in the broad context of ‘Third 
World feminism’ and cultural feminism. Islamist gender activists take the position that the 
norms and values of Western feminism do not apply to them in total. The gender activist 
organisation Karamah argues that, as women of colour in the U.S. have pointed out 
earlier, Western feminist theories tended to be unworkable for their communities because 
they reflected white middle-class concerns and values (Karamah 1995). Thus Islamist 
women point out that it is important to realise that feminist scholarly practices exist within 
relations of power. The West (usually white upper-class women) dominates the 
production of this feminist knowledge which does not comprise merely of objective 
knowledge. Feminism today does attempt to come to terms with and recognise differences 
based on class, religion and ethnicity. However, an analysis of sexual difference as a cross- 
culturally singular monolithic notion of patriarchy or male dominance leads to the 
construction of a similarly reductive and homogenous notion of the ‘Third World’ 
difference (Mohanty 1988:65) . This image of the oppressed subordinate Third World 
woman is considered as being especially representative of the Muslim woman.
Gender activists are striving to destroy the myth perpetuated by earlier Western feminist 
writings on Islam. This Orientalist myth saw a universal, ahistorical monolithic Islam that 
was uncompromisingly oppressive to women. It viewed Islam as an ideology separate 
from and outside social relations and practices, rather than as a discourse which included 
rules for economic, social and power relations. Islamist women are especially critical of 
Western feminist writings on the subordination of Muslim women. They take a similar 
position to Third World feminists and women of colour. Mohanty makes a direct attack 
on Western feminist scholarship and argues that Western feminist writings on women in 
the Third World must be considered in the context of the global hegemony of Western 
scholarship - the production, publication, distribution and consumption of information and 
ideas (Mohanty 1988:64). Marginal or not, this writing has political effects and 
implications beyond the immediate feminist or disciplinary audience. A homogenous 
notion of the oppression of women as a group is assumed in many Western feminist 
writings that seek to produce the image of an ‘average Muslim women’. This average 
Muslim woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender and is 
therefore sexually constrained, ignorant, poor, tradition-bound, religious and 
domesticated. This is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as
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being educated, modem and having control over their bodies and sexualities and the 
‘freedom’ to make their own decisions (Mohanty 1988:65). Mohanty argues that beyond 
sisterhood there is still racism, colonialism and imperialism. Despite the insistence of 
Muslim women on the empowerment and liberation they achieve through religion, 
intellectual elitism often leads to the dismissal of these claims as ‘false consciousness’. In 
the hegemonic Western feminist discourse there continues to be the assumption that the 
sexual control of women is a universal fact in those countries in which women are veiled. 
Institutions of veiling and sexual segregation (such as purdah) are thus denied any cultural 
and historical specificity, and contradictions and potentially subversive aspects are totally 
mled out. As Islamist women point out, it is wrong to assume that the mere practice of 
veiling women indicates the universal oppression of women.
The cmx of the problem, which now presents a fundamental challenge to feminism itself, 
lies in the initial assumption of women as a homogenous group or category. However, the 
explication of the ‘Third World difference’ includes a paternalistic attitude towards women 
in the Third World. Feminist anthropology today attempts to address the problem of 
generalising about Muslim women by looking at historical and cultural specificities. It is 
acknowledged that the self-representation of women is a necessary and vital corrective to 
the homogenising tendency of Western feminist discourse. Muslim women bitterly resent 
the way they are often silenced by the very Western movements that claim to stand up for 
their rights. Awareness of bias on the whole and of ethnocentrism and Orientalism in 
particular is of crucial importance to the Muslim women’s quest for autonomy. 
Furthermore it is imperative to overcome the rigid subject/object dichotomy if we are to 
surmount anthropology’s patronising practices.
5.6 De-Essentialising Feminism and Fundamentalism
Much of the modem political and social science discourse accepts unquestioningly the 
concept of a monolithic ‘fundamentalism’ that is categorically opposed to feminism. A 
good example here is the U.K.-based organisation Women Against Fundamentalism 
(WAF). This organisation has as its basis the assumption that religious fundamentalism 
poses a huge threat to feminist activities and women’s rights. WAF argues that religious 
fundamentalism has encouraged abuses of human rights and specific attacks on women and
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women’s rights (WAF 1994). WAF considers that “the overall effect of fundamentalist 
movements has been very detrimental to women, limiting and defining their roles and 
activities and actively oppressing them when they step out of line. This link between
fundamentalism and women’s oppression has been recognised in many countries ”
(Sahgal 1992:9). WAF do not in any way acknowledge the ambiguities and contradictions 
in the religious revival towards gender. Whilst it is partly true that much of the neo­
revivalist discourse promotes gender inegalitarianism, it should be noted that there are 
contradictions in the Islamists’ discourse and practice relating to gender. Furthermore, 
due to their active involvement in these religious movements Islamist women have become 
empowered and gender conscious in unexpected ways.
Overwhelming evidence points to the growing assertiveness of many women that is based 
on the egalitarianism of the Qur’anic message. Islamist women affirm that although 
different in biology, role and function women are equal before God and equally responsible 
for maintaining the moral order. Their equality, they argue, is not granted as a gift from 
men due to benevolence but is assumed to be a God-given right affirmed repeatedly in the 
Qur’an. In most Muslim societies where there are extreme differences of wealth but where 
education and technological training have provided avenues of social mobility, the 
egalitarianism promoted by the Islamist organisations affirms the brotherhood and 
sisterhood of all believers. It cuts across class distinctions, making such common elements 
as ideological commitment and the profession of faith all important. Islamism has thus 
paradoxically contributed to the democratisation of society. An outcome of the increased 
participation of women in Islamic movements has been their politicisation. They display a 
more demanding attitude in their efforts to address gender discrimination. They tend to 
assert their rights in language very similar to that used by secular and non-Islamist 
women’s rights activists. There is now a tendency for Islamist women to be not only more 
open to change but also to try to engage in dialogue with persons outside their 
movements. As such they may be leading a renaissance and a fundamental rethinking of 
the values of Islam and its role. Islamists are also trying to create a new trend in the 
gender division of labour whereby women are active in the work force, albeit under 
conditions that they see as fulfilling the Islamic requirements.
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Many Muslim women ask whether feminists in the West have achieved liberation and live 
free from the hardships caused by patriarchal customs and institutions (Watson 1994:155). 
They question whether the modernised husbands of working women take on household 
chores. The women’s questions and commentary point to the need for studies that 
recognise critical or divergent views of Western norms and values. The integration of 
other voices is necessary to avoid a polarised Western feminist representation of Muslim 
women under the impact of religious ‘fundamentalism’. The integration of other voices is 
necessary to prevent the Muslim woman taking the place of the irrational and inferior 
Oriental unable to represent herself.
Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ is not a monolithic entity that is always opposed to women’s 
rights. Islamism is not imposed on women from above. Indeed, many women choose 
consciously to adopt it. My study has made it clear that there are as many interpretations 
o f Islam as there are ‘feminisms’ and in some manifestations the two overlap. There are 
many new forms of women’s activism that can be denoted ‘feminist’ within the religious 
framework. Even within the Islamist movements women’s gender activism seeks to 
subvert the hegemony of the dominant Islamist discourse on gender relations.
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In this thesis I have looked at the change and evolution of feminism(s) among Muslim 
women in the past few decades. The rise and expansion of feminist groups throughout the 
Middle-East this Century has been an important indicator and facilitator of social and 
economic change. The language of liberalism, social equality and human dignity has today 
become globalised and widely accepted. The discourse of feminism was initially primarily 
based on secular liberal principles, although an alternative more religiously based discourse 
was also present. In its origins, feminism in the Middle-East was influenced by the 
colonialist-Orientalist discourse which saw all religions as regressive and Islam as 
inherently oppressive to women. Religion and tradition were seen as blocking the path to 
modernity, development and ‘sexual equality’. This discourse presumed a monolithic, 
rigid Islam that justified and perpetuated sexual discrimination. The sex/gender system and 
all that it entails have thus undergone profound change in Middle-Eastern countries. 
Today, world capitalism has drawn women into the work-force and there is a growing 
necessity in most areas for more women to earn a cash income. Economic development, 
universal schooling, mass communications and legal reforms in the Middle-Eastern 
countries have produced a stratum of women whose very existence subverts the patriarchal 
order. In conjunction with mass female education and the entry of women into the formal 
work-force the expanded activities of women’s organisation have proved to be a strong 
challenge to patriarchy.
Conservative religious forces throughout the world have been resisting the enormous 
challenges to the patriarchal world order. Religious authorities have attempted to conceal 
the more ambiguous currents of their own traditions, since this consolidates their authority 
and discourages others from disrupting the status quo. Within world religions such as
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Islam there is a general effort to muster tradition in order to withstand the inroads of 
modernity. Western cultural influences threaten to overwhelm local culture and obliterate 
Islamic institutions. Muslim societies are thus struggling in their confrontations with 
enormous cultural dilemmas as they are rethinking, re-negotiating and, in some instances, 
re-inventing traditional society, often with unique modem tones. Although the marshalling 
of tradition, evidenced by the growth of identity politics and ‘fundamentalism’ world-wide, 
has been linked to socio-economic and political factors, however, it is important to see 
this resurgence as a social and cultural reality, albeit interacting with these infra-structural 
changes.
Organised anti-feminism has emerged in many parts of the world to resist the changes 
occurring in the ‘patriarchal’ systems. This backlash movement has emerged partly due to 
the perceived threat of feminism to material and status interests. These anti-feminist 
movements have been described as pro-institutional in character; i.e. supportive of the 
establishment and the status quo. Dworkin, in his study of anti-feminism in the Western 
sphere, writes that there are several vested interest groups whose position in the political 
economy is threatened by the growing success of feminist activism (Dworkin 1987). Overt 
organisational support for anti-feminism in both the Western and Middle-Eastern situations 
is obtained from the clergy of major orthodox religious organisations. Changes in gender 
definition systems threaten basic tenets and the authority of male-dominated orthodox, 
conservative and neo-revivalist religion. However, it is not men alone who are threatened 
by these changes. Despite the substantial altering and expanding of the roles of women 
due to urbanisation and industrialisation, there are many who continue to be encapsulated 
in traditional familial roles and who find these roles to be fulfilling. For such women the 
changes proposed by feminist movements may undermine their economic and social status. 
Much of the feminist discourse appears to ordinary Muslims to be quite foreign. It uses 
concepts such as ‘equality’ and freedom that are indeterminate and could be easily be 
appropriated. For conservatives and Islamists the family has become the last bastion 
against Western cultural encroachment. Therefore the recent global upsurge in identity 
politics has focused especially on women and the family. By stressing strictly defined 
gender roles the Islamist movements have in many ways attempted to push women back 
into their homes and deny them the privileges and rights that they had achieved in the 
course of modernist reform.
143
6. Conclusion
Contemporary feminist activism is a counter-response to the increasing popularity of 
Islamist movements and state attempts to change family law. Middle-class women have 
assumed a pivotal role as Islamists and non-Islamists in the social and political changes. 
These women themselves are now in the centre of change and discourse about change in 
the Middle-East. Prominent women such as Nawal el-Saadawi, political spokeswoman 
Azam Taleqani, Fatima Memissi and her region-wide network of anti-fundamentalist 
activists and intellectuals and the growing silent minority of women at work in the 
government, universities and factories are spurring development and change. Therefore 
the Islamist backlash is primarily directed at middle-class women with education and jobs. 
The complaints about Westernisation, taking inappropriate forms of employment and 
ignoring the family and home is primarily directed against them. As I have indicated earlier 
this is largely because most of the educational and employment gains made by women 
under the newly independent modem states were unequally distributed: middle and upper- 
class women emerged as the largest beneficiaries, and only a very small segment of 
working class women joined them. The modernising policies of the state have often led to 
a deterioration of women's position, particularly in the countryside.
Even though modernist-nationalist discourse was instrumental in bringing about massive 
changes in patriarchal gender systems, change was not uniform in all areas of life. The 
primary goals of the nationalist reformers were to develop a synthesis that would 
successfully preserve the structure of the Islamic family (and its gender roles and relations) 
and the social acceptance of women’s education and work that are Western indices of 
modernisation. Despite the huge changes, modem patriarchal systems emerged which 
allowed women increased public participation in education and employment but kept the 
asymmetrical definitions of gender roles and relations within the family. Similarly in the 
West modernisation did not begin by extending the principles of liberty and equality to 
women. Even when the struggles of women expanded the public principles of liberty and 
equality to women, the family remained as a social arena where patriarchy (and gender 
inequality) was firmly entrenched. Thus in the Middle-East the modemist-liberalist 
discourse that stressed the public liberty of women co-existed with personal forms of 
subordination in the family, the work place and the political systems. Modernist personal 
status laws themselves did not challenge the hierarchical nature of the marital relationship.
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I have explored how campaigns for reform in patriarchal personal status laws in Egypt and 
Iran are occurring in the context of gender activism. Gender activists challenge the 
supremacy of the Shari ’ah in the Islamic religious heritage. They question its supposed 
‘divinity’ and immutability.
All the differing ideologies in the Middle-East whether nationalist, socialist or Islamist 
have recognised and challenged the oppression of women in underdeveloped Muslim 
societies. All these ideological forces have seen the liberation of women within the context 
of liberation of the whole society whether it be from the outmoded cultural norms or 
decadent social customs. Haddad has described the important characteristics that 
distinguish the Arab feminist movement from its counterpart in the West (Haddad 
1985:296). These characteristics are generally true for Muslim societies such as Egypt and 
Iran. In the Arab context feminism is not based on the concept of the liberation of the 
individual. Its most prominent advocates have been men who have taken up the cause of 
women. Haddad points out that the feminist movement in all its various manifestations has 
never advocated sexual liberation (ibid). Moreover, from its inception it has had to 
consistently disavow such a goal in order to survive. Old boundaries between Islamist and 
feminist women have to an extent blurred today and a new trend is observable in Muslim 
countries. Muslim women today exhibit a variety of ‘feminisms’ which they seek to 
articulate in more indigenous terms. Within this broad spectrum of gender activism many 
of the core values of Western feminism are espoused. Since the contemporary climate is 
not receptive to overt confrontational feminism of two decades ago, gender activists 
eschew labels and public identification with feminism.
The sacred history and religious texts continue to have strong influence on the position of 
contemporary Muslim women. I believe that the majority of Muslim women wish to seek 
their autonomy and subjectivity within the religious tradition. An important distinction 
that the gender activist discourse has made is that between Islam and patriarchy. They 
acknowledge that many patriarchal ideas and institutions have been built into orthodox 
establishment Islam and the Shari ’ah. However, they point out that an alternative reading 
of Islam or Islams is possible. Islam is not monolithic, static and immutable as those who 
advocate a dogmatic literalist assertion of one correct interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah would have it. Muslim gender activists argue oppression of women is real but is
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extrinsic to Islam: had the true intent of the Qur’an been followed. Gender equality, they 
say, was undermined by Arabian patriarchal practices and by imports from surrounding 
inegalitarian civilisations. Thus contemporary gender activists position themselves against 
the previous trend of secular feminism that blamed Islam for being irrevocably gender- 
inegalitarian. The critique of the gender activist position points out, however, that there is 
substantial scriptural basis for discriminatory practices. They argue that reform in gender 
relations if undertaken within the Islamic framework would be forever confined and 
restricted. This is because many of the revealed Verses in the Qur’an deals with issues 
relevant to women such as polygamy, divorce and the relationship of the wife and 
husband. The interpretations of these Verses can only generate conflict since they trespass 
on the domain of revelation. There are many Verses in the Qur’an that have constantly 
proved difficult if not impossible to be translated in more gender egalitarian terms.
6.1 The Critique
Whether the Qur’an and later Islamic law improved the position of women and, if so to 
what degree, remains a matter of controversy. The predominant scholarly view that is 
reiterated by gender activists is that the Qur’an marked an improvement on previous 
practices in certain ways, though not as dramatic an improvement as is held by most 
believing Muslims. They argue that the Qur’an prescribed some improvements for women 
(but on balance not for those from matrilineal tribes) and some limitations. Improvements 
were not revolutionary, nor do we know enough about the practices of all tribes to be able 
to evaluate them precisely. Gender activists have adopted a permissive attitude towards 
early Islamic history and searched for positive aspects to support their arguments; e.g. they 
emphasise the role of Khadija and A’isha and the female warriors.
Modernist reformers and gender activists claim that some of the objectionable rules in the 
Shari'ah may now be reformed by reviving the techniques of ijtihad. However, these 
scholars find it difficult to claim that such reform could possibly remove all discriminations 
against women and non-Muslims because ijtihad itself has its limitations. Thus if one was 
to rigidly apply the orthodox methods of Islamic jurisprudence it would be impossible to 
remove all discriminations: in the orthodox interpretation ijtihad is not permitted in any 
matter governed by an explicit and definite text of the Qur’an or Sunnah. Many of the
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discriminatory rules are based on these texts and are thus not open to reform through 
ijtihad nor through any other technique known to historical Shari 'ah.
It is my view that it is virtually impossible to argue against certain Islamic practices (such 
as polygamy and male prerogatives in repudiation) using the usual methods of 
historical/biographical criticism or textual criticism. Whilst gender activists have tried to 
restrict these practices by pointing out and emphasising the numerous qualifications, 
provisos and conditions that they argue were intended to prevent the abuse of these 
practices, they find it difficult to justify their outright abolition. The only serious 
alternative option that appears viable for the future of the gender activist discourse seems 
to me to be to emphasise the egalitarian precepts of the Q ur’an and to consider them to 
be the binding and eternal ones. The discriminatory edicts have to be dismissed as being 
relevant only to the 7th Century and only to the then Arab society. This position has 
been exemplified by Mahmoud Taha87. He argues that the only way out of the dilemma 
of modem Muslims is to evolve Islamic law to a fresh plane, rather than simply waste time 
in piecemeal reform that will never achieve the moral and political objective of removing 
all discrimination against women in the Shari 'ah. However, such a view is unlikely to 
become immediately widely accepted since, according to the ‘orthodox’ view, specific 
injunctions of the Qur’an cannot be ignored or tampered with by professing Muslims.
Muslim gender activists are therefore open to the risk of being marginalised by both the 
religious orthodoxy and the secular feminists. Gender activists by aiming to reclaim and 
reinterpret religion are open to being labelled heretical and denied legitimacy within the 
orthodox canons. Similarly, American feminists working within the framework of religion 
were labelled as being ‘ungodly’ in the first wave of American fundamentalism (De Berg 
1990). By keeping as close as possible to orthodox methods and tools of interpretation of 
the sacred texts, gender activists are trying to counter any claims of heresy. However, I 
believe that Muslim gender activists are in essence arguing that gender equality cannot be 
achieved until Islam as we know it today is radically altered. Furthermore, many 
authorities are highly critical of their endeavours. For example, in the case of Christianity 
critics argue that Christian feminism in untenable as there are no solid scriptural grounds
87 Many male progressive interpreters o f the Qur'an have paid with their lives. Mohammed Mahmoud Taha was executed, 
Ashgar Ali Engineer escaped bombs in India and the Tunisian Tahar Haddad was persecuted.
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for it. Although one can read feminist content into scripture (e.g. by attributing feminist 
motive to Jesus’ treatment of women), critics such as theologian Hampson feel that such 
efforts are wholly made by women who have already decided to maintain their Christian 
allegiance and who are thus faced with having to derive the feminist present from a 
patriarchal past (Madsen 1994). This she describes as a bending of the truth to shore up 
received doctrines. Obviously the same criticism can be levelled at Muslim gender 
activism too. However, in my view this accusation can be countered by the proposition 
that religious tradition is diverse and ambiguous enough to permit radically different 
interpretations, as is evidenced by early Islamic history and some contemporary 
movements. Many reformers are of the view that Islam, like all the great religions, is a 
reserve of symbols, values and ideas for which it is possible to derive a contemporary 
political and social code. The issue of women’s role in society according to Islam will 
continue to remain a very complex issue. Whilst the Muslim gender activist discourse has 
many problems, it is nevertheless important as an alternative interpretation that is 
empowering to women.
The desire for reinterpretation by gender activists and reformers is clearly motivated by an 
urgent need to accommodate the ideals and requirements of the modem age. However, it 
is not just gender activists who are selective in looking at the religious scriptures. All the 
parties involved in the debate over women’s status have manipulated women’s history.. 
Both Islamist and non-Islamist women find historical examples and scriptural 
interpretations to support their cases. Those who argue for a conservative position and 
continued or re-imposed restrictions on women’s activities have had an easier time 
formulating their positions because there are abundant later Hadith to draw upon.
6.2 The Future?
During Islamic history women’s active participation in formal religion and leadership roles 
has been relatively small. Female leaders of women’s religious ceremonies, women saints, 
shrines, pilgrimages and ceremonies - all of which express women’s initiative - were 
prominent in Shi’a Islam; and were also to a lesser degree present amongst Sunnis. The 
contemporary feminisation and democratisation of religion involve the active participation 
of women in formal religion on a much larger scale. A new generation of Muslim women
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can be observed that are not only educated in the liberal arts and sciences but who have 
also acquired a deeper knowledge of Islamic literacy through study of the Qur’an and the 
Hadith. Despite the emphasis on traditional gender roles in some of its manifestations, 
Islamism has been of extreme importance in increasing feminist consciousness. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the many traditional Islamic sanctions against women 
leaders, today we observe the existence of several Muslim women heads-of-states. Whilst 
their achievements are due in part to their kinship relations to prominent male politicians, 
nevertheless the very fact of a woman achieving such positions is remarkable given the 
present religious climate and the emphasis on women’s domesticity.
Within the Islamist movements there is a growing crisis in the movements’ relations with 
its female adherents and sympathisers. There is a greater effort to address the needs and 
aspirations of 20th Century women. The similarity in core ‘feminist’ values and on issues 
of education and employment between Islamist, non-Islamist and secular women is quite 
striking. However, at present despite the common concerns and emerging tentative 
dialogue the divisions between non-Islamist and Islamist women remain sharp (Mumtaz 
1994). The antagonism between the two persists and suspicions run deep. Whilst non- 
Islamist and Islamist women share much common ground on matters of education, 
employment, family planning and political participation the hijab and SharVah law 
constitute the dividing line.
Many continue to re-iterate the Orientalist view that the Islamic hijab symbolise 
^oppression and backwardness. The ‘system’ that subordinates women continues to be 
assumed to be a monolithic and static Islam. Abu Odeh has argued that the veil is seen as 
being dis-empowerering to women, often due to the normative assumptions of feminist 
women (Abu Odeh 1993:31). Such assumptions by Arab feminists are based on the 
premise that women should be able to express themselves sexually. Middle-Eastern 
feminism however, has never argued for sexual liberation in Western terms. Therefore, 
seen from a Western feminist perspective there is indeed a very awkward fit between 
feminism and Islam. The feminisms and arguments of Islamist gender activist women are a 
vital corrective to the homogenising tendencies of Western theoretical perspectives on 
Islam. Women’s own voices describe the liberating potential of the veil. Watson argues 
that what these women who have adopted the veil in very different environments have in
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common is that they form an active politicised response to forces of change, modernity and 
cross-cultural communication (Watson 1994:156). Given the complexity and rich 
symbolism in the institution of veiling it is a fallacy to consider the veiling in the 
contemporary Islamist movements as a regressive return to ‘the veil’. It is obvious that in 
many ways the contemporary re-veiling has taken on a new meaning and significance as 
well as practical implications.
Feminist scholarship has to address the bias and reductionism of a monolithic Islam or a 
‘fundamentalist Islam’ that is oppressive to women. The destruction of the myth of the 
subjugated Muslim woman and the acceptance of ‘difference’ means itself the 
fragmentation of a hegemonizing Western feminism. It is essential to recognise the 
diversity of Muslim women’s experience and perception both within specialist and popular 
discourse. Researchers should consider the extent to which their work repeats and 
reinforces negative media representations of Muslim women. We need to consider the 
compatibility of Islamic ideals and female emancipation in greater depth whilst being wary 
of ethnocentric and Orientalist bias. The gender activist discourse shows much promise in 
becoming a global discourse and assisting Muslim women to achieve a degree of autonomy 
and independence in the future. It is time we realised that Muslim women are capable of 
representing themselves and of articulating their needs and desires.
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